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The period since the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis has witnessed many reforms in the 
economic structure and financial landscape in Asian economies that have increasingly influenced 
the global economy and financial discourse. The extents of these reforms not only involve 
macroeconomic policies but most importantly affect the behavior of economic agents and have 
challenged traditional economic assumptions and fundamentals. 
 The first chapter analyzes the issue of a savings glut that arose due to the claim that 
corporations hoard cash after the 1997 Asian Crisis. The savings behavior that the corporations 
exhibited went against the conventional economic theory that firms are supposed to invest in 
productive sectors to generate employment and increase labor force participation. This 
unfortunately wasn’t the case because firms turned to alternative investments in financial 
markets that caused negative repercussions on social welfare especially by adversely affecting 
the incidence of poverty.  
Based on these findings, we proceed with the second chapter using historical data and a 
financial computable general equilibrium (FCGE) model to examine the economy-wide impact 
of fiscal and monetary policies, and  in particular, the impact on poverty and the income of the 
bottom 20% of the population in Thailand. The argument that expansionary policies will improve 
the income distribution is reconsidered and the model reveals that this is not necessarily the case. 
Finally, the third chapter draws an example from a group of lower income households in the 
rural area of Lombok that have successfully and independently improved their financial 
conditions and welfare and were not adversely affected by the investment behavior of 
corporations or the economic policies of the government and central bank. Their sustainable 
growth for more than two decades provides hope and it shed lights on the possibility for the poor 
to survive and improve their well-being without depending on subsidies or external funding.  
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CHAPTER 1 
WHAT DRIVES CORPORATE SAVING GLUT POST-97 ASIAN FINANCIAL 
CRISIS? THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF INDONESIA, PHILIPPINES AND 
THAILAND 
1. Introduction and Overview of Excess Saving 
1.1. Motivation 1: Corporate Saving 
One of the main focuses in this paper is on corporate saving, that is to validate the 
widely claim across the news about the rise of corporate saving that have attracted 
considerable attention in the past years. “Corporations awash with cash eschew 
corporate bonds” (Financial Times, June 29th, 2010), “Hoarding Not Hiring – 
Corporations Stockpile Mountain of Cash” (ABC News, April 1st, 2010), “Companies 
pile up cash but remain hesitant to add jobs” (Washington Post, July 15th, 2010), 
“Savings by Companies – The Corporate Savings Glut” (The Economist, 7th July, 
2005). We find that these saving scenarios odd because theoretically companies are 
net borrowers, investing for future output and incomes while households are the net 
savers that provide them with capital through banks. The switch in companies 
dissaving to net saving is global spanning from North America, Europe and Asia. In 
Emerging East Asia, the surge of corporate saving for unusually many years after the 
1997 AFC warrant a thorough research on the possible determinants that have led to 
such behaviors. The following three figures showed the trend of savings by sectors in 
Asean-3 and it is apparent that the highest saver in the economy is the corporate 
sectors as compared to household sectors, government sectors and financial sectors. In 
2 
 
Figure 1.1 for Thailand, we can conclude that non-financial corporations have the 
highest saving and the highest investment in the real sector relative to other economic 
players such as households and government. In Figure 1.2 for Philippines, the non-
financial corporations become the leading sector for gross saving and gross capital 
formation starting in 2003 in which prior to that, the households’ savings were the 
highest. In Figure 1.3 for Indonesia, both the non-financial corporations and the 
households sectors are the leading savers and investors in the economy relative to the 
government sector.  
 
 
Source: Flow-of-Funds Accounts of Thailand 
Figure 1.1: Saving vs Investment by Economic Sectors: Thailand (millions of bath) 
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Source: Flow-of-Funds Accounts of Philippines 
Figure 1.2: Saving vs Investment by Economic Sectors: Philippines  (millions of pesos) 
 
 
Source: Flow-of-Funds Accounts of Indonesia 
Figure 1.3: Saving vs Investment by Economic Sectors: Indonesia  (in percent of GDP) 
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Furthermore, in Figure 1.4, we can see that there is an upward trend in the corporation 
gross saving of Asean-3 whereby in 2009 it reaches about 35% of GDP in Thailand 
and 20% of GDP in both Indonesia and Philippines. Economists expect that this 
upward trend would continue for years to come unless the factors that drive this 
behavior are tackled. 
 
Source: Flow-of-Funds Accounts  
Figure 1.4: Corporation Gross Saving in Asean – 3  (in percent of GDP) 
 
 
Since the companies in aggregate are becoming net savers on a huge scale across the 
globe, the repercussion of such hoarding behavior is not only to the individual 
country’s domestic economy but significantly affecting at global level as well. It is 
arguably among mainstream economists and medias that the excess saving is the cause 
of prolonged low bond yields around the world, tight credit spread, the strengthening 
of dollars, the equities do not rally, the rise in unemployment and the widening of 
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income distribution between the rich and the poor in a country. We explain briefly 
here how the corporation excess saving
1
 mechanism has brought about the rise in 
unemployment rate and low bond yields although a thorough research is needed to 
validate these claims which are not the main focus of our paper.  
-Rise in unemployment
2
: A rise in the saving would shift the IS curve to the left and 
downward, lowering the interest rate and reducing the output. As described in the 
textbook, a decline in output produced would lead corporations to cut back on its 
factor of productions including labor and this will lead to a rise in unemployment 
(unless the shift of the IS curve is accompanied with the shift in the LM curve 
downward and to the right, possibly due to monetary easing by the government, which 
would still lower the interest rate but raise the output).  In Figure 1.5 below, we see 
that Thailand’s unemployment rate was highest in 1998 to 2002, coinciding with the 
period of corporation’s positive excess saving there (Figure 1.17). Similarly in 
Indonesia, the rise in the unemployment rate from 1998 to 2005 corresponded 
positively to the period of corporations’ positive excess saving (Figure 1.25). 
However, this was not the case in Philippines whereby the fall in the unemployment 
rate from 2004 and beyond corresponded to the corporations’ positive excess saving 
(Figure 1.21). Table 1.1 shows the correlations between excess saving and the 
unemployment rate. The degree of correlation is very strong in Thailand (0.7573), but 
shows very weak linear relationship in Indonesia (0.0125) and Philippines (0.0127). 
                                                          
1
 We defined excess saving as gross saving minus gross investment. A positive excess saving indicates 
gross saving greater than gross investment and vice versa for negative excess saving.  
2
 Unemployment data is taken from World Bank Database and is defined as the number of 
unemployed as % of labor force. 
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The correlations across all these countries are positive (0.3667) implying that there 
might exists spillover effect between them.  
 
Source: EIU Database 
Figure 1.5: Emerging Asean – 3: Unemployment Rate (in percent) 
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Table 1.1: Correlations between Corporation Saving and Unemployment 
 
Correlations between Corporation Saving and Unemployment 
  
Corporation 
Gross Saving 
Across Countries 
Thailand 
Corporation 
Gross Saving  
Indonesia 
Corporation 
Gross 
Saving 
Philippines 
Corporation 
Gross 
Saving 
Unemployment 
Across 
Countries 
0.3667       
Unemployment 
(Thailand) 
  0.7573     
Unemployment 
(Indonesia) 
    0.0125   
Unemployment 
(Philippines) 
      0.0127 
 
-Low Bond Yields: When the corporations have excess saving, their extra cash need to 
be put somewhere: they could continue to hold them as cash and currency or invest in 
the bonds market or in the equity market. Lately, the investors are flooding the bond 
markets especially the Emerging East Asia market that is perceived as safe haven 
given the benign financial market conditions in the Euro Zone and in the US. The high 
demand for bonds in East Asia region dampens its yield and increases its prices. Some 
might argue that this is due to excess liquidity and not excess saving. While these two 
concepts, “excess liquidity” and “excess saving” are not mutually exclusive, the 
mechanism that channels the shocks from excess liquidity or excess saving to the bond 
yield is not clear and empirical work on these is limited due to the difficulty in 
identifying the underlying structural shocks (Bracke and Fidora, 2008). Figure 1.6 
below shows the upward rising in the size of local currency bond market for 
corporations in Asean-3, with Thailand reaching about USD45 billion in Dec. 2010. 
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Figure 1.7 shows the volatility of bond yield in Asia with highest spike for Thailand in 
November, 2009 and in October, 2008 for Indonesia. Overall, the data shows less 
volatile yield for bond market in Asia.  
 
Source: EIU Database 
Figure 1.6: Size of LCY Bond Market for Corporations in Asean – 3  (in USD billions) 
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Source: Asian Development Bank
3
 
Figure 1.7: The Volatility of Bond Yield in Asia 
 
                                                          
3
 Yield volatility is the standard deviation of the change in daily yields of LCY benchmark 10-year 
government bond over the last 21 trading days. The yield volatility near zero implies that the daily 
yield are clustered around the average yield while the high volatility implies less predictability of in the 
daily change over the covered period. 
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1.2. Objective 
Hence, the purpose of this paper is fivefold. First, we will review briefly the causes 
and the consequences of global imbalances from the existing literatures. Second, we 
will extend the issue surrounding global imbalances discussed above to the saving-
investment behaviors of economic agents
4
 in Emerging East Asia countries notably 
Thailand, Indonesia and Philippines (ASEAN-3). In other words, we will examine the 
agents’ preferences to save and to invest prior and post 1997 AFC and prior to 2008 
GFC. Then we will focus solely on corporation gross saving and gross capital 
formation graphical evidence to support the corporation savings glut. Third, we will 
relate this finding to a greater research of Felstein-Horioka regression in order to 
determine the component of savings that affect the corporation investment decision. In 
other words, we are looking at the effect of corporation saving, household saving and 
government saving that could potentially influence the decision to invest or to save by 
corporate sector. Forth, using empirical approach, we will look at the driving forces 
behind the rise in the corporate sectors saving that are claimed to drive this global 
saving glut (Loeys and Mackie, 2005). Our regression variables would consist of not 
only the standard macroeconomic variables that are commonly used in the existing 
literatures on private saving but include both the business and the firms’ specific 
variables as well. Finally, we will analyze the claim on the rise in the financial market 
instruments post 1997 AFC by corporate sector. The purpose of these is to see whether 
the decline in the corporation investment in the real sector is supplemented by an 
increase in the corporation investment in the financial market. 
                                                          
4
 Economic agents here refer to household sector, government and non-financial corporations.  
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2. Global Imbalances 
2.1. What is Global Imbalances? 
According to Adams and Park (2009), the recent phenomena of global imbalances or 
global current account imbalance referred to the large current account surpluses or 
deficits that started to emerge since the last 10 years in the world economy. They 
added that most of these imbalances were heavily concentrated on certain regions and 
countries. Callabero (2009) also referred ‘global imbalances’ to massive, large and 
persistence current account deficits of the US that were financed by emerging 
countries (peripheries). Azis (2009) clearly mentioned that the US current account 
deficit stood at 7% of GDP which was far above the dangerous threshold of 4-5% of a 
country’s GDP. This being translated into an annual rate of more than $800 billion and 
constitute about 70% of the global current account deficits. On the other hand, about 
half of global current account surpluses came from East Asia which means that US 
deficits have been financed by countries from these regions – emerging economy 
countries. As of the first half of 2010, China ran up a $119 billion of trade surplus, 
which will likely exceed last year’s total of $227 billion. Bernanke (2007) referred 
‘the large increase in the net financial capital or net desired saving (desired saving less 
desired investment) from outside industrial countries’ as global saving glut.  
Balance of Payment 
Current Account 
Trade Balance = Export (X) – Import (M)  
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Current Account Balance = Trade Balance + Net Factor Income 
GDP = Consumption(C) + Investment (I) + Government Spending (G) + (Export (X) –  
             Import (M)) 
GNI = Consumption(C) + Investment (I) + Government Spending (G) + (Export(X) –  
            Import (M)) + Net Factor Income 
 Y = C + I + G + Current Account Balance 
 (Y – C – G) – I = Current Account Balance 
 S – I  = Current Account Balance                                  (1) 
Hence if S – I < 0 => Current Account Deficit and if S – I > 0 => Current Account Surplus 
Since Current Account Balance is the difference of saving and investment, it makes 
conceptually more useful to analyze the global imbalances phenomena from saving and 
investment of countries or regions.  
 
2.2. What are the Causes of Global Imbalances? 
There are many different perspectives on the causes and the effects of global imbalances. 
These include the perspectives from India, Europe, US and developing Asia countries 
including China. Azis (2009) investigated the cause of global imbalances from two sides: the 
emerging economy countries and the industrialized countries. He stated that from emerging 
markets’ perspectives, the declined in investment was caused by the “super cautious attitude 
among the governments and investors” (Azis, 2009, pg. 9) following the 1997 Asian financial 
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crisis. This implies that S – I > 0 (under investment) since I is declining. On the other hand, in 
the industrial countries like the US, the Fed accommodative fiscal and monetary policies have 
led to over consumption and credit booms. The US over consumption at the expense of 
borrowing from abroad had caused especially the households to suffer from dual-gap 
problem: investment-saving gap (low saving due to low interest rate in the US as a result of 
accommodative policies => S-I <0 since S is declining and I is increasing) and trade gap (the 
US has been borrowing from abroad resulting in capital account surplus or widening current 
account deficit). Adams and Park (2009) provided three main arguments on the causes of 
global imbalances from the developed Asia perspectives
5
. In their arguments, they stated three 
main reasons for Asia current account surplus: too much saving that surge since 2003 
especially in PRC due to rapid economic growth, too little investments in the real estate sector 
since 1997 AFC and Bretton Woods II that is the role of highly competitive exchange rate to 
boost exports and rapid growth. From the US perspectives, Bernanke (2007) argued that the 
origin of the global saving glut from 1996-2004 was the result of transformation of emerging 
market economies notably East Asian economies and oil producing countries.  However, 
according to Bernanke (2007) the increase in saving or the decline in investment patterns 
varies by countries with China for instance experiencing higher saving rate than investment 
rate while other developing Asia countries showed more a decline in investment. In the US, 
there was a decline in domestic saving while investment remained unchanged during the 
period of 1996-2004. From the Indian perspectives, Reddy
6
 (2006) stated that emerging 
market economies (EME) especially Asia have come to rely heavily on external demand in 
                                                          
5
 Developed Asia countries included the newly industrialized economies of Hong Kong, China, Republic of Korea, Singapore, 
Taipei, China as well as other developing Asian economies as defined by the IMF. 
6
 Dr.Y.V.Reddy is the Governor of Reserve Bank of India. 
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the late 1990s that lead to these countries’ currencies being undervalued in order to maintain 
the external price competitiveness. This, along with sharp rise in US consumption demand 
that can be met through imports led to the US large current account deficits and Asia large 
current account surplus. He added that India has experienced current account surplus from 
2000-2004 due to business cycles and current account deficit from 2004-2006 when the 
business cycle unwind. Furthermore, for India, capital flows is more important in the 
accumulation of reserves as opposed to current account surplus and hence Indian policies do 
not attribute to the widening of global imbalances. Similarly, the Europe with their close-to-
zero current account balances when taken as aggregate does not contribute to current global 
imbalances as well (Lane and Ferretti, 2007). Although the oil-producing countries do 
attribute to global current account surplus as a result of a surge in oil price, more attention is 
on the emerging market economies especially Asia, particularly because of Lucas Paradox. 
Figure 1.8 below shows that oil producing countries have been experiencing relatively stable 
current account surplus while emerging Asia shows a gradual increase in current account 
surplus since the late 1990s that eventually surpassed the oil exporters’ countries current 
account balance.  
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Figure 1.8: The Sizable Current Account Balances of the US and Others 
 
2.3. What are the Consequences of Global Imbalances? 
There are many consequences of current global imbalances on most countries in the world 
although the particular country may not have attributed to the widening current account deficit 
or surplus. Azis (2009) had argued that global imbalances could create “several types of 
conflict ranging from trade disputes, conflicts between multi-nationals and domestic 
companies, and internal conflicts sparked by contradictory interpretations of law within a 
country (pg. 8)”. Furthermore, these unattended imbalances could create global recession and 
financial crisis just as the current 2007/2008 financial crisis. Although the global imbalances 
may seem to have negative impact on the current deficit countries, Azis (2010) stated that 
current account surplus countries also experienced the negative consequences such as a 
decline in the employment growth rates as a result of a decline in real sectors’ investment and 
worsen income disparity as a result of increase in financial sector investment. However, Azis 
(2010) did caution not to single out this saving-investment pattern as the only cause for the 
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negative consequences. Adams and Park (2009) on the other hand argued that since global 
imbalances underlie global financial crisis, Asia’s main strategy of export-oriented 
industrialization as a key factor for economic growth may not be sustainable in the future. 
Moreover, they mentioned on the welfare costs due to over saving, under investment, 
excessive foreign exchange reserves and current financial crisis. Although India as mentioned 
earlier is not one of the countries that attributed to global imbalances, there is the potential of 
spill-over effect from global developments on the domestic interest rate and fiscal policies. 
Reddy (2006) outlined the effects on India’s corporate sectors, banks and households whereby 
these institutions are more susceptible to shocks from variable interest rates and foreign 
currency exchange rate. Despite these potential adverse effect, the Federal Reserve of India 
have taken regulatory actions in ensuring that corporate sectors and banks are hedged against 
interest rate and currency risks and have put a cap/ceiling on these institutions’ exposure.   
 
3. Literature Review 
3.1. Theoretical Review 
Adams and Park (2009) showed that developing Asia including China, the Middle East and 
Russia experienced global current account surplus sharply after 1997-1998 while the US has 
experienced current account deficit starting from 1991. Although they have shown in general 
the pattern of current account surpluses for Thailand, Indonesia and Philippines since 1980s, 
they didn’t show the source for these surpluses. Instead, they argued the possible explanations 
for post crisis current account surpluses were too much saving, too little investment and 
Bretton Woods II with emphasis mainly on China. Serven and Nguyen (2010) have also 
shown that the US was in current account deficit from 1992 and exceed 1% of the world GDP 
17 
 
in 1999. The US counterparts during this period was Japan and emerging Asian countries 
excluding China but after 2000, while the US current account continues to be in large deficit 
relative to the world GDP
7
, its counterparts now are those of China and oil exporting 
countries
8
.  Furthermore, they have taken one step further in showing the components of 
saving and investment (% of GDP) for selected countries from 1990-2008. For China, EU, 
Japan, and Asia (including Japan), the saving is always higher than the investment but it was 
reversed for the US since 1990.  
Some economists have used flow-of-funds as one of the methodologies in analyzing the 
macroeconomic conditions of a country although it is not a very popular way. Bezermer 
(2009) had claimed that if economists had analyzed the investment pattern in US using FoFs 
prior to 2007, they might have seen the sign of bubble in the financial markets and the bust 
that had happened. He further added that FoFs could potentially be one way forward in 
anticipating the financed-induced recession. Dawson (2004) had used Thailand FoFs (1996-
1997) in analyzing the financial vulnerability of Thailand’s economy during the Asian crisis. 
Azis (2010) had used the FoFs for the saving-investment analysis that underlied the current 
global imbalances. He has shown that Asean-4
9
 saving less investment (% of GDP) became 
tremendously positive after the 1997 AFC, reached its peak in 1999 and surpassed China, 
Japan, and NIE before gradually decreasing (but still positive) until 2004. However, the 
investment in real sector (% of GDP) of Asean-4 dropped from 40% (1997) to 15% (1999) 
and remained at 20% to 25% until 2004.  
                                                          
7
 The US large current  account deficit reached its peak in 2005 and 2006 at more than 1.5% of the world GDP. 
8
 In 2007-2008, the deficit with China accounted for about 40% of the US overall current account deficit.  
9
 Asean-4 refers to Thailand, Indonesia, Philippines and Malaysia. 
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In this paper, we are contributing to the existing literature of using the FoFs in analyzing the 
saving-investment pattern of Asean-3 during the period of pre and post 1997 AFC which is an 
extension of Azis (2010) coverage. However, instead of looking at aggregate gross saving and 
aggregate gross capital formation, we will look only at corporate saving and the composition 
of its financial funds since 1990s
10
.  
 
3.2. Empirical Review  
As an extension to the FoF analysis on saving-investment behaviors of economic players in 
the economy, we will determine the macroeconomic and financial factors that drive the 
hoarding behavior of corporate sectors. As we have mentioned earlier, they have been much 
talk on the corporate sectors hoarding behavior around the world and economists are 
perplexed that even in a tight economy with financial landscape that supposedly induced 
lower savings, we are witnessing the opposite behavior among the corporations.  
In looking at factors that influence the private savings, several empirical studies that cover 
various data for different sample periods and countries have been done. In addition, most of 
these papers differ in terms of model specifications, estimation techniques and econometric 
procedure.  Due to this, the estimated signs and the reported significance levels of a number 
of factors that are relevant to private saving decision appear to vary. 
Boileau and Moyen (2009) have shown that precautionary motive and liquidity motive are the 
two mechanisms that increased idiosyncratic risk that lead to higher cash holdings although 
the liquidity motive through large increase in the volatility of cash flows (net income) best 
explains the rise in North American firms’ cash holding. 
                                                          
10
 With exception to Philippines since its flow-of-funds are only available since 2000.  
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Loaza et al. (1999) has shown the determinant factors that drive the private saving (household 
saving and corporate saving) for 150 countries from 1965 to 1994 as part of their research 
project for World Bank Database. They have used the evidence from their empirical finding 
using cross section Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimates and Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM) system estimator to provide support on the policy making variables and to 
interplay its connection with other variables that are affecting saving. Their finding using the 
preferred method of GMM system estimators have shown that real  per capita GPDI, real 
growth rate of per capita GPDI, real interest rate, terms of trade, urbanization ratio, age 
dependency ratio, public saving, private credit flow per GPDI and inflation rate have 
significant effect on the private saving across these countries. Furthermore, they have 
highlighted that one of the potential problems that could arise in the empirical study on saving 
rate is the joint endogeneity problem, the joint determinants between the explanatory variables 
and the dependent variable e.g. the real interest rate and the real income growth. Another 
problem is the presence of “unobserved country-specific effects” that are correlated with the 
regressors. Due to this, Louza et al (1990) based their empirical analysis on GMM estimators 
applied to dynamic model using panel data.  
 Earlier study by Edwards (1995) was on the determinants of private saving and public saving 
using panel data across 36 countries from 1970-1992. In his study, he has found that per 
capita growth, political economy, foreign savings reflected by the current account balance and 
financial development are among the statistically significant determinants of private and 
public savings. Among the empirical problems that he has raised are the lacked of data on the 
relevant independent variables, measurement error and endogeneity that leads to causality. 
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Hence, he has employed instrumental variables estimation methods using lagged values of 
endogenous variables as the instruments.  
Another recent empirical study was by Nair (2006) that looked instead at the household 
saving in India and its relation to the continuous time series financial sector liberalization 
index (FLI). Using general OLS model, he found that FLI has negative significant impact on 
the household saving whereas the absolute income is the major significant and positive 
determinant of the household savings. 
 In line to these main researches on driven factors of saving rate, we will look specifically at 
corporate saving
11
 in Asean-3 and the potential macroeconomics and financial variables that 
have caused such hoarding behavior, if it exists. The mentioned studies above provide an 
impetus of potential determinant variables of the corporate saving to use in our estimation 
model. We will investigate 38 variables that in our opinion could potentially affect such 
behavior and employ the appropriate regression technique to make our conclusion. The 
uniqueness of our research is the fact that we are looking at corporate saving data obtained 
from each country’s Flow-of-Funds Accounts and to the best of our knowledge; this is the 
first paper that will investigate the relation of corporate saving in Asean-3 incorporating not 
only the tangible macroeconomics variables but also the intangible financial variables such as 
business confidence, firms’ net worth and banks’ net worth. Additionally, we would relate our 
finding to Feldstein-Horioka (1977) saving-investment puzzle that is, under the perfect capital 
mobility across the world, the domestic saving should not be relevant to the decision of 
                                                          
11
 Not private saving which commonly would include household saving and corporate saving. 
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corporate sector to invest. In other words, there shouldn’t be any differences for corporate 
sectors in raising capital domestically or from abroad.  
 
4. Data and Methodology 
4.1. Data Description 
We will use Flow-of-Funds (FoFs) Accounts of Thailand (1995-2009), Indonesia (1996-2009) 
and Philippines (2000-2009) in investigating the existence of excess saving in these countries. 
The FoFs provide the data on sectoral saving and investments in both the production and 
financial markets in addition to tracing the sources and the used of these funds in an economy.  
Next, in examining the possible factors that drive the rise in corporate saving, we will first 
collect the data on relevant variables from various sources mainly CEIC, IFS, World Bank 
Database, Trading Economics and EIU. It should be noted that the data available are for small 
number of years leading to regression analysis that are possible but only in parsimonious 
forms. For example, the corporate saving in Philippines are observed only for the years of 
2000 - 2009 and the data for construction of financial liberalization index such as prudential 
regulations are available even for shorter period of time. In addition, note that these panel data 
sets are unbalanced with the number of observations varying considerably across Asean-3.  
Section 4.2 provides a detailed description of the variables chosen and their relations 
(expected signs) to corporate saving. These saving determinant variables are  identified not 
only from the existing literatures but are relevant to the context of current scenarios in which 
intangible elements such as banks  networth, business confidence, firms networth and other 
behavioral factors are included.  
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4.1.1. Flow-of-Funds (FoF) 
As we have mentioned earlier, our data source for institutional savings and investments were 
taken from the FoF accounts for each country. These FoF accounts are constructed in 
accordance to the definitions, coverage and concepts of the System of National Accounts 
(SNA) set forth by the United Nations. The information is classified based on the economic 
institutional sectors and their transactions respectively. In general, the economic institutional 
sectors typically would include government sector, financial sector, non-financial sector, 
household sector and rest of the world. We will describe in further detail the definition of 
these sectors for Asean-3 countries in the next following section. The transaction activities in 
the FoF are categorized into two types: non-financial transaction and financial transaction.  
-Non-Financial Transaction shows saving and investment activities of each economic sector 
during the period using the data obtained from National Income
12
. The major non-financial 
transactions are: 
1. Gross Saving - the saving of each economic sector during the period of one year.    
Gross Savingi = Incomei – Consumptioni (excluding depreciation expense) + Net 
Transferi/Subsidyi            where i= each economic sector 
It is important to note that in the System of Flow-of-Funds Account, the financial assets hold 
by each of this economic sector is not part of gross saving. Instead, the financial assets are 
                                                          
12
 The information is obtained publicly from System of the Flow-of-Funds Account of Thailand document. 
https://docs.google.com/a/cornell.edu/viewer?a=v&q=cache:qCM-
wxoPSi4J:www.nesdb.go.th/Portals/0/eco_datas/account/ff/ff2001-
2006/32.Definition.pdf+gross+saving+in+flow+of+funds+thailand&hl=en&gl=us&pid=bl&srcid=ADGEESh9wuxUM4S9sYK78
M65LtIq_-ES0AyXz83r3BLJbzhdaDzvCY9zHGLR2flK7PGtyukqs0CK_8vDbKnhxG8RM69tUh-iwDu-t94XxB-
PJpolHhGhSVWl6SFVi5CJP9CTkZj7Ow01&sig=AHIEtbQqVNeE3xrdntBmgS38HqeWJhYUcQ&pli=1 
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classified under the financial transaction type that shows the usage of the savings surplus or 
funding of the saving-investment deficit through the financial instruments. For instance, if a 
corporation has positive excess saving, it can use this extra additional saving to acquire 
financial instruments such as bonds, equities, loans, or even keep them in a form of cash, the 
most liquid instrument.  In addition, we have to distinguish between saving and liquidity. An 
economic sector could have high saving due to the liquidity requirements. Most dictionaries 
would define liquidity as the ability to convert an asset to cash quickly or having enough cash 
on hand to meet financial obligations without needing to sell off the fixed assets. The concept 
of excess saving and excess liquidity is not mutually exclusive. In fact, excess saving could be 
the source of excess liquidity and excess liquidity is often refers to narrow money (M1), broad 
money (M2) or credit given out in the economy.  
 As quoted in Ruffer and Stracca (2006), “While the concept of excess liquidity sounds 
intuitive, its measurement is fraught with difficulties. What exactly is liquidity, and how do we 
determine whether it is excessive or not? I usually define excess liquidity as the ratio of a 
monetary aggregate to nominal GDP,a.k.a. the ‘Marshallian K’, which is equivalent to the 
inverse of the ‘velocity of money’.”  
2. Gross Capital Formation – Expenses incurred in acquiring fixed assets such  
machineries, equipments and buildings in addition to changes in inventories. The values for 
the capital goods refer to the values of new assets purchased while the values of changes in 
inventories are the values of inventory at the end of the period less the value of inventory at 
the beginning of the period (net value) 
3. Purchase of Land – Recorded as net value of changes in land homeownership  
among the economic agents that could affect their financial transactions. 
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4. Transfers – the transfer of assets or wealth among economic agents that do not  
affect the production of goods and services.  
-Financial Transaction – shows the usage of financial instruments from the saving 
investment surplus or the source of financial instruments in funding the saving investment 
deficits for each economic sector. These data are typically obtained from the balance sheet 
and financial statements of all the institutions involved and its classification varies depending 
on its liquidity and popularity. The description of financial transactions involved in Asean – 3 
are described in the next section.  
 
4.1.2. Overview on Thailand FoFs Accounts 
In this FoFs framework, there are five economic sectors: 
1. Non-Financial Corporation Sectors  
- businesses owned and controlled by corporation and quasi corporation 
- businesses entity owned by government or enterprise (Corporate Business).  
2. Financial Corporation Sectors  
- Central Bank is the Bank of Thailand 
- Other Depository Corporations such as Commercial Banks, Finance Companies, 
Saving Co-operatives, Special Purpose Financial Institutions (Government Saving 
Bank, Government Housing Bank, Bank for Agricultural and Agricultural Co-
operatives, Export-Import Bank for Thailand, Small and Medium Enterprise 
Development Bank for Thailand and Islamic Bank of Thailand 
- Other Financial Corporations such as stock exchange of Thailand, pawnshops, 
Financial Institutions Development Fund, Life and Non Life Insurance Companies, 
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Provident Fund and Government Pension Fund, Securities Companies and Asset 
Management Companies, Credit Foncier Companies, Agricultural Co-operatives, 
Small Industry Credit Guarantee Corporation, Asset Management Corporation, 
Secondary Mortgage Corporation, Thai Asset Management Corporation.  
3. General Government Sector 
- Central Government 
- Local Government  
- Public State Enterprise 
4. Rest of the World (ROW) 
5. Households and Non-Profit Institutions Serving Household Sectors 
The financial instruments used in Thailand FoFs framework are: 
1. Monetary Gold and Special Drawing Right (SDR) 
–  Gold and international reserve assets form by International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
2. Currency and Deposit 
- Currency is the banknotes and coins circulating in the economy 
- Transferable deposit is the deposits that can be changed into check and payable order 
- Other deposits refer to all claims that are represented by evidence of deposits other 
than transferable deposits 
3. Securities Other than Shares 
- Short term and long term of private and public securities such as bills, bonds, 
certificate of deposits, commercial paper, debentures and similar instruments normally 
traded in the financial market.  
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4. Loans 
- Short term loans in which the maturity is less than one year 
- Long term loans in which the maturity is more than one year 
5. Shares and Other Equity 
- Common stocks and preferred stocks whose owner has the right to ownership of the 
company and its capital 
6. Insurance Technical Reserves 
- Reserves for insurance claims of insurance companies, provident funds and pension 
funds 
7. Other Account Receivables or Payable  
- Receivables and payables from purchasing and selling of goods and services  
- Any remaining transactions in the balance sheet that cannot be categorized in any of 
the 1-6 financial instruments above. 
 
4.1.3. Overview on Philippines FoFs Accounts
13
 
In these FoFs framework, we have six economic players: 
1. Non-Financial Corporation Sectors 
- Corporations and quasi corporations engaged in the production of goods and non-
financial services such as agricultural, manufacturing, construction, utilities, trade, 
transport and communications, hotels and restaurants, education, health, business, real 
estate and personal services.  
                                                          
13
 Source: Revised Technical Notes on the Philippines Flow of Funds - 
http://www.bsp.gov.ph/statistics/fof/FOFTechnotes.pdf 
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- Government owned and controlled corporations (GOCCs) engaged in the mentioned 
activities are also included. 
2. Financial Corporation Sectors 
- Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) 
- Corporations and quasi-corporations engaged in financial intermediation and in 
auxiliary financial services such as Commercial Banks, Thrift Banks, Rural Banks, 
Insurance and Pension Fund Companies. 
- Other Financial Corporations such as Financing Companies, Lending Investors and 
Stock Dealers and Brokers. 
- Government Financial Institutions (GFIs) 
3. General Government Sector 
- National Government (NG) 
- Local Government Units (LGUs) 
- Social Security Agencies (SSAs) 
- Central Bank Board of Liquidators (CB-BOL) 
4. Rest of the World (ROW) 
5. Household Sectors  
- Entrepreneurial activities of households, all other unaccounted transactions in the 
domestic economy and non-profit institutions serving households (NPISH).  
- All resident households and household operated activities.  
6. Domestic Economy  
- Sum of the domestic sectors' transactions among themselves and with the rest of the 
world (ROW) such as purchase and sale of land. 
28 
 
The financial instruments used in Philippines FoFs framework are: 
1. Monetary Gold and Special Drawing Rights (SDR)  
2. Currency and Deposits 
- Currency and bank notes 
- Transferable deposits and other deposits by national and foreign currency 
3. Securities Other than Shares 
4. Loans 
- Bank and other institutions loans in local and foreign currency 
5. Shares and Other Equity 
6. Insurance Technical Reserve 
- Life insurance and pension reserve 
7. Accounts Receivable or Payable 
- Trade credits and advances  
- Interbank claims 
 
4.1.4. Overview on Indonesia FoFs Accounts 
In these FoFs framework, we have five economic players: 
1. Financial Corporation Sector 
-  Central Bank of Indonesia 
-  Deposit Money Banks 
2. General Government Sector 
3. Other Domestic Sector  
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- non-financial sector (businesses) 
- household sectors 
4. Rest of the World 
The financial instruments used in Indonesia FoFs framework are: 
1. Monetary Gold and SDRs 
2. Currency and Deposits 
- Currency and bank notes such as Rupiah and foreign exchange currency 
- Transferable deposits and other deposits by national and foreign currency, time 
deposits, saving deposits, demand deposits, postal Giro deposits and cooperation 
3. Credit  
- Securities other than shares such as bonds and bills. 
- Loans - bank and other institutions loans in Rupiah and foreign currency 
4. Shares and Other Equity 
5. Others 
- Trade credits and advances  
- Interbank transactions 
-     Insurance technical reserve 
 
4.2. Relevant Variables as Regressors 
In general, there are two channels that can affect saving rate: income effect or substitution 
effect. Income effect refers to changes in lifetime income while substitution effect refers to 
substituting between current and future consumption (Aghevli et.al, 1990). When a factor that 
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induces higher discounted present value of future income leads to a rise in current 
consumption but a fall in saving, then this is the income effect. On the other hand, if current 
consumption declines and saving rises (in favor of future consumption), this is the negative 
substitution effect.  
 
4.2.1. Macroeconomic Indicators 
1. Government (public) saving/GDP (%): There are several views on the relationship between 
government saving (fiscal policy) and private saving. Aghevli et al (1990) mentioned three 
ways of looking at this through the life-cycle approach. Essentially, the life-cycle theory is 
about households saving to smoothen their consumption in anticipating any abruption to their 
lifetime income or the return on their savings. When this concept is applied to private sectors 
saving behavior, it is the anticipation on the abruption in their future income and consumption 
that would be affected by government saving or dissaving (Aghevli et al, 1990). The three 
views that discussed on this relationship are neoclassical, Keynesian and Ricardian. In the 
Neoclassical version of the life-cycle model, when the government saving decreases, the 
consumption rises and this discourages private saving. In the Keynesian model, the temporary 
effect when there is an increase in government dissaving (due to unutilized resources) is a rise 
in consumption and income (due to an  increase in employment) and through the multiplier 
effect, this will generate additional saving in the economy. In the long run, the effect of 
government dissaving is as described in the Neoclassical version (Aghevli et al, 1990). 
However, the ‘Ricardian Equivalence’ that has been highly criticized due to the assumptions 
used, argued that government dissaving (through debt financing or tax financing) to stimulate 
demand in the economy will not work since the public will still save its excess income to pay 
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for future tax increases that will be used to offset the debt. Another explanation for negative 
relation between government saving and private saving is when government saving crowds 
out the private saving (Edwards, 1990).  Another evidence of this negative relation which 
supported the ‘Ricardian Equivalence Theory’14 was from Corbo and Schimidt-Hebbel (1991) 
that showed the partial decline in private saving to offset the rise in public saving although the 
value differs depending on the fiscal policies taken (taxation or current expenditure).   
2. Real Interest Rate (%)
15
: The effect of real interest rate on corporate saving is ambiguous 
from the existing researches that have been carried out. Fry (1978, 1988) showed a positive 
significant effect of real interest rate on a sample of 14 Asian developing countries using a 
pooled cross section time series from 1961 to 1983. This is in addition to Mckinnon - Shaw 
hypothesis (Mckinnon (1989) and Shaw (1973)) that financial liberalization through 
deregulation of interest rate has positive effect on private saving that will stimulate growth in 
the economy. On the other hand, Loayza, Schmidt – Hebbel and Serven (2000) found 
negative coefficients of real interest rate changes on private saving although it is not 
significant. The ambiguity arises due to the potential offsetting between income effect versus 
substitution and wealth effects. Under the income effect, when the interest rate increases and 
the economic agents act as lenders, their future income will increase prompting higher current 
consumption and lower saving. While the substitution effect of higher real interest rate would 
cause the price of current consumption is higher relative to the future consumption (decline in 
current consumption) and this might induce higher saving (for instance, if one would want to 
take a bank loan at higher interest rate, then the price of its current consumption, that is 
                                                          
14
 It supported the Ricardian Theory on the negative relation but it was not one-to-one effect. Instead the decline in private 
saving is less than 1.  
15
 Real Interest Rate = ln [(1+ Nominal Interest Rate)/ (1+ Inflation)]  
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borrowing is higher and so he would save more for future consumption). If the substitution 
effect is greater than the income effect, then saving responds positively to the rise in the real 
interest rate. The wealth effect is similar to the substitution effect in a way that an increase in 
real interest rate would lower the future value of financial portfolio of corporations and that 
would induce higher saving. 
3. Financial depth or Domestic Credit Constraints – M2/GDP (%), M2/GNI (%) and Claims 
on Private Sector/GDP
16
 (%): The usage of these traditional variables as proxies to the size 
and the development of financial intermediation (financial depth), the severity of financial 
repression or the extent of domestic constraints have been  used  by Edwards (1991), Corbo 
and Schimidt-Hebbel (1991), Levine (1997), Loayza et al (1999) and Zhang et al (2007). 
There have been mixed effects of these variables on savings depending on whether it is 
viewed as financial depth or as domestic constraints. When M2/GDP has positive effect on 
corporate saving/GDP, this might indicate that although there is deep  financial liquidity in the 
economy, due to  the domestic borrowing constraints, money cannot be channeled easily to 
the corporations while the negative effect to the corporate saving/GDP implies corporations 
could easily access this money either via financial intermediaries or stock market. The 
positive effect of claims on private sector on corporate saving could potentially explains that 
the credit from the financial system is going to other sectors that are not helping the 
corporations to deter their saving behavior. Loaza, Hebbel and Serven (1999) found a 
                                                          
16
 From the definition in the International Financial Statistics (IFS) Database, “Claims on private sector includes gross credit 
from the financial system to individuals, enterprises, nonfinancial public entities not included under net domestic credit, 
and financial institutions not included elsewhere. 
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negative significant relation between domestic borrowing constraints and private savings
17
 
while Schmidt-Hebbel, Webb and Corsetti (1992) showed a negative relation between 
monetary wealth and the household savings. However, in using these variables as proxies to 
domestic borrowing constraint, Loayza et. al. (1998) has used the flows (for example 
M2/GDP Flows) of these variables instead of the stock of these variables. On the other hand, 
Edwards (1991) found a positive significant effect suggesting that countries with deeper 
financial system will have higher private savings. The choice of M2/GNI is to test whether 
this is a better proxy for financial depth in the cross section data than in the time series 
dimension since the time series dimension often reflect short term factors like monetary 
policy (Loaza et al., 1999) and could reverse the sign of the coefficients.  
4. Income – Real GDP Growth (%) and RGDP per Capita (%): An increase in income 
represented by real GDP growth or RGDP per capita would lead to higher or lower saving 
depending on the dominance of either income effect or substitution effect. In addition, the 
positive sign of the coefficients could also be associated with the consumption theory and life-
cycle model. This is supported by Levine and King (1993), Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000) 
and Levine and Zervos (1993, 1998).  
5. Uncertainty – Expected Inflation18, Capital Flight, Interest Rate Spread: The inflation rate 
is used as a proxy for price uncertainty (Deaton, 1977) and macroeconomic instability (Fisher, 
1993). When there is an increase in the inflation rate or an uncertainty about the future 
outlook, we would expect a decline in the wealth of corporate sectors and they would 
compensate these losses by increasing their saving – precautionary motives. The interest rate 
                                                          
17
 The negative effect suggests that relaxing the credit constraints on claims on private sector/GDP leads to the decrease in 
the private saving rate.  
18
 Expected inflation is taken as lagged -1 of inflation. 
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spread
19
 is used as a benchmark to indicate the uncertainty in an economy. A low interest rate 
spread implies that the economic condition is stable and there is great confidence among the 
investors that their money is safe. However, a higher spread indicates more volatile, uncertain 
economic conditions and that higher interest rates need to be charged in order to ascertain that 
the borrowers will repay their loan.  
6. Demographics – Age Dependency Ratio(%), Population and Urbanization Ratio(%): The 
age dependency ratio refers to population below 15 years old and above 65 years old over the 
total working population. It is anticipated that the coefficient would be negative which is 
consistent with the standard life-cycle theory of consumption
20
. Urbanization refers to 
proportion of total population that lives in urban area. It is expected to have negative impact 
on the private saving due to precautionary saving objective (Edward, 1995 and Loayza et al, 
1999).  For instance, rural residents will most likely have higher saving due to lack of 
diversification of their source of income in comparison to urban residents that have higher 
options in the city. In addition, as pointed out by Edward (1995) the saving rate will increase 
in countries with higher variable in income and this in general referred to countries that 
depend heavily on agricultural sector. 
7. Foreign Borrowing Constraints – Total Foreign Debt/GDP(%) 21 , Financing via 
International Capita Market 
22
(Gross Inflows/GDP %) and Current Account 
                                                          
19
 The interest rate spread
19
 is defined as the lending rate charged by banks to its prime customers minus the deposit rates 
on demand deposits, time deposits and savings deposits.  
20
 Life-Cycle theory of consumption stated that people would borrow against their future earnings  during their study years 
and early working years (negative saving), starts to save more during their most productive working years (positive saving)  
and use their saved assets during their retirement years (negative saving).  
21
“Total foreign/external debt is debt owed to non-residents and is the sum of public, publicly guaranteed and private non-
guaranteed long term debt, use of IMF credit and short term debt which include all debt having maturity of one year or less 
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Balance/GDP(%): These indicators show the substitutability between foreign savings (current 
account deficit) and private savings as well as measuring the financial openness in the 
economy. When the impact is positive, this means that foreign saving have crowded out the 
private saving while if it is negative, then according to Loayza et. al. (1999), this is coherent 
to the standard view that foreign lending (external saving) is a complement rather than 
substitute to domestic saving. In other words, foreign saving is supporting the private 
investment and consumption.  
8. Public (Government) Investment / GDP (%): When government increases its investment, 
this leads to an increase in the private consumption and a decrease in private saving.  Loayza 
et al (1999) found a negative coefficient of government investment on private saving or in 
other words, complementarity relation between public goods and private goods.  
9. Financial Liberalization Index (FLI) –Many had argued that financial liberalization has 
caused financial bubbles and crises and we include this as one of our regressors. The data and 
methodology used for the construction of FLI was from Kaminsky and Schmukler (2007) and 
we had extended the construction to match with the duration of our data that was until 2009. 
The FLI comprised of the liberalization of capital account, domestic financial sector and the 
stock market. Here we have FLI1 that is constructed by modifying the FLI2 from Kaminsky 
and Schmukler (2007). In their construction, if capital account is repressed – then the assigned 
value is 3, if it is partially liberalized – then it is 2 and if it is fully liberalized – then it is 1. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
and interest in arrears on long term debt. The debt is repayable in foreign currency, goods or services,” World Bank 
Database. 
22
 “Financing via International Capital Market includes the sum of notional amount of gross bond issuance by government, 
public and private sector borrowers in international capital markets, bank lending raised by government, public and private 
sectors borrowers via international syndicated lending and the notional amount of cross border equity placement,” World 
Bank Database 
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For example, if in a particular year, the capital account is repressed (3), domestic financial 
sector is fully liberalized (1) and the stock market is fully liberalized (1), then the FLI for that 
year is 1. Our construction on the other hand would prorate the values assigned – for instance 
if the stock market is repressed from January to May – then the assigned value is 5*3 = 15 
and then it is fully liberalized from June to December – then the assigned value is 7*1=7. 
Hence, the FLI for that particular year is (15+7)/12 = 1.833 instead of 1 in their method.  
10. Stocks Market – Stock Market Index, Stocks Traded23  (Total Stocks Value/GDP %), 
Market Capitalization of Listed Companies
24
 (% of GDP), Equity Index
25
, Stocks Turnover 
Ratio 
26
(%): These indicators represent how well the economy is doing and how much can the 
firms obtain their financing via the stocks market.  Market capitalization of listed companies 
show the market size of stocks market relative to the economy and often use to indicate the 
degree of financial openness in the economy. The positive impact on the corporate saving 
implies the possibility of difficulty in raising capital via stocks market while the negative 
impact indicates the opposite. 
11. Business Confidence Index (BCI): This is a survey data from the companies on their level 
of optimism about the economic conditions and the future prospects that their organizations 
will have. Theoretically, we would expect that as the level of optimism rises, the corporations 
saving/GDP will decline.  
 
                                                          
23
 Stocks Tradedt = Total Value of Shares Tradedt. 
24
“Market Capitalization or market value is the share price times the number of shares outstanding and listed domestic 
companies are the domestically incorporated companies listed on the country’s stock exchanges at the end of the year and 
exclude investment companies, mutual funds, or other collective investment vehicles,” World Bank Database. 
25
 Equity Index refers to S&P Global Equity Indices (annual % change). 
26
 Turn Over Ratiot = Total Value of Shares Traded t / Average Market Capitalizationt.  
Average Market Capitalizationt = (Market Capitalization t + Market Capitalization t-1)/2 (Source: World Bank Database) 
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4.2.2. Banks Specific Indicators 
1. Banks’ Non-Performing Loans/Total Gross Loans 27  (%): When the financial 
intermediaries have a lot of non-performing loans recorded on their balance sheet, we 
would expect that they will be reluctant in giving out further loans and would induce 
higher corporate saving in the economy.  
2. Domestic Credit provided by Banks: An easy accessible of credit at satisfactory 
lending rate would induce lower corporate saving since the opportunity costs of 
borrowing from the banks are lower than its own saving for financing. 
3. Banks’ Net Worth: Banks’ net worth is the total amount in which the total assets 
exceed the total liabilities. If the total assets exceed the total liabilities, then the net 
worth is positive and if the total liabilities exceed the total assets, then the net worth is 
negative. A high net worth bank is more likely to extend credit to corporations and 
thus lowering the corporate sectors’ saving.  
 
4.2.3. Corporations Specific Indicators  
1. Firms’ Net Worth: Firms’ net worth is defined as its total assets minus total liabilities. 
The net worth will be what the corporations/banks owe to their owners (shareholders). 
We would expect the sign to be ambiguous since a positive impact on the corporation 
savings show that as firms’ net worth increases, firms are more likely to save in order 
                                                          
27
 Banks’ Non Performing Loans/ Total Gross Loans = Value of NonPerforming Loans/ Total Value of the Loan Portfolio 
(include nonperforming loans before the deduction of specific loan-loss provisions (Source: World Bank Database) 
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to make their balance sheet looks even better and perhaps to pay higher dividends to 
its shareholders using its savings. On the other hand, a negative impact on corporate 
saving could indicate that the firms are more willing to invest in the productivity 
activities as their net worth improves. Net worth is an important indicator of the firms’ 
creditworthiness since it gives the history of the company’s investment in addition to 
determining the value of a company.  
 
4.3. Estimation Methodology: 
We first plotted the graphs (Appendix 1) to see the relation between the independent variables 
and the corporate saving. The main reason for eye-balling this relationship is to identify if any 
transformation is needed on the independent variables in order to capture its influence on the 
dependent variables. Next, we will calculate the correlations between these variables in order 
to identify the degree of dependency between these predicted variables which could 
potentially be useful in finding the instrumental variables and to tackle the problem of 
multicollinearity (Appendix 2). Our next step is to employ the Granger-causality test which 
provide information on whether the lagged of explanatory variables are good predictors of the 
dependent variable and vice versa (reverse causality). In other words, we can use this test 
result to see the existence of joint endogeneity problem. However, due to the limitation of the 
number of observation, we will limit the lag used in the Granger test to up until one  lag only 
in such that we don’t lose much information from the missing values28 instead of comparing 
across AIC/BIC. The null hypothesis for Granger non-causality test is: Variable X does not 
                                                          
28
 Including lags means the loss of information, both by additional parameters to estimate and decrease in degrees of 
freedom. 
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granger cause variable Y (Corporate Saving/GDP) and Variable Y (Corporate Saving/GDP) 
does not granger cause variable X (Appendix 4). Our results indicate the existence of joint 
endogeneity between claims on private sector and corporate saving and we can fix this in the 
regression by using instrumental variable such as domestic credit by banks. We will use the 
instrumental variable only if the claim on private sector is included in our final model.  
Then, prior to our estimation, we will examine another statistical property of our annual data 
that is stationarity by using Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test statistic. The presence of 
non-stationarity can be due to unit root which can be corrected by taking differences 
(differences stationarity) or due to trend component which can be corrected by detrending the 
variables (trend stationarity). However, take note that differencing the variables could lead us 
to losing the long run information and theoretically, most of the economic relationships are of 
long term that involves level variables and not their differences (Nair, 2006). Hence, it is 
desirable to have level variables that are stationary. 
 Results from non-stationarity variables can be spurious (biased coefficient) and misleading. If 
non-stationarity is caused by the former (existence of unit root), the OLS estimate can still be 
performed if these variables are cointegrated, otherwise, if cointegration doesn’t exist, then 
our data does not have long term equilibrium relationship and only short term equilibrium 
relationship. The unit root test on our data series is necessary but not sufficient for 
cointegration. The null hypothesis in ADF test is that variable X has a unit root. We will first 
carry out this test without specifying the trend and the constant/intercept of the variable and if 
the test statistic indicates that we should reject the null hypothesis, we will keep the variable 
as it is. If the unit root condition is still unsatisfactory, we will still run the ADF test with the 
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first differencing on the variable. If the results indicate that first differencing is needed to 
satisfy the unit root condition, we will run the cointegration test to see whether the long run 
equilibrium exists instead of taking the first differencing since our data is non-stationary of 
degree one. We used Schwarz Info Criterion (SIC) to choose the optimal lag and our results 
indicate it is optimal at lag zero. The ADF results in Appendix 5 show that most of the 
variables suffer from unit root problem and taking first differencing will correct for this. 
Hence, we will proceed with our cointegration test on the entire model by using the rule of 
thumb proposed by Granger and Newbold (1974) that two series suffer from spurious 
regression when R
2 
> Durbin Watson test.  
 
Equation for Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) Test for Variable X 
Null Hypothesis: Variable X has unit root 
Test: ADF test with level variable (no intercept/constant and no trend) 
Δ(Variable X)t = β0*(Variable X)t-1   + β1* Δ(Variable X)t-1    
Test: ADF test with level variable (include intercept/constant and trend) 
Δ(Variable X)t = β0*(Variable X)t-1   + β1* Δ(Variable X)t-1    +  
Β2*(Trend) + Constant 
Test: ADF test with first differencing (no intercept/constant and no trend) 
Δ
2
(Variable X)t = β0* Δ(Variable X)t-1   + β1* Δ
2
(Variable X)t-1    
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After satisfying these necessarily statistical properties, we will now proceed with our 
regression estimation. We have two sets of regression models that are of interest to us.  
First is the replication of the Feldstein – Horioka (FH) regression for Asean – 3 over the 
period of 1995 to 2009. The main purpose of doing this is to determine the components of 
saving in the economy that has significant influence on the corporation’s decision to invest. 
The basic empirical specification for FH model is the following: 
(Icorporation/GDP)t = β0 + β1*(Scorporation/GDP)t + β2*(Sgovernment/GDP)t  +   
β3*(Shouseholds/GDP)t + εt                                                                                                          (1) 
Second is the unconditional regression of corporate saving/ GDP on various macroeconomic 
variables, banks’ specific variables and firms’ specific variables. The reasons for inclusion of 
these variables have been described in the earlier section. 
(Corporation Saving/GDP)t =  β0 + β1*(Government Saving/GDP)t + 
β2*(Stock Market Index)t + β3*(Real GDP Growth)t + β4*(Expected 
Inflation)t + β5*(Current Account Balance)t + β6*(Per Capita Real 
GDP)t + β7*(M2/GDP Stocks)t + β8*(Total Foreign Debt/GDP)t + 
β9*(Capital Flight/GDP)t + β10*(Urbanization)t + β11*(Age 
Dependency Ratio)t + β12*(Government Investment/GDP)t + 
β13*(Real Interest Rate)t + β14*(Financial Liberalization Index)t + 
42 
 
β15*(Banks’ Non-Performing Loans)t + β16*(Stocks Traded/GDP)t + 
β17*(Business Confidence Index)t + β18*(Claims on Private 
Sectors/GDP)t + β19*(Domestic Credit by Banks/GDP)t + β20*(Interest 
Rate Spread)t + β21*(Gross Inflows/GDP)t + β22*(Market 
Capitalization/GDP)t + β23*(Equity Index)t + β24*(Stocks Turn Over 
Ratio)t + β24*(Firms’ Net Worth)t + β25*(Banks’ Net Worth)t + εt                  
                                             (2) 
We first run the standard OLS regression on Equation 1 and Equation 2 and by comparing 
across the adjusted R-square, we will omit the irrelevant variables that do not improve our 
model. Hence, we will have our final reduced-form model that will yield the highest adjusted 
R-square. . Take note that OLS provides a good base for examining the potential problems 
that we might have with our data and the structural model. For instance, a significantly high 
coefficient and R-square could be due to serial correlation. OLS will not be performed unless 
the data is cointegrated and even if the data is not cointegrated and the OLS is performed, 
then there might not exist the long term relationship and the result only shows the short term 
relationship. Our final reduced-form regression model for Equation 2 is the following 
empirical specification which yields the highest adjusted R-square and includes most of the 
statistically significant variables that are of interest to us.  
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(Corporation Saving/GDP)t =  β0 + β1*(Stock Market Index)t + 
β2*(Current Account Balance)t + β3*(Capital Flight/GDP)t + 
β4*(Urbanization)t + β5*(Age Dependency Ratio)t + 
β6*(Government Investment/GDP) t + β7*(Real Interest Rate)t + 
β8*(Financial Liberalization Index 1)t + β9*(Banks’ Non-
Performing Loans)t + β10*(Stocks Traded/GDP)t + β11*(Business 
Confidence Index)t + β12*(Domestic Credit by Banks/GDP)t + 
β13*(Market Capitalization/GDP)t + β14*(Equity Index)t + 
β15*(Stocks Turn Over Ratio)t + β16*(Firms’ Net Worth)t + 
β17*(Banks’ Net Worth)t  + εt                                                                                (3) 
The regression result of our OLS regression on reduced-form corporate saving/GDP model is 
in Appendix 9 (Table 1.7).  We then examined the statistical properties of this regression 
specifically the significance of the variables, the sign of the coefficients, the common problem 
in panel data series that is heteroskedasticity (using the white test), the common problem in  
time series data that is autocorrelation (using Durbin –Watson test29),  the existence of 
cointegration using the rule of thumb proposed by Granger and Newbold (1974) that two 
series suffer from spurious regression when R
2 
> Durbin Watson test and the F-statistic to 
                                                          
29
DW test statistic that is close to 2 indicates no presence of autocorrelation/serial correlation – the present residual is 
correlated with the past residual. 
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investigate the null hypothesis that there is no linear relationship between the dependent 
variable and the explanatory variables in the model.  
Our result in Appendix 7 indicates that our model suffers from negative autocorrelation since 
the Durbin-Watson test statistic is greater than 2. We then plotted the graphs of residuals on 
lagged 1 of residuals and the graph in Appendix 8 shows the existence of negative 
autocorrelation. The result for heteroskedasticity is satisfactory given the fact that we have 
only panel data set across three countries but longer period of time (the effect of time series 
problem (autocorrelation) takes greater weight than the effect of panel data problem 
(heteroskedasticity)). Our rule of thumb that is R-square < Durbin Watson test statistic is 
satisfactory and hence we know that there are one or more cointegrated time series data in our 
model. Finally, our F(17, 21) that assumes the null of no linear relationship in the model is 
rejected.  
One way to correct for autocorrelation is to run the autoregressive model of order 1, AR(1) for 
our reduced-form model. The equation for AR(1) is as follows: 
(Corporation Saving/GDP)t =  β0 + γ1*(Corporation Saving/GDP)t-1 
β1*(Stock Market Index)t + β2*(Current Account Balance)t + 
β3*(Capital Flight/GDP)t + β4*(Urbanization)t + β5*(Age Dependency 
Ratio)t + β6*(Government Investment/GDP)t + β7*(Real Interest Rate)t 
+ β8*(Financial Liberalization Index 1)t + β9*(Banks’ Non-Performing 
Loans)t + β10*(Stocks Traded/GDP)t + β11*(Business Confidence 
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Index)t + β12*(Domestic Credit by Banks/GDP)t + β13*(Market 
Capitalization/GDP)t + β14*(Equity Index)t + β15*(Stocks Turn Over 
Ratio)t + β16*(Firms’ Net Worth)t + β17*(Banks’ Net Worth)t  +  
β18*(Dummy
30
1) + β19*(Dummy2)                                   (4)                        
The AR (1) result is shown in Table 1.8 of Appendix 12. In order to strengthen our analysis 
on the determinants of corporate saving across Asean-3, we run additional regression that is 
Vector Auto Regression (VAR) and examine the impulse response function and the variance 
decomposition. VAR is ordering-dependent and we can check the robustness of our result by 
changing the order.  Our main interest is in the variance decomposition that shows how much 
of a change in a variable is due to its own shock and how much is due to shocks of other 
variables. However, prior to the variance decomposition, we need to inspect the result of our 
impulse response which will trace the time path of the effect of structural shocks on our 
dependent variables in the model.    
A two-variable VAR(1) with k=2. 
yttttt zcyczbby   1121111210                           (5) 
zttttt zcycybbz   1221212120                              (6) 
Equation (5) and equation (6) can be written in the VAR system in the standard form: 
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 Since we have unbalanced panel data set, the dummy variables take values of 1 in the last year of these two 
out of three countries, specifically in the year of 2009 for Thailand (Dummy 1) and in the year of 2009 for 
Philippines (Dummy 2).   
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5. Results and Analysis 
5.1. Gross Saving versus Gross Capital Formation in Asean-3? 
Figure 1.9 shows the excess saving for the entire domestic economy
31
 with Indonesia and 
Thailand achieving the level above zero after 1997. A negative excess saving implies that 
investment exceeds saving while positive excess saving means that saving exceeds 
investment. However, in the case of Philippines, the domestic economy excess saving takes a 
turning point from negative excess saving (over investment) prior to 1998  to fluctuation 
around zero afterwards, implying balanced domestic saving and domestic gross capital 
formation. When we analyzed only the gross saving for the entire economy in Figure 1.10, 
Thailand shows a slight drop after 1998 but its corporate gross saving component shows a 
tremendous significant increase after 1998 approaching to about 35% of GDP (Figure 1.11). 
Indonesia domestic economy gross saving (Figure 1.10) stays relatively the same throughout 
the period except for the biggest plunge in 1999 but for its corporate sector, the gross saving 
surges to about 35% of GDP in 1998 and approaches to  about 20% of GDP hereafter (Figure 
1.11). In Philippines, the domestic gross saving is relatively about 15% - 20% of GDP with a 
high peak in 2000 while the corporate gross saving shows a significant upward trend since 
2000. From these three figures, we can conclude that the domestic excess savings spiked up in 
1997 to 1999 during the period of Asian financial crisis, and dropped during the recovery 
period to the level it was before the 1997 crisis.  Although this was the case for the countries 
domestic gross savings, the corporate saving however, have shown an upward trending since 
2001 for both Thailand and Philippines and 2003 for Indonesia. This is insinuating that 
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 Domestic economy includes non-financial corporations, government, households, financial corporations and 
rest of the world.  
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despite the relatively level domestic gross saving, there are significant rise in the corporate 
gross saving across Asean-3.  
 
Source: IFS Database 
Figure 1.9: Domestic Gross Saving over Gross Investment in Asean- 3 (in percent of GDP) 
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Source: IFS Database 
Figure 1.10: Domestic Gross Saving in Asean- 3 (in percent of GDP) 
 
 
Source: Flow-of-Funds Accounts 
Figure 1.11: Corporation Gross Saving in Asean- 3 (in percent of GDP) 
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5.1.1. The Evidence of Positive Excess Saving in Thailand? 
Figure 1.12 showed the overall domestic gross saving and gross capital formation in Thailand, 
including the financial corporations sector and the rest of the world sector. It was apparent 
from the graph that Thailand experienced higher gross investment prior to 1997 and in 1997, 
it took a reversed turning point when gross saving started to exceed gross capital formation 
until 2009.  
Now in Figure 1.13, we have compared the gross saving and the gross capital formation in 
Thailand’s economy by excluding the financial corporations and the rest of the world 
(ROW)
32
. The graph indicated that Thailand experienced negative excess saving prior to 1997 
AFC and positive excess saving from 1997 to 2003. However, a different trend was witnessed 
prior to 2008 GFC in which positive excess saving existed prior to the recent crisis. When the 
non-financial corporations sector saved more than they invested during the recovery period of 
1998 – 2002, the household sector’ saving level started to decline in response to the rise of 
corporate sector saving (Figure 1.14). The household sector saving picked its increasing pace 
again in 2002 when the non-financial corporations started to exhibit negative excess saving – 
more investment than saving. Overall, the household sector and the government sector in 
Thailand often have positive excess saving during these years of observation but the non-
financial corporations suffered negative excess saving except for during the period of crisis 
and its recovery (Figure 1.15 and Figure 1.16). When the firms save more than they are 
                                                          
32
 We exclude the financial corporations because they are financial intermediaries that have high saving but 
very small concentration in the gross capital formation investment. The ROW is excluded because in the FoF 
accounts, they have no gross capital formation and only gross saving which could distort our excess saving 
analysis.  
50 
 
investing in real sectors, the government sector will start to counter back by investing more 
although the household sector saving will still decline.  
The AFC in Thailand started in July 1997 when Thai’s fixed exchange rate came under attack. 
It exacerbated in 1998 when many other countries were affected. In order to prevent further 
precipitation of Bath and to comply with IMF conditionality, the monetary authority raised 
the interest rate
33
 and the government implemented structural reform in corporate governance, 
international debt and finance. This could possibly explain the increased of saving and a 
declined in investment for non-financial corporations sector (Figure 1.15 and Figure 1.16). On 
the other hand, due to tight credit, the household sector used their saving to support their 
consumption. The government saving was declining too during this period because of its 
repayment of debts falling due and to stabilize exchange rate. In 2002, after the new Prime 
Minister, Thaksin was elected, the household saving and the government saving started to 
increase again during in which the non-financial corporations gross capital formation started 
to outpace the gross saving again (Figure 1.14).  
 
                                                          
33
 In January 1998, the lending rate was 17%.  
51 
 
 
Source: Trading Economics Database 
Figure 1.12: Domestic Gross Saving and Gross Capital Formation - Thailand  (in percent of GDP) 
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Source: Flow-of-Funds Accounts 
Figure 1.13: Saving-Investment Balance - Thailand  (in percent of GDP) 
 
 
Source: Flow-of-Funds Accounts 
Figure 1.14: Saving vs Investment by Economic Sectors - Thailand  (Millions of Bath) 
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Source: Flow-of-Funds Accounts 
Figure 1.15: Excess Saving Pre-97 AFC - Thailand  (in percent of GDP) 
 
 
Source: Flow-of-Funds Accounts 
Figure 1.16: Excess Saving Post-97 AFC - Thailand  (in percent of GDP) 
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5.1.2. The Evidence of Positive Excess Saving in Philippines? 
When we compare across all economic players
34
 in Philippines, Figure 1.17 shows that gross 
capital formation exceeds gross saving from 1991 to 2009, with exception to the year of 2000 
2007 and 2009. The gross saving spikes up in the year of 2000 and stay relatively stable 
around 15% of GDP. On the other hand, the gross capital formation is declining and 
eventually starts to converge to about 15% of GDP as well. In Figure 1.18, we exclude the 
ROW and the financial corporations because their roles are mainly to save and very little 
investment in the real sector which could distort our excess saving analysis. In these graphs 
that are based on Philippines FoFs accounts, we find that the domestic economy saving has 
been rising since 2000 while the domestic investment has been declining. In other words, we 
can see that from the year of 2000 to 2002, Philippines domestic economy (excluding the 
financial corporations and the ROW) experience negative excess saving and positive excess 
saving beginning in 2004 onwards. When we examine the behavior of these economic agents 
in Figure 1.19, there are an upward trend in the gross saving of firms and the government. The 
household sector shows the opposite behavior in which its gross saving is declining when the 
firms gross saving is rising and its investment in the real sector is also rising up after a plunge 
in 2003. The changes in Philippines saving-investment structure confirmed with what many 
economists have argued – an increased in saving and a decline in real sector investment for 
corporate sector. Tan (1997) argued that the rise in saving mobilization in Philippines began 
since 1994 when President Ramos administration launched an aggressive financial 
liberalization such as the relaxation of foreign bank entry, raising the foreign equity limits and 
                                                          
34
 All economic players include non-financial corporation, government, households, financial corporation and 
rest of the world.  
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establishing a more independent central bank.  Furthermore, the requirement for non-financial 
corporations sector to establish statutory saving or mandatory saving through pension funds 
also increased its saving. The government saving although it was rising overtime was lower 
than its investment due to slow growth rates per capita income and political instability in 
Philippines. The annual per capita income grew slowly and this decelerated the government 
tax collections. Furthermore, in order to stimulate the economy, the government needs to 
increase its expenditure and this explained the declined in its saving and a higher level of 
investment. 
 
Source: Trading Economics Database 
Figure 1.17: Domestic Gross Saving and Gross Capital Formation - Philippines  (in percent of 
GDP) 
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Source: Flow-of-Funds Accounts 
Figure 1.18: Saving-Investment Balance - Philippines  (in percent of GDP) 
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Source: Flow-of-Funds Accounts 
Figure 1.19: Saving vs Investment by Economic Sectors - Philippines  (Millions of Pesos) 
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Source: Flow-of-Funds Accounts 
Figure 1.20: Excess Saving Post-97 AFC - Philippines (in percent of GDP) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-7
-5
-3
-1
1
3
5
7
NonFinancial
Corporation
General Government Households Domestic Economy
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
59 
 
5.1.3. The Evidence of Positive Excess Saving in Indonesia? 
In the case of Indonesia from 1997 to 2009, the domestic gross saving across all economic 
players including the financial corporations and the rest of the world in Figure 1.21 was 
higher than the gross capital formation. However, two years prior to the 1997 AFC, this 
relationship was reversed but not prior to 2008 GFC. In Figure 1.22, we excluded the 
financial corporations and the rest of the world. The graph showed an existence of positive 
excess saving from 1998 to 2007. However, the excess saving was negative pre and during the 
crisis period of 1997 AFC and in 2008 to 2009 pre and during GFC.  In Figure 1.22, we could 
see an upward trend in the real sector investment beginning in 2001 until 2009 while the gross 
saving showed a rise starting in 1999. The saving rate in Indonesia was highest immediately 
during the crisis that was in 1998 at 25% of GDP (Figure 1.22).  During this year, the real 
GDP growth in Indonesia was also at its lowest throughout the 12 year period from 1997 to 
2009 while the real sector investment was at its lowest in 2001. In Figure 1.23, it is obvious 
that the movements of the gross saving and the gross capital formation are in the same 
direction. The government sector has consistently displayed positive excess saving with the 
highest gap arising in 1996 to 1997 and 2008 to 2009. This was a substitute to the behavior of 
the non-financial corporations and the households which have positive excess saving from 
1998 to 2002 and in 2006 hereafter, their investment surpassed the saving. Both investment 
and saving for non-financial corporations exhibited a similar trend that was a declining trend 
in 1998 to 2003 and an increasing trend onwards (2003-2009). During the AFC that witnessed 
the ending of Suharto long time presidency and the austerity measures imposed by the IMF 
including increasing the tax, no government bailouts and corporate reformation, it made sense 
to see the obvious spike of gross saving for the firms and the households sectors and the 
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plunged in the real sector investment. On the other hand, the government in its effort to 
stabilize the political, economic and social conditions there had to step up, dis-saving and 
increased its spending. 
 
Source: Trading Economics Database 
Figure 1.21: Domestic Gross Saving and Gross Capital Formation – Indonesia 
 (in percent of GDP) 
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Source: Flow-of-Funds Accounts 
Figure 1.22: Saving-Investment Balance - Indonesia (in percent of GDP) 
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Source: Flow-of-Funds Accounts 
Figure 1.23: Saving vs Investment by Economic Sectors - Indonesia (Billions of Rupiahs) 
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Source: Flow-of-Funds Accounts 
Figure 1.24: Excess Saving Pre and Post 97 AFC- Indonesia (in percent of GDP) 
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a continuous increase in saving since 2000 to 2009 and a decline in real sector investment 
since 2003 to 2009. The results for Thailand and Indonesia corporate sectors were the same in 
which the positive excess saving appeared only from 1998 to 2002. Finally, we could 
intuitively conclude that the government policies (including financial liberalization, 
controlling interest rate, complying with IMF conditionality and etc.) influenced the decisions 
of corporate sectors to invest and to save either by complementing the behavior of firms (in 
the case of Philippines) or substituting it (in the case of Thailand and Indonesia). 
 
5.2. The Estimation Results: 
5.2.1. Feldstein-Horioka Regression Result 
Next, we will validate our intuition from the graphical results by looking at the institutions’ 
influence on corporate sector investment decision. Following the study by Feldstein-Horioka 
(1980) on 16 OCED countries over the average of 15 years for each country, when there is 
perfect capital mobility, we should observe low correlation between domestic saving and 
domestic investment. Corporate sector decision to invest domestically will not depend on the 
domestic financing since they have free access to international market at world rate and at the 
same time, domestic savers could lend their entire saving to foreign investors. As we have 
described earlier, we regressed the corporate sector gross investment on the institutional 
savings to identify the institution that have the highest influence on its investment decision. 
The results in Table 1.5 of Appendix 6 showed that all the institutional saving have significant 
positive impact on the corporate investment with the government saving has the most 
influence in all the three regression models. The R-square in each scenario is reasonably high 
– greater than 0.5. The greater sensitivity of gross corporate investment to government saving 
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indicates that fiscal policies and rigidities in the economy in terms of regulations, domestic 
borrowing constraint, capital control and etc. influence the corporate sector’s decisions. The 
large coefficient indicates that corporation investment is greater in countries with higher 
government saving. In addition, this sensitivity results provides a basis in looking at policies 
that would stimulate investment by changing the form of institutional saving and in this case, 
it appears to be the government saving that has the highest impact on the corporate 
investment.  
 
5.2.2. Determinants of Corporate Saving Regression Result 
Our regression result in Table 1.5 shows that the corporate sector investment is most sensitive 
to the government saving and there is no perfect capital mobility among these developing 
countries which is shown from the coefficients that are statistically positive and different from 
0. However, here, we are looking at the other side of the coin, that is the corporate sector 
saving which is the substitute of corporate sector investment. 
 In  this section, we presented our estimation results obtained from  the regression on Asean-3 
using yearly data from 1995-2009.  These results will be used to address the question on what 
drive the corporate sector saving behaviour within Asean-3 in addition to the fact that there is 
no perfect world capital mobility and the highest sensitivity to the government saving. We 
first run the standard unconditional OLS regression on various variables to see their statistical 
impact on the corporate sector saving decisision.  
In Table 1.6 of Appendix 7, we have the results of our unconditional regression on all the 
variables that we have specified earlier. However, our approach is to reduce this full – form 
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model into reduced – form model with the highest adjusted R-square and the most  number of 
variables that are statistically significant and to our interest. The results of our OLS reduced-
form model is in Table 1.7 of Appendix 9. In this model, the statistically significant variables 
are stock market index (SMI), current account balance (CAB), urbanization (Urban), age 
dependency ratio (Age), government investment (GovInv), financial liberalization index 
1(FLI1), banks’ non -performing loans (BankNPL), stocks traded, domestic credit to banks 
(DomCreditbyBanks), market capitalization of listed companies (MarketCap), equity index 
(EqIndex), stocks turnover ratio (StockTurnOver), firms’ networth (FirmsNetworth) and 
banks’ networth (BanksNetworth). The insignificant variables are business confidence index 
(bci), real interest rate (rint) and capital flight (CapFlight).  
Although the reduced-form model yields the highest adjusted R-square and it satisfies some of 
the statistical properties such as cointegration, heteroskedasticty and F- test statistic, it suffers 
from negative autocorrelation – the Durbin Watson test statistic is 2.360685 and the plot of 
residuals again residuals of lagged-1 period (Graph 1.5 of Appendix 11) indicates the negative 
correlation which could make our results unuseful. As we have mentioned in our data and 
methodology, we will then correct this autocorrelation problem by running an AR(1) 
regression on our reduced-form model variables and the results are shown in Table 1.8 of 
Appendix 12. We chosed lagged 1 period to avoid losing the degree of freedom and the 
richness of information from our model considering that we have only limited observations 
across three countries. 
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From our AR(1) results, it shows that capital flight and dummy 2 are the only variables that 
are statistically insignificant. Based on this result, we can categorized the variables in the 
reduced-form model into three categories for our analysis purposes.  
-Variables that are related to the economic outlook in the future: stock market index, current 
account balance, government investment, financial liberalization index, stocks traded, 
business confidence index, market capitalization of listed companies, equity index, stocks 
turnover ratio, capital flight. 
-Variables that are related to the domestic borrowing constraints: real interest rate, banks’ 
non-performing loans, domestic credit by banks, firms’ networth and banks’ networth. 
-Other type of variables such as demographic variables: urbanization and  age dependency 
ratio. 
The following provides the description on how these regressors affect the corporate 
saving/gdp: 
1. Current Account Balance: The current account balance positive impact on the corporate 
saving implies that the increase  in current account balance (reduce in current account deficit 
or lower foreign saving) by one percentage point will increase the corporate saving by 
0.75857 percentage points. As argued in many existing literature, when  the foreign saving 
increases, it will crowd out the corporate saving due to the competition for the saving 
instruments indicated by the coefficient that represents the degree of substitutability between 
foreign saving (current account deficit) and national private saving. Edwards (1997) have 
argued that when the coefficient value is less than 1, it will crowd out the private saving in 
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less than one to one manner – in our case, it is 0.75857  (Appendix 12). In addition, to relate 
this result to Feldstein-Horioka puzzle, we draw the conclusion from Blanchard and Giavazzi 
(2002) study on Greece and  Portugal that high current account deficit could be the potential 
explanation for FH puzzle. Another supporter of this claim is  in a study by Amornthum 
(2003)  mentioning that current account solvency is one of the six possible explanations of FH 
puzzle.  
2. Stock Market Index: An increase by one point of stock market index increases the predicted 
value of corporate saving by 0.00445 percentage points. Stock market index typically 
indicates the confidence and expectations of investors towards the prospects of economy. It is 
one of the good barometers in judging the investors anticipation of the future market direction 
and velocity. From the investors point of view, when the stock market index is high, this 
reflect the sentiment of less concern/fearful about the market and they anticipate low volatility 
in the economy. We find it interesting that despite the bullish sentiment of investors, the 
corporate saving is rising and intutively, we think that although the firms are optimist about 
the economy, the domestic borrowing constraints made them rely on their own saving for 
future investment.  
3. Urbanization: A one pencentage point increase in the proportion of urban population to 
total population lead to an increase of corporate saving by 3.6256 percentage points.  This is 
contrary to the finding of negative coefficients in the existing literattues that would be along 
the argument of precautionary saving objectives; the urban residents have more options to 
diversify the uncertainty in their income and hence will save less. The rural residents, 
however, lack the means to diversify their income uncertainty  and that would lead them to 
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save a large portion of their income (Loaza et. al. 1997). This new finding of positive 
coefficient is consistent with the new finding of Ramajo et al. (2007) in which they claim that 
perhaps due to a widespread income support program in the agricultural sector have lessen the 
precautionary motive for saving in the rural area. Another reason for high corporate saving in 
the urban area could potentially be that the higher proportion of urban population would mean 
more congestive and other welfare problems that lead firms to save more and if the firm 
employs more employees, then the requirement to provide the employees’ benefits, pensions, 
medical support, insurance and etc. could lead the firms to save more.  
4.Age Dependency Ratio: The next variable that is signifcant is the age dependency ratio. 
When there is a one percentage point increase in the proportion of population aged <15 years 
old and >65 years old relative to total population, there will be a decline of 0.706093 
percentage points in the corporate saving.  The coefficient estimate is significantly negative 
which is consistent with the life-cycle consumption – an increase in the age dependency ratio 
means lower proportion of people in the working age group and less for firms to support these 
working people employees’ benefits, medical expenses, insurance coverage and etc.  
5. Government Investment: An increase by one percentage point in the government 
investment would decrease the firms saving by 1.61086 percentage points. This means that 
the increase in government investment would increase the firms investment and the firms 
saving would drop by more than one-to-one relation, Our result on FH regression earlier 
indicates that an increase in the government saving will increase the corporate sector saving 
by about 2%, implying the complementarity relationship between the government 
investment/saving and the corporate saving/investment. The crowding-in effect of 
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government investment could happen in these developing countries considering that their 
economy resources are under-employed. 
6. Financial Liberalization Index (FLI1): The next variable that is positively significant is the 
financial liberalization index 1 (FLI1). The positive sign indicates that the more liberalized 
the financial market in these countries are, the higher is the corporate saving. This is contrary 
to the finding of Bandiera et.al(2000) in which he had found a negative significant relation 
between FLI and Indonesia private saving using the data from 1975 to 1994. Earlier, we have 
shown graphically that the corporate sector saving has increased post 1997 AFC and despite 
the reform in the financial governance and the liberalization of financial markets in these 
countries, it still fail to induce higher corporate investment. It is in our opinion that although 
there is a significant financial development both at  the institutional level and the innovation 
of financial instruments such as mutual funds, hedge funds, options, futures and etc. within 
these countries post-1997 AFC, the rigidity and the constraints imposed by the financial 
lenders a.k.a. the banks made it harder for these firms to borrow from the banks and hence 
they have to rely upon their own saving for any future investment.  
7. Domestic Credit by Banks: The result indicates that an increase by one percentage point in 
the domestic credit by banks would lead to a decline by 0.3361 percentage points in the 
corporate saving. Since domestic credit by banks reflect the monetary policy within a country, 
a declined implies that if the firms have easy access to the banks due to loose monetary 
regulations, they will less likely save. Furthermore, this is related to the earlier explanation 
that despite a significant financial liberalization (FLI1) in these countries, the firms still opt to 
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save more due to domestic borrowing constraints and here we have shown that an easy access 
to the banks would reduce their saving level.  
8. Business Confidence Index (BCI): The coefficient value of -.0.04725 indicates than when 
business confidence index increases by one point, the corporate saving will decline by 
0.04725 percentage points. When the firms have bullish view on the future prospects of the 
economy, they will reduce their saving level. As mentioned earlier, the BCI is the survey data 
of the firms themselves on the future economic conditions and the prospects of their firms in 
the economy.  
9. Market Capitalization of Listed Companies: An increase by one percentage point in the 
value of the firms’ shares lead to a declined by 0.1651 percentage points in the corporate 
saving. The market capitalization reflects the financial depth in the economy and when the 
value of corporate shares rises, they will more likely save less and raise capital via external 
financing where their shares value will be higher.  
10. Stocks Traded: When the stocks traded increases by one percentage point relative to the 
GDP, the corporate saving increases by 0.2688 percentage points. Unlike the market 
capitalization that shows the value of corporation shares, high trading volumes mean that the 
stock can be traded easily, has high liquidity and narrow spread, more competitive and less 
volatile. The price of the security is more expensive when the trading volume is high because 
people are willing to buy it. In our result, it seems that the higher trading volume does not 
deter the corporate saving behaviour, similar to the effect of stock market index but contrary 
to the effect of market capitalization of listed companies. It is possible that the corporate 
sectors are less likely to issue shares/equity as this would increase the ownership in their firms 
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and hence trading volume or stock market index would not make them save less. Instead, if 
the value of their existing shares increase, indicated by the market capitalization of listed 
companies, then they would save less to raise their capital via external financing. 
11. Stocks Turnover Ratio: A one percentage point increase in the stock turnover ratio will 
decrease the corporate saving by 0.3361 percentage points. Stocks turnover ratio is a measure 
of stock market liquidity and the higher the turnover ratio, the more liquid is the secondary 
market. We have defined it as the extent of total value of stocks traded in the secondary 
market relative to the total value of outstanding stocks. When the firms’ traded stocks value 
increases relative to its outstanding value, the investors will perceive it as efficiency in the 
firms stocks management and would lead the firms to reduce its saving and raise capital via 
the secondary market. It is noteworthy that the volume of the stocks traded alone does not 
deter the corporate saving but when the value of these volume rises, then the firms would 
reduce its corporate saving and most likely tap the market.  
12. Equity Index: A one percentage point increase in the annual percentage change of S&P 
Global Equity Indices will cause a decline in the predicted value of corporate saving by 
0.01801 percentage points. Unlike the stock market index above that causes an increase in 
corporate saving, the equity index on the other hand causes a decline. The stock market index 
refers to the national index of a given nation’s stock market performance and usually 
composed of the stocks of large companies listed on a nation’s largest stock exchanges like 
Jakarta Stock Exchange, Philippines Stock Exchange and Stock Exchange of Thailand. The 
S&P global equity indices is the annual US dollar price change in the stock markets covered 
by the S&P/IFCI and S& P/Frontier BMI Country indices. The S&P/IFCI and S&P/Frontier 
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BMI Country will monitor and evaluate a nation’s stock market before it can be included in 
the S&P Global Equity Index series. For example, one of the requirements for S&P/IFCI is 
that a country must represents at least 40 bp of the total market weight of the combines 
S&P/IFCI countries and if the country drops below 40bp over long periods of time, then S&P 
will remove it. Furthermore, the country’s classification will be based on economic and 
political conditions, relative market size, market capitalization and etc. It is in our opinion that 
since the equity index takes into account many factors, including total market value before 
listing the country’s index, this gives an opportunity for firms to raise capital via equity 
market instead of using their own internal financing. The stock market index does not deter 
the corporate saving behavior but equity index that reflects many criterias including market 
value of listed companies will deter corporate saving behaviour.  
13. Real Interest Rate: A one percentage point increase in the real interest rate lead to a 
decline of about 0.12 percentage points in the corporate saving. The negative coefficient of 
real interest rate on corporate saving is consistent with Loayza, Schmidt – Hebbel and Serven 
(2000) and Edwards (1995). Furthermore, a lot of empirical study on private saving in 
developed and developing countries have shown low interest rate elasticity of domestic 
aggregate saving including Boskin (1978) and Giovannini (1983).  Existing literatures would 
argue that the income effect outweighs the sum of the substitution effect and the wealth effect. 
Under income effect, when the interest rate is lower, the price of future consumption is lower 
than the price of current consumption and if the firms perceive that they will be obtaining 
lower income in the future, they will decrease the current consumption and increase their 
corporate saving. In other words, despite the low interest rate, the firms are still saving 
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because they perceive the low income they will be getting in the future could affect their 
obligation in meeting up their operational expenses, hence leading to higher saving.  
14. Banks’ Non-Performing Loans: The result is intutively clear that when the banks non-
performing loans increase, the corporate sector will save more since the banks are less likely 
to extend out any credits. This was obvious during the 1997-AFC in which the banks were left 
with many non-performing loans that led to a credit crunch in the economy.  
15. Firms’ Net Worth: Our results indicate that when the firms’ net worth increases by one 
percentage point, the corporate saving will increase by 0.1342 percentage points. We find it 
quite strange that when the firms’ net worth rises, the corporations tend to save more which 
reflects what is happening around the world now, that although the firms’ balance sheet looks 
good, the firms still choose to save rather than to invest . This intuitively suggests that firms 
might be saving either because of domestic borrowing constraints from the financial 
institutions in their countries or the uncertainty about the future prospects. It is noteworthy 
that currently the economic situation in Asean-3 is not similar to the economic environment in 
the US in which despite the  negative real interest rate and the willingness of the banks to 
extend their credit, the firms in the US prefer to hoard their cash than to invest. In Asean-3, 
the real interest rate have been relatively stable except for a huge plunge in 1997 (Graph 1.2, 
Appendix 3). Hence, it is not obvious whether the firms’ decision to save despite the increase 
in their net worth is attributed to the domestic borrowing constraints or the uncertainty about 
the future.  
16. Banks’ Net Worth: When the banks’ net worth increases by one percentage point, the 
corporate saving will decline by 0.3395 percentage points. The negative coefficient of banks’ 
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net worth and domestic credit by banks strongly support that an easy access to domestic 
borrowing would reduce the firms likeliness to save. Furthermore, since the variables firms’ 
net worth and stock market index do not reduce the corporate saving, it is possible that what 
matter to the firms is available credit from financial intermediaries.  
17. Capital Flight: Another variable that is used as a proxy to macroeconomic uncertainty is 
capital flight/gdp. It is positive although insignificant in our model. The positive coefficient  
indicates that when there is an increase in the capital flight from a country, the corporate 
saving will also increase  due to precautionary motives although it is not in one to one fashion 
– the coefficient value is 0.04821 (Table 1.8, Appendix 12).   
Our regression results have shown the variables that statistically influence the corporate sector 
behavior to save rather than to invest, but we can’t conclude the main reason for such 
behavior. To summarize,  some of these variables represent the uncertainty about the future, 
the domestic borrowing constraints,  the firms’ performance and the demographic landscapes 
– but which of this category is the main driver of corporate saving. In Table 1.9 of Appendix 
15, we have listed the expected and the actual sign of the AR(1) model regression coefficients 
in order to provide intuitively the main category for fims to save. The variables stock market 
index, firms’ net worth and urbanization ratio deviate from our expectation. As explained 
earlier, we have expected that when investors have positive sentiment of the future economic 
condition as reflected by the stock market index, the corporate sector will save less, but this 
wasn’t the case which in a way, give more weight to the domestic borrowing constraints 
relative to the future uncertainty. Similarly, we expect that when the firms’ net worth 
increases, which means that the firms are performing well, they will save less but instead the 
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result show that they will save even more –intuitively, again giving more weight to the 
domestic borrowing constraints relative to the future uncertainty.  
As we have mentioned earlier, there are four main categories of variables in our AR(1) model 
listed in Table 1.10 of Appendix 16. We assume that the variables that are related to the 
economic uncertainty as representing the independent shocks in the economy. Our next step  
is to compare the adjusted R-square from dropping off each of these variables from our 
reduced form model. The purpose is to see the impact of the excluded variable on the linear 
combinations of the remaining variables in explaining the total variation of corporate saving. 
Take note that adjusted R-square is the square of correlation coefficient between the actual 
data and the predicted values and it measures how well does the regression line fits the actual 
data points. This we hope could intuitively gives us an idea of which category of the variables 
that is the main driver of corporate saving. The result in Table 1. 11 of Appendix 17 shows 
that the top five excluded variables that cause the highest reduction in adjusted R-square (by 
17% decline for FLI1) come from the demographic category and the future economic 
uncertainty. Although this was not what we were expecting, the results show that the 
exclusion of FLI for example, woud have the highest effect on the linear combination of other 
regressors in predicting the values of corporate saving. Finally, we will use a formal empirical 
approach of VAR to address our question on the main category of variables that drive 
corporate saving. The VAR is ordering-dependent and our initial shock will be from the 
economic uncertainty variables. As mentioned earlier, we can check the robustness of this 
ordering by reorder them or to use generalized impulse (where ordering is not a matter) 
instead of Cholesky Decomposition. We run several VAR(1) of different orders to determine 
the category of variables that highly influence the corporate saving.  
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Government Investment -> Real Interest Rate -> Banks’ Non-Performing Loans -> Banks’ 
Net Worth -> Domestic Credit by Banks -> Firms’ Net Worth -> Corporate Saving           (1)         
Stock Market Index ->Business Confidence Index-> Real Interest Rate -> Banks’ Non-
Performing Loans -> Banks’ Net Worth -> Domestic Credit by Banks -> Firms’ Net Worth -> 
Corporate Saving                               (2) 
Financial Liberalization Index ->Current Account Balance -> Real Interest Rate -> Banks 
Non-Performing Loans -> Banks’ Net Worth -> Domestic Credit by Banks -> Firms’ Net 
Worth -> Corporate Saving                                (3)                                                                              
For equation (1), the results in Graph 1.9 of Appendix 18 shows that when the government 
investment increases, the real interest rate will increase, the banks’ non performing loans 
decreases, the banks’ net worth will increase, the domestic credit by banks will increase 
leading to firms’ net worth decreases and the corporate saving decreases as well. In Appendix 
19, we show the variance decomposition of corporate saving and it is apparent that the highest 
variation comes from domestic credit by banks, followed by real interest rate and banks’ non-
performing loans, the variables in the category of domestic borrowing constraints. In this 
result, we find it quite strange that when the real interest rate increases, the banks’ non-
performing loans decreases. In our opinion, this could be due to the initial shocks of 
government investment that increases the firms investment and lead to lower banks’ non-
performing loans. For equation (2), the results in our Appendix 20 shows the impulse 
response from the transmission of shock that is initiated by the stock market index and the 
business confidence index. The variance decomposition in Appendix 21 shows that for the 
first two period, the highest variation in corporate saving is due to real interest rate but in the 
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long run, about 30% of the variation comes from both real interest rate and domestic credit by 
banks. Banks’ non-performing loans and business confidence index contribute about 10% of 
the corporate saving variance. Overall, we can conclude that the domestic borrowing 
constraint variables explain higher variation in the corporate saving relative to variables in 
other categories. In Appendix 22, we can see the impulse response that is initiated by an 
increase in the financial liberalization index causing a decline in the current account balance 
(more foreign saving) followed by an increase in the real interest rate, a decline in the banks’ 
non-performing loans, an increase in banks’ net worth, an increase in the domestic credit by 
banks that would reduce the firms’ net worth and their corporate saving. However, unlike the 
previous two variance decomposition, the effect of current account balance is the highest on 
corporate saving variation relation to real interest rate, banks’ non-performing loans and 
domestic credit by banks. In conclusion, although we strongly believe that domestic 
borrowing constraint is the main category that drives the corporate saving, we don’t have 
solid evidence to support this claim. The variance decompositions from the government 
investment shock and the stock market index shock clearly show that the highest percentage 
of variation in corporate saving comes from real interest rate and domestic credit by banks but 
the shock to financial liberalization index cause the variation to be highest from current 
account balance.  
 
 
 
79 
 
5.3. The Evidence of an Increase in Financial Market Investment Post-97 AFC by 
Corporate Sector? 
In Figure 1.25, we have plotted three different categories of financial market instruments 
(securities other than shares, shares and other equity, foreign debt and claims) that non-
financial corporations have invested while in Figure 1.26, we have their investment in non-
financial market instruments (currency and deposits, loans, other account recevables). For the 
non-financial corporations in Thailand, there was a large withdrawal/liquidation of securities 
other than shares in 1997 (Figure 1.25) and other account receivables in 1999 and 2004 
(Figure 1.26). Securities other than shares comprised of commercial bills, debentures, debt 
securities and public authority securities. During the period of 1998 to 2003, when the 
corporate sector was experiencing positive excess saving, the only instrument holding that had 
rebounded from a huge plunge in 1997 was securities other than shares while other assets 
including shares and other equities, loans and currency and deposits remain below the level it 
was prior to 1997. Hence, this supported our hypothesis that the non-financial corporations 
channeled their excess saving to financial market specifically in the holding of securities other 
than shares. After 2003, we can see that the holding of shares and other equity is not as 
demanding as loans, currency and deposits, and securities other than shares, which support 
our earlier finding that the corporations are less likely to raise capital via stock market. In 
addition to looking at the behavior of non-financial corporations, we also found that there was 
a declined in the loan/credit issuance by financial corporations from 1998 to 2003 during 
which the corporations were experiencing positive excess saving (Figure 1.27), supporting the 
claim that the investment in productivity sectors were declining and the investment in 
securities other than shares were rising (Figure 1.25). 
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Source: Flow-of-Funds Accounts 
Figure 1.25: Non-Financial Corporations Used of Financial Instruments - Thailand 
(Millions of Bath) 
 
 
 
Source: Flow-of-Funds Accounts 
Figure 1.26: Non-Financial Corporations Used of Non-Financial Instruments - Thailand 
(Millions of Bath) 
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Source: Flow-of-Funds Accounts 
Figure 1.27: Financial Corporations Issuance of Loans - Thailand 
(Millions of Bath) 
 
In the case of Philippines, the non-financial corporations experienced positive excess saving 
from year 2004 onwards. From Figure 1.29, we can conclude that these extra saving were 
used mainly in the holding of account receivables/payables such as trade credit and securities 
other than shares (Figure 1.28). Other categories of instruments exhibited declining trends 
post-2004 with biggest drop in 2007/2008 during the GFC before they started to increase 
again. The loan/credit extended by the financial corporations in Figure 1.30 showed an 
increasing trend during this positive excess saving period. In our opinion, it was interesting to 
see that despite the positive excess saving, the issuances of loans/credits were also increasing. 
The financial liberalization of financial market in Philippines could potentially have opened 
up a lot of business opportunities that lead them to buy trade credit as the source of their 
external financing. Although  it was quite  clear that financial corporations did not exhibit 
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-1500000
-1000000
-500000
0
500000
1000000
1500000
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Loans
82 
 
their trade investment and if they are the trade creditor, the delayed payment due to trade 
credit lead them to hold their cash balances for longer period.  
 
Source: Flow-of-Funds Accounts 
Figure 1.28: Non-Financial Corporations Used of Financial Instruments - Philippines 
(Millions of Pesos) 
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Source: Flow-of-Funds Accounts 
Figure 1.29:Non-Financial Corporations Used of Non-Financial Instruments –
Philippines (Millions of Pesos) 
 
 
 
Source: Flow-of-Funds Accounts 
Figure 1.30: Financial Corporations Issuance of Loans - Philippines 
(Millions of Pesos) 
 
-200000
-100000
0
100000
200000
300000
400000
500000
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Currency and deposits Loans Other accounts receivable
-100000
-50000
0
50000
100000
150000
200000
250000
300000
350000
400000
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
Loans
84 
 
Indonesia experienced positive excess saving from 1998 to 2003. In Figure 1.31 and 1.32, we 
can see that there was a gradual rise in the holding of currency and deposits and bills, bonds 
and loans. The holding of financial instrument such as shares and other equities showed an 
increase only in 2002 to 2003. In Figure 1.33, we can see that the issuance of loans by 
financial corporations were declining during the corresponding period, indicating that the rise 
in the bills, bonds and loans was more likely on the holding of bills and bonds. During the 
1997 AFC, there was a large capital outflows from these countries and since the Indonesia 
government needs to finance their budget deficits and recapitalized the banking system, they 
raised capital by issuing the government bonds and bills that the non-financial corporations 
and households had to hold. Furthermore, after the AFC, there was a high priority on the 
development of Asia bond market which could attribute to the gradual rise in the holding of 
these instruments.  
 
Source: Flow-of-Funds Accounts 
Figure 1.31: Non-Financial Corporations and Households Used of Financial Instruments 
– Indonesia (Billions of Rupiahs) 
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Source: Flow-of-Funds Accounts 
Figure 1.32: Non-Financial Corporations and Households Used of Non-Financial 
Instruments – Indonesia (Billions of Rupiahs) 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Flow-of-Funds Accounts 
Figure 1.33: Financial Corporations Issuance of Loans - Indonesia 
(Billions of Rupiahs) 
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6. Conclusion 
6.1.Concluding Remarks: 
We started this paper at the beginning with fivefold. Firstly, we described the current issue of 
the rise in corporations hoarding behavior that was at the center stage of debate among 
economists as our source of motivation to investigate the saving of corporate sector. Most 
empirical studies on private saving aggregated both the household and the corporate savings, 
but in this study, we focused solely on corporate/non-financial corporations saving. The 
discrepancy of the claim on the duration of corporate positive excess saving or commonly 
known as corporation savings glut among the economists arises depending on how one 
defines corporate saving. In our case, we used the data from the flow-of-funds and defined 
excess saving to be the difference between gross saving and gross capital formation.  
Secondly, we examined graphically the claim on excess saving existence in Asean-3 
especially in the aftermath of 1997 AFC. It was interesting to note from the graphical 
evidence that the hoarding behavior of the firms lasted even after the recovery period and this 
prompted us to look at the sensitivity of their saving - investment behavior. In Thailand and 
Indonesia, the corporate positive excess saving was from 1998 to 2003 while in Philippines, it 
was from 2004 to 2009. Thirdly, we relate this results to the larger body of research initiated 
by  Feldstein-Horioka (FH) puzzle and found that the corporate investment decision was very 
positively significant to the government saving. It was also positively significant to the 
corporate saving and the household saving but in terms of the value of estimated coefficients, 
the government saving was the main determinant factor. This intuitively telling us that 
perhaps government policies are the main driver of corporate saving in addition to the claim 
that current account balance is one of the answers to FH puzzle. Although Feldstein-Horioka 
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puzzle stemmed from the research on OECD countries and it was concluded that there was no 
perfect capital mobility, we extended this methodology to developing countries in Asia and as 
expected, FH puzzle held. We agree that despite the financial globalisation and financial 
liberalization that take place much after the 1997 AFC, the regression result still shows that 
there is no perfect capital mobility. In our opinion, this is because along with the liberalization 
of financial market and financial governance come stricter and more prudent regulations 
imposed on the economic sectors in these countries in addition to the fact that their financial 
system is not fully liberalized or being liberalized in stages. Forthly, we investigate 
empirically the determinant of corporate saving using not only the standard macroeconomic 
variables but also the firms and banks’ specific factors such as business confidence index, 
firms’ net worth, banks’ net worth, banks’ non-performing loans and etc. We employed 
AR(1) approach that will correct for autocorrelation and our results have shown that stock 
market index, current account balance, urbanization, age dependency ratio, government 
investment, financial liberalization index, banks’ non-performing loans, stocks traded, 
business confidence index, domestic credit by banks, market capitalization, equity index, 
stocks turnover ratio, firms’ net worth, banks’ net worth and real interest rate are the 
significant variables while capital flight is the only insignificant variable. We categorized 
these variables from our reduced-form model into three categories: future economic 
uncertainty, domestic borrowing constraint and others such as demographic category in order 
to determine the main category that influences the corporate saving. Our intuitive approach is 
to first exclude one variable at a time and compare across adjusted R-square. Our empirical 
approach is to use impulse response and variance decomposition which indicate that the 
dominant category depends on the initial shock of the variable that we have used. For 
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instance, the shocks transmitted from government investment, stock market index and 
business confidence index show that the highest percentage of variation in corporate saving 
comes from domestic credit by banks and real interest rate while the shock that was initiated 
from financial liberalization index and current account balance resulting in highest variation 
that comes from current account balance itself. Hence, we conclude, that there are no 
conclusive category that have highest weight on corporate saving since the main driver of 
corporate saving depends on the source of the shocks. Furthermore, since our economy itself 
is a complex mechanism in which there is no single factor that is independent/exogeneous 
without being affected by other variables or is affecting other variables, and the web of 
economic integration itself is entangled with more complexity due to financial globalization 
and liberalization, it is impossible to rule out single dominant category that drives saving glut 
around the world, and in our case Asean-3. However, our finding on the possible determinant 
variables that could influence the corporate saving will provide an avenue for policy-makers 
to adjust these variables in their effort to balance the saving investment in the economy. 
Based on our empirical results, we can say that the main variable that drives the saving-
investment behavior of corporation is the current account balance, reflecting the importance 
of export-import sector within a country. In addition, we have also shown the economic 
players’ behaviour ranging from households, non-financial corporations and government 
sectors decisions to save and to invest that will give an insight to the government and 
monetary authority to target the right economic player in order to  achieve their economic 
goal. Finally, we investigate graphically whether corporate sector investment in the financial 
market has increased post-1997 AFC. In the case of Thailand that experienced positive excess 
saving from 1997/1998 to 2003, there was an increase in corporations holding of securitites 
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other than shares and the issuance of loans by financial corporation were declining during 
these same period. Similarly, in the case of Indonesia, the period of positive excess saving 
(1998 to 2003) showed a significant increased in the holding of bills and bonds and the 
issuance of loans by financial corporations were declining. These trends of declining in the 
issuance of loans by financial corporations and the increase of investment in financial market 
instruments during the period of positive excess saving (or recovery period from 1997 AFC) 
in our results could be viewed as the combination of Blinder and Stiglitz (1983) theoretical 
work on broad credit channel and the expansion of alternative financial investment. In their 
work, it is arguably that the ability of firms to borrow depends on its balance sheet in 
particular whenits net worth is low. Otherwise, at all times, the condition of the balance sheet 
would be in least consideration for firms to seek funding for its investment. However, in the 
case of Philippines that was experiencing positive excess saving from 2004 and onwards, bulk 
of the corporations’ assets were in terms of account receivables/payables (trade credit) 
although there was a gradual increase in the holding of securities other than shares. The 
financial corporations issuance of loans were increasing during these corresponding period 
and most of it were used by corporations as trade credit. This again supports the classical case 
of Blinder and Stiglitz (1983) broad credit channel argument that the condition of a firm’s 
balance sheet would affect its ability to borrow, especially when its net worth is low. 
Philippines experienced positive excess saving from 2004 onwards and was not hard-hitted by 
the 1997 AFC as Thailand and Indonesia. Hence, it is sufficient to conclude that its firms 
were not suffering from low net worth that would otherwise deter the extension of loans by 
financial corporations.  
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Our paper is unique in the sense that we incorporate new variables to our regression analysis 
that deviate from the traditional approach of focusing solely on macroeoconomic variables. 
Furthermore, the source of data that comes from flow-of-funds provides a clear insight into 
the economic landscapes of these countries including the economic players’ behaviour to 
invest or to save in addition to how they use their funds and the source of these funds that they 
choose from. However, further research using larger data source from flow-of-funds could be 
conducted to validate our claim and  the mixed results for the dominant category of corporate 
saving deserve additional research attention.  
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APPENDIX 
 Appendix 1 
 Graph 1.1: Graphs of Corporate Saving/GDP and its Determinant Variables 
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Appendix 2 
Table 1.2: Correlation Matrix of Corporate Savings and its Determinant Variables 
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Appendix 3  
Graph 1.2: Relevant Variables across Time (1970 – 2009) 
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Appendix 4  
Table 1.3: Pairwise Granger – Causality Test 
 
Lags: 1
 Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob. 
 GOVSAV does not Granger Cause CORPSAV 38 3.1579 0.0843
 CORPSAV does not Granger Cause GOVSAV 0.07771 0.7821
 TOTALSAV does not Granger Cause CORPSAV 38 0.09997 0.7537
 CORPSAV does not Granger Cause TOTALSAV 0.18205 0.6722
 SMI does not Granger Cause CORPSAV 38 1.13818 0.2933
 CORPSAV does not Granger Cause SMI 0.68148 0.4147
 RGDPGR does not Granger Cause CORPSAV 38 0.73205 0.398
 CORPSAV does not Granger Cause RGDPGR 0.00099 0.9751
 POP does not Granger Cause CORPSAV 38 0.52991 0.4715
 CORPSAV does not Granger Cause POP 0.06984 0.7931
 INF does not Granger Cause CORPSAV 38 0.9699 0.3315
 CORPSAV does not Granger Cause INF 1.35088 0.253
 EXPINF does not Granger Cause CORPSAV 38 0.13052 0.7201
 CORPSAV does not Granger Cause EXPINF 1.26832 0.2677
 CAB does not Granger Cause CORPSAV 38 0.22471 0.6384
 CORPSAV does not Granger Cause CAB 0.27338 0.6044
 PCNGDP does not Granger Cause CORPSAV 38 2.78383 0.1041
 CORPSAV does not Granger Cause PCNGDP 0.26132 0.6124
 PCRGDP does not Granger Cause CORPSAV 38 3.00925 0.0916
 CORPSAV does not Granger Cause PCRGDP 0.92019 0.344
 M2GDPS does not Granger Cause CORPSAV 38 1.59945 0.2143
 CORPSAV does not Granger Cause M2GDPS 1.47908 0.2321
 M2GNI does not Granger Cause CORPSAV 38 0.00035 0.9853
 CORPSAV does not Granger Cause M2GNI 0.02715 0.8701
 TFRGNDBT does not Granger Cause CORPSAV 38 0.16512 0.687
 CORPSAV does not Granger Cause TFRGNDBT 1.35261 0.2527
 CAPFLIGHT does not Granger Cause CORPSAV 38 4.27399 0.0462
 CORPSAV does not Granger Cause CAPFLIGHT 0.04534 0.8326
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests
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 URBAN does not Granger Cause CORPSAV 38 1.62358 0.211
 CORPSAV does not Granger Cause URBAN 1.78191 0.1905
 AGE does not Granger Cause CORPSAV 38 0.00444 0.9473
 CORPSAV does not Granger Cause AGE 1.34125 0.2547
 GOVINV does not Granger Cause CORPSAV 38 0.56539 0.4571
 CORPSAV does not Granger Cause GOVINV 0.0009 0.9763
 LNDINT does not Granger Cause CORPSAV 38 0.3396 0.5638
 CORPSAV does not Granger Cause LNDINT 0.46978 0.4976
 RINT does not Granger Cause CORPSAV 38 0.98087 0.3288
 CORPSAV does not Granger Cause RINT 0.01139 0.9156
 FLI1 does not Granger Cause CORPSAV 38 3.15772 0.0843
 CORPSAV does not Granger Cause FLI1 0.13653 0.714
 FLI2 does not Granger Cause CORPSAV 38 0.21069 0.6491
 CORPSAV does not Granger Cause FLI2 0.21099 0.6488
 M2GDPF does not Granger Cause CORPSAV 38 0.01293 0.9101
 CORPSAV does not Granger Cause M2GDPF 0.57992 0.4514
 BANKNPL does not Granger Cause CORPSAV 38 0.00143 0.9701
 CORPSAV does not Granger Cause BANKNPL 0.15153 0.6994
 STOCKSVAL does not Granger Cause CORPSAV 38 0.78871 0.3806
 CORPSAV does not Granger Cause STOCKSVAL 0.08939 0.7667
 STOCKSTRADE does not Granger Cause CORPSAV 38 3.29433 0.0781
 CORPSAV does not Granger Cause STOCKSTRADE 0.74444 0.3941
 BCI does not Granger Cause CORPSAV 38 0.05564 0.8149
 CORPSAV does not Granger Cause BCI 0.56973 0.4554
 CLAIMSONPS does not Granger Cause CORPSAV 38 0.1034 0.7497
 CORPSAV does not Granger Cause CLAIMSONPS 4.86258 0.0341
 DOMCREDBYBANKS does not Granger Cause CORPSAV 38 2.36348 0.1332
 CORPSAV does not Granger Cause DOMCREDBYBANKS 1.24024 0.273
 INTSPREAD does not Granger Cause CORPSAV 38 0.12649 0.7242
 CORPSAV does not Granger Cause INTSPREAD 0.11759 0.7337
 GROSSINFLOWS does not Granger Cause CORPSAV 38 0.38384 0.5396
 CORPSAV does not Granger Cause GROSSINFLOWS 0.4769 0.4944
 MARKETCAP does not Granger Cause CORPSAV 38 0.33487 0.5665
 CORPSAV does not Granger Cause MARKETCAP 0.44555 0.5088
 EQINDEX does not Granger Cause CORPSAV 38 0.7435 0.3944
 CORPSAV does not Granger Cause EQINDEX 0.09126 0.7644
 STOCKTURNOVER does not Granger Cause CORPSAV 38 2.72264 0.1079
 CORPSAV does not Granger Cause STOCKTURNOVER 2.5408 0.1199
 FIRMSNETWORTH does not Granger Cause CORPSAV 38 0.2405 0.6269
 CORPSAV does not Granger Cause FIRMSNETWORTH 0.23854 0.6283
 BANKSNETWORTH does not Granger Cause CORPSAV 38 0.21356 0.6468
 CORPSAV does not Granger Cause BANKSNETWORTH 0.06575 0.7991
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 Appendix 5  
Table 1.4: Results of Unit Root Tests Using Augmented Dickey Fuller Statistic 
 
corpsav -0.887879 (-3.430003)* I(1)
govsav -1.372942 -2.326222 I(1)
smi -0.538457 -2.777449 I(1)
rgdpgr -3.591333 (-5.19335)*** I(0)
expinf (-3.213759)*** (-5.112635)*** I(0)
cab (-3.564052)*** (-4.309982)*** I(0)
pcrgdp (-1.896734)* (-3.281447)* I(0)
m2gdps -1.138583 -3.007623 I(1)
tfrgndbt -1.143126 -2.402912 I(1)
capflight (-5.170463)*** (-5.275114)*** I(1)
urban (-2.355016)** -2.381188 I(0)
age -1.111578 -1.697483 I(1)
govinv -1.332689 -3.064643 I(1)
rint (-4.26717)*** (-6.243382)*** I(0)
fli1 0.356272 -3.079938 I(1)
banknpl (-1.77054)* (-3.822424)** I(0)
stockstrade -1.378156 -2.132003 I(1)
bci -0.599539 -2.32631 I(1)
claimsonps (-4.88429)*** (-5.420978)*** I(0)
domcredbybanks -1.549153 -2.216929 I(1)
intspread -1.522075 (-4.067635)** I(0)
grossinflows (-1.952454)** -3.050025 I(0)
marketcap (-1.933717)* (-4.274873)** I(0)
eqindex (-6.46132)*** (-7.01204)*** I(0)
stockturnover -0.871759 -2.387263 I(1)
firmsnetworth (-3.762436)*** (-3.481798)* I(0)
banksnetworth (-5.619809)*** (-5.68651)*** I(0)
Augmented Dickey Fuller Test Statistics 
Variables (Level)
Without Intercept 
and Trend
With Intercept and 
Trend
Inference
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Appendix 6 
Table 1.5:Determinants of Corporate Investment/GDP (F-H Regression) 
 
1 2 3 
OLS Estimate Weighted Least Square (WLS) Panel Data (FE) 
Corporate Saving/GDP 0.4340**                                  
(2.553) 
0.3872***                                       
(2.900) 
0.5986***          
(5.221) 
Household Saving/GDP 0.6341*                                    
(2.01) 
0.6704*                                              
(1.799) 
0.1566               
(1.689) 
Government 
Saving/GDP 
2.3308***      
(7.593 ) 
2.0074***                                                     
(7.878) 
2.6267***           
(5.75) 
F(3,35) 49.1828*** 46.829*** F(5,35): 25.0292*** 
R-Square 0.7578 0.8005 0.7913 
Multicolinearity (VIF) 
CS/GDP: 1.488 CS/GDP: 1.488 - 
HS/GDP: 1.217 HS/GDP: 1.217 - 
GS/GDP: 1.412 GS/GDP: 1.412 - 
Heteroskedasticity 
19.503*** (WT)        
5.5865      (BP) 
- 1.8049 (Wald Test) 
Autocorrelation (Durbin 
Watson) 
1.5423 1.5323 
1.492 
Cointegration Yes Yes Yes 
 
1.*** indicates significant values at 1%, ** indicates significant at 5% and * indicates 
significant at 10%. 
2. The values in parentheses are the t-statistics.  
3. The null hypothesis for F(3,35) test statistic: There is no linear relationship between 
corporate saving/GDP and the explanatory variables 
4. Multicollinearity is a problem when several explanatory variables are highly correlated. 
VIF>10 indicates the existence of multicollinearity problem. 
5. The null hypothesis to check the heteroskedasticity is: There is no presence of 
heteroskedasticity. We used both White’s test and Breusch-Pagan test to examine its 
existence. 
6. The null hypothesis for autocorrelation using Durbin Watson is that there is no presence of 
autocorrelation.  
7. We used Rule of Thumb proposed by Granger – Newbold to test the existence of 
cointegration. Essentially if R
2 
< Durbin Watson statistics, the cointegration exists and we 
don’t have the problem of spurios regression 
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Appendix 7  
Table 1.6: Ordinary Least Square Full-Form Model of Corporate Saving/GDP 
 
 
 
Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const -13.2228      1 7.0633 -0.7749 0.4534
GOVSAV -0.0533978 0.140862 -0.3791 0.7113
SMI 0.00356584 0.000962663 3.704 0.0030   ***
RGDPGr 0.182546 0.178831 1.021 0.3275
ExpInf 0.126006 0.139603 0.9026 0.3845
CAB 0.81182 0.198037 4.099 0.0015   ***
PCRGDP -0.00287484 0.00344205 -0.8352 0.4199
M2GDPS 0.0445369 0.0602524 0.7392 0.474
TFrgnDbt -0.118897 0.0734049 -1.62 0.1313
CapFlight 0.46952 0.172939 2.715 0.0188   **
Urban 2.43804 0.493535 4.94 0.0003   ***
Age -0.723994 0.115444 -6.271 4.12e-05 ***
GovInv -1.64046 0.40701 -4.031 0.0017   ***
Rint 0.109325 0.237707 0.4599 0.6538
FLI1 26.3706 4.12549 6.392 3.44e-05 ***
BankNPL 0.0527147 0.0470003 1.122 0.284
StocksTrade 0.161703 0.0566456 2.855 0.0145   **
BCI -0.0915983 0.0374177 -2.448 0.0307   **
ClaimsonPS 0.00142455 0.0400178 0.0356 0.9722
DomCredbyBanks -0.119052 0.0900222 -1.322 0.2107
IntSpread -0.536962 0.575999 -0.9322 0.3696
GrossInflows 0.598163 0.366843 1.631 0.1289
MarketCap -0.0982401 0.042412 -2.316 0.0390   **
EqIndex -0.0281001 0.0103105 -2.725 0.0184   **
StockTurnover -0.0901405 0.0204116 -4.416 0.0008   ***
FirmsNetworth 0.155395 0.0721 2.155 0.0522   *
BanksNetworth -0.301667 0.116366 -2.592 0.0236   **
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1.*** indicates significant values at 1%, ** indicates significant at 5% and * indicates 
significant at 10%. 
3. The null hypothesis for F(26,12) test statistic: There is no linear relationship between 
corporate saving/GDP and the explanatory variables 
4. Multicollinearity is a problem when several explanatory variables are highly correlated. 
VIF>10 indicates the existence of multicollinearity problem. 
5. The null hypothesis to check the heteroskedasticity is: There is no presence of 
heteroskedasticity. We used both White’s test and Breusch-Pagan test to examine its 
existence. 
6. The null hypothesis for autocorrelation using Durbin Watson is that there is no presence of 
autocorrelation.  
7. We used Rule of Thumb proposed by Granger – Newbold to test the existence of 
cointegration. Essentially if R
2 
< Durbin Watson statistics, the cointegration exists and we 
don’t have the problem of spurios regression.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean dependent var 19.93004 S.D. dependent var 7.591806
Sum squared resid 69.00895 S.E. of regression 2.398071
R-squared 0.968491 Adjusted R-squared 0.900222
F(26, 12) 1886.159 P-value(F) 3.97E-18
Log-likelihood -66.46676 Akaike criterion 186.9335
Schwarz criterion 231.8497 Hannan-Quinn 203.049
rho -0.298163 Durbin-Watson 2.593014
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Appendix 8 
Graph 1.3: Plotted of Residuals over Time for the OLS Full-Form Model 
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Appendix 9 
 
Table 1.7: Ordinary Least Square Reduced-Form Model of Corporate Saving/GDP 
 
 
 
 
 
White's test for heteroskedasticity - 
 Null hypothesis: heteroskedasticity not present 
 Test statistic: LM = 36.0409 
 with p-value = P(Chi-square(34) > 38.7617) = 0.373246 
 
LM test for autocorrelation up to order 1 - 
 Null hypothesis: no autocorrelation 
 Test statistic: LMF = 1.13006 
 with p-value = P(F(1,120) > 1.32303) = 0.300431 
coefficient std. error t-ratio p-value
const -41.6564 8.1 -5.143 4.28e-05  ***
SMI 0.004601 0.000645 7.132 4.93e-07  ***
CAB 0.765179 0.132265 5.785 9.64e-06  ***
Urban 3.51853 0.271708 12.95 1.77e-011 ***
Age -0.68486 0.090682 -7.552 2.05e-07  ***
GovInv -1.42907 0.365469 -3.91 0.0008    ***
FLI1 33.4119 2.92907 11.41 1.84e-010 ***
BankNPL 0.067263 0.031995 2.102 0.0478    **
StocksTrade0.241937 0.063147 3.831 0.0010    ***
BCI -0.03599 0.03055 -1.178 0.2519
DomCredbyBanks-0.31916 0.049554 -6.441 2.20e-06  ***
MarketCap-0.13953 0.030436 -4.584 0.0002    ***
EqIndex -0.02104 0.005282 -3.983 0.0007    ***
StockTurnover-0.07756 0.026983 -2.874 0.0091    ***
FirmsNetworth0.152118 0.033188 4.584 0.0002    ***
BanksNetworth-0.32786 0.083089 -3.946 0.0007    ***
Rint -0.08469 0.05695 -1.487 0.1518
CapFlight 0.142225 0.117144 1.214 0.2382
OLS Regression Results for Reduced-Form Model
Mean dependent var 19.93004 S.D. dependent var 7.591806
Sum squared resid 90.44611 S.E. of regression 2.075321
R-squared 0.958703 Adjusted R-squared 0.925273
F(17, 21) 235.8036 P-value(F) 3.95E-20
Log-likelihood -71.7419 Akaike criterion 179.4837
Schwarz criterion 209.4278 Hannan-Quinn 190.2274
rho -0.18284 Durbin-Watson 2.360685
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Appendix 10 
 
Graph 1.4: Plotted of Residuals over Time for the OLS Reduced-Form Model 
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Appendix 11 
 
Graph 1.5: Plotted of Residuals over Lagged-1 of Residual for the OLS Reduced-Form Model 
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Appendix 12 
 
Table 1.8: Autoregressive of Order (1) Model of Corporate Saving/GDP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
coefficient std. error z p-value
const           - 40.0047 7.45077 -5.369 7.91e-08  ***
phi_1 -0.397195 0.190431 -2.086 0.0370    **
SMI 0.00444888 0.00059688 7.454 9.09e-014 ***
CAB 0.75857 0.104578 7.254 4.06e-013 ***
Urban 3.62569 0.324586 11.17 5.71e-029 ***
Age -0.706093 0.064841 -10.89 1.29e-027 ***
GovInv -1.61086 0.338779 -4.755 1.99e-06  ***
FLI1 34.0507 3.17826 10.71 8.78e-027 ***
BankNPL 0.078261 0.0321899 2.431 0.0150    **
StocksTrade 0.268778 0.0509311 5.277 1.31e-07  ***
BCI -0.04725 0.0232898 -2.029 0.0425    **
DomCredbyBanks -0.336079 0.0552184 -6.086 1.16e-09  ***
MarketCap -0.165111 0.0319933 -5.161 2.46e-07  ***
EqIndex -0.0180162 0.0065623 -2.745 0.0060    ***
StockTurnover -0.0886819 0.0242753 -3.653 0.0003    ***
FirmsNetworth 0.134154 0.0482845 2.778 0.0055    ***
BanksNetworth -0.33947 0.0959536 -3.538 0.0004    ***
Rint -0.120122 0.0682742 -1.759 0.0785    *
CapFlight 0.0482071 0.104032 0.4634 0.6431
Dummy1 -3.55263 1.68163 -2.113 0.0346    **
Dummy2 1.84879 1.69786 1.089 0.2762
AR(1) Model of Corporate Saving/GDP
Mean dependent var 19.93004 S.D. dependent var 7.591806
Mean of innovations 0.014974 S.D. of innovations 1.339132
Log-likelihood -66.8133 Akaike criterion 177.6266
Schwarz criterion 214.2249 Hannan-Quinn 190.7578
Real Imaginary Modulus Frequency
AR Root 1 -2.5177 0 2.5177 0.5
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Appendix 13 
 
Graph 1.6: Plotted of Residuals over Time for AR(1) Model of Corporate Saving/GDP 
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Appendix 14 
 
Graph 1.7: Plotted of Residuals on Lagged-1 of Residuals for AR(1) Model 
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Appendix 15 
 
                            Table 1.9: Expected and Actual Sign of the AR(1) Regression Coefficients 
 
 Actual Expected 
SMI + - 
CAB + + 
Urban + - 
Age - - 
GovInv - - 
FLI1 + +/- 
BankNPL + + 
StocksTrade + +/- 
BCI - - 
DomCredbyBanks - - 
MarketCap - +/- 
EqIndex - - 
StockTurnover - - 
FirmsNetworth + - 
BanksNetworth - - 
Rint - +/- 
CapFlight + + 
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Appendix 16 
 
Table 1.10: Categories of Variables in our AR(1) Model 
 
  
Variables that are Related to Economic Uncertainty 
Stock 
Market 
Index 
Current 
Account 
Balance 
Government 
Investment 
Financial 
Liberalization 
Index 
Business 
Confidence 
Index 
Stocks 
Traded 
Market 
Capitalization 
Equity Index 
Stocks Turnover Ratio Capital Flight 
Variables that are Related to Borrowing Constraints 
Banks' 
Non-
Performing 
Loans 
Domestic 
Credit by 
Banks 
Real Interest 
Rate 
Banks' Net 
Worth 
Variables that are Related to Firms’ Perspectives 
Firms' Net Worth   
Variables that are Related to Demographic Landscapes 
Urbanization Age Dependency Ratio 
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Appendix 17 
 
Table 1.11: Adjusted R-Square Results from Variable Exclusion 
 
 
  
Excluded Variable Adjusted R-Square from 
lowest to highest 
FLI1 0.765334 
Urban 0.771845 
Age 0.78758 
CAB 0.839174 
SMI 0.849109 
DomCredbyBanks 0.880671 
StocksTrade 0.898637 
GovInv 0.901103 
MarketCap 0.901272 
BanksNetworth 0.90934 
FirmsNetworth 0.912062 
EqIndex 0.914751 
StockTurnover 0.914911 
BankNPL 0.922803 
BCI 0.925347 
Rint 0.925695 
CapFlight 0.925871 
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Appendix 18 
 
Graph 1.8: The Impulse Response Function to VAR(1) of Variables Government Investment, 
Real Interest Rate, Banks’ Non-Performing Loans, Banks’ Net Worth, Domestic Credit by 
Banks, Firms’ Net Worth and Corporate Saving. 
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Appendix 19 
 
Graph 1.9: Variance Decomposition of Corporate Saving to Government Investment, Real 
Interest Rate, Banks’ Non-Performing Loans, Banks’ Net Worth, Domestic Credit by Banks 
and Firms’ Net Worth 
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Appendix 20 
Graph 1.10: The Impulse Response Function of VAR(1) with Variables Stock Market Index, 
Business Confidence Index, Real Interest Rate, Banks’ Non-Performing Loans, Banks’ Net 
Worth, Domestic Credit by Banks, Firms’ Net Worth and Corporate Saving. 
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Appendix 21 
 
Graph 1.11: Variance Decomposition of Corporate Saving to Stock Market Index, Business 
Confidence Index, Real Interest Rate, Banks’ Non-Performing Loans, Banks’ Net Worth, 
Domestic Credit by Banks and Firms’ Net Worth 
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Appendix 22 
Graph 1.12: The Impulse Response Function of VAR(1) with Variables Financial Liberalization 
Index, Current Account Balance, Real Interest Rate, Banks’ Non-Performing Loans, Banks’ Net 
Worth, Domestic Credit by Banks, Firms’ Net Worth and Corporate Saving. 
 
- .1
. 0
. 1
. 2
2 4 6 8 10
Response of FLI1 to FLI1
- .1
. 0
. 1
. 2
2 4 6 8 10
Respons e of FLI1 to CAB
- .1
. 0
. 1
. 2
2 4 6 8 10
Response of FLI1 to RINT
- .1
. 0
. 1
. 2
2 4 6 8 10
Res pons e of FLI1  to  BANKNPL
- .1
. 0
. 1
. 2
2 4 6 8 10
Res po ns e o f FLI1 to  BANKSNETW ORTH
- .1
. 0
. 1
. 2
2 4 6 8 10
Re s p o ns e  o f  FLI1  to  DOM CREDBYBANKS
- .1
. 0
. 1
. 2
2 4 6 8 10
Res pons e of FLI1 to FIRM SNETWORTH
- .1
. 0
. 1
. 2
2 4 6 8 10
Res pons e of FLI1 to  CORPSAV
- 4
0
4
2 4 6 8 10
Respons e of CAB to FLI1
- 4
0
4
2 4 6 8 10
Re s p on s e  o f CAB to  CAB
- 4
0
4
2 4 6 8 10
Res pons e o f CAB to  RINT
- 4
0
4
2 4 6 8 10
Re s p o n s e  o f  CAB to  BANKNPL
- 4
0
4
2 4 6 8 10
Re s p o n s e  o f  CAB to  BANKSNETW ORTH
- 4
0
4
2 4 6 8 10
Re s p o n s e  o f  CAB to  DOM CREDBYBANKS
- 4
0
4
2 4 6 8 10
Re s p on s e  o f CAB to FIRM SNETW ORTH
- 4
0
4
2 4 6 8 10
Re s p o n s e  o f  CAB to  CORPSAV
- 5
0
5
10
2 4 6 8 10
Response of RINT to FLI1
- 5
0
5
10
2 4 6 8 10
Res pons e of RINT to  CAB
- 5
0
5
10
2 4 6 8 10
Res pons e of RINT to  RINT
- 5
0
5
10
2 4 6 8 10
Re s p on s e o f RINT to  BANKNPL
- 5
0
5
10
2 4 6 8 10
Re s p o n s e  o f RINT to  BANKSNETW ORTH
- 5
0
5
10
2 4 6 8 10
Re s p o n s e  o f RINT to  DOM CREDBYBANKS
- 5
0
5
10
2 4 6 8 10
Res pons e of RINT to  FIRM SNETWORTH
- 5
0
5
10
2 4 6 8 10
Re s p o n s e o f  RINT to  CORPSAV
- 20
-10
0
10
20
2 4 6 8 10
Res pons e of BANKNPL to  FLI1
- 20
-10
0
10
20
2 4 6 8 10
Re s p o n s e  o f BANKNPL  to  CAB
- 20
-10
0
10
20
2 4 6 8 10
Re s p on s e o f BANKNPL to  RINT
- 20
-10
0
10
20
2 4 6 8 10
Re s p o n s e  o f  BANKNPL  to  BANKNPL
- 20
-10
0
10
20
2 4 6 8 10
Re s p o n s e  o f  BANKNPL  to  BANKSNETW ORTH
- 20
-10
0
10
20
2 4 6 8 10
Re s p o n s e  o f  BANKNPL  to  DOM CREDBYBANKS
- 20
-10
0
10
20
2 4 6 8 10
Re s po n s e  o f  BANKNPL to  FIRM SNETWORTH
- 20
-10
0
10
20
2 4 6 8 10
Re s p o n s e  o f BANKNPL  to  CORPSAV
- 4
- 2
0
2
4
2 4 6 8 10
Res po ns e o f BANKSNETW ORTH to  FLI1
- 4
- 2
0
2
4
2 4 6 8 10
Re s p o n s e  o f  BANKSNETW ORTH to  CAB
- 4
- 2
0
2
4
2 4 6 8 10
Re s p o n s e  o f BANKSNETW ORTH to  RINT
- 4
- 2
0
2
4
2 4 6 8 10
Re s p o n s e  o f BANKSNETW ORTH to  BANKNPL
- 4
- 2
0
2
4
2 4 6 8 10
Re s p o n s e  o f BANKSNETW ORTH to  BANKSNETW ORTH
- 4
- 2
0
2
4
2 4 6 8 10
Re s p o n s e  o f  BANKSNETW ORTH to  DOM CREDBYBANKS
- 4
- 2
0
2
4
2 4 6 8 10
Re s p o n s e  o f BANKSNETW ORTH to  FIRM SNETW ORTH
- 4
- 2
0
2
4
2 4 6 8 10
Re s p o n s e  o f BANKSNETW ORTH to  CORPSAV
- 10
0
10
20
2 4 6 8 10
Re s p o ns e  o f DOM CREDBYBANKS to  FL I1
- 10
0
10
20
2 4 6 8 10
Re s p o n s e  o f  DOM CREDBYBANKS to  CAB
- 10
0
10
20
2 4 6 8 10
Re s p o n s e  o f  DOM CREDBYBANKS to  RINT
- 10
0
10
20
2 4 6 8 10
Re s p o n s e  o f DOM CREDBYBANKS to  BANKNPL
- 10
0
10
20
2 4 6 8 10
Re s p o n s e  o f  DOM CREDBYBANKS to  BANKSNETW ORTH
- 10
0
10
20
2 4 6 8 10
Re s p o n s e  o f  DOM CREDBYBANKS to  DOM CREDBYBANKS
- 10
0
10
20
2 4 6 8 10
Re s p o n s e  o f  DOM CREDBYBANKS to  FIRM SNETW ORTH
- 10
0
10
20
2 4 6 8 10
Re s p o n s e  o f  DOM CREDBYBANKS to  CORPSAV
- 10
- 5
0
5
10
2 4 6 8 10
Res pons e of FIRM SNETWORTH to  FLI1
- 10
- 5
0
5
10
2 4 6 8 10
Re s p on s e  o f FIRM SNETW ORTH to  CAB
- 10
- 5
0
5
10
2 4 6 8 10
Res pons e of FIRM SNETWORTH to  RINT
- 10
- 5
0
5
10
2 4 6 8 10
Re s po n s e  o f  FIRM SNETW ORTH to  BANKNPL
- 10
- 5
0
5
10
2 4 6 8 10
Re s p o n s e  o f  FIRM SNETW ORTH to  BANKSNETW ORTH
- 10
- 5
0
5
10
2 4 6 8 10
Re s p o n s e  o f  FIRM SNETW ORTH to  DOM CREDBYBANKS
- 10
- 5
0
5
10
2 4 6 8 10
Res po ns e o f FIRM SNETW ORTH to  FIRM SNETW ORTH
- 10
- 5
0
5
10
2 4 6 8 10
Re s p o n s e  o f  FIRM SNETW ORTH to  CORPSAV
- 8
- 4
0
4
8
2 4 6 8 10
Res pons e of CORPSAV to  FLI1
- 8
- 4
0
4
8
2 4 6 8 10
Re s p o n s e  o f  CORPSAV to  CAB
- 8
- 4
0
4
8
2 4 6 8 10
Re s p o n s e o f  CORPSAV to  RINT
- 8
- 4
0
4
8
2 4 6 8 10
Re s p o n s e  o f  CORPSAV to  BANKNPL
- 8
- 4
0
4
8
2 4 6 8 10
Re s p o n s e  o f  CORPSAV to  BANKSNETW ORTH
- 8
- 4
0
4
8
2 4 6 8 10
Re s p o n s e  o f  CORPSAV to  DOM CREDBYBANKS
- 8
- 4
0
4
8
2 4 6 8 10
Re s p o n s e  o f  CORPSAV to  FIRM SNETW ORTH
- 8
- 4
0
4
8
2 4 6 8 10
Re s p o n s e  o f  CORPSAV to  CORPSAV
Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
119 
 
Appendix 23 
 
Graph 1.13: Variance Decomposition of Corporate Saving to Financial Liberalization Index, 
Current Account Balance, Real Interest Rate, Banks’ Non-Performing Loans, Banks’ Net 
Worth, Domestic Credit by Banks and Firms’ Net Worth 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
10
20
30
40
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Percent CORPSAV var iance due to FLI1
0
10
20
30
40
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Percent CORPSAV var iance due to CAB
0
10
20
30
40
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Percent CORPSAV var iance due to RINT
0
10
20
30
40
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Percent CORPSAV var iance due to BANKNPL
0
10
20
30
40
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Percent CORPSAV var iance due to BANKSNETWORTH
0
10
20
30
40
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Percent CORPSAV var iance due to DOMCREDBYBANKS
0
10
20
30
40
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Percent CORPSAV var iance due to FIRMSNETWORTH
0
10
20
30
40
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Percent CORPSAV var iance due to CORPSAV
Variance Decomposition
120 
 
REFERENCES 
1. Adams, F. Gerard and Prazmowski, Peter A. (2003). “Why are Saving Rates in East Asia 
so High? Reviving the Life Cycle Hypothesis,” Empirical Economics, Vol. 28 (2), April 2003.  
2. Amornthum, Somchai (2003). “Two Decades of the Feldstein-Horioka Puzzle: Has the 
Puzzle Been Solved Yet?” Research Paper for Economics 662, International Monetary 
Economics, Department of Economics, University of Hawaii.  
3. Azis, J. Iwan (2009). “Crisis, Complexity and Conflict,” in Contributions to Conflict 
Management, Peace, Economics and Development, Vol. 9, July 2009.  
4. Bernanke, B. (2007). “Global Imbalances: Recent Developments and Prospects,” Federal 
Reserve Government News Event, 09/11/2007.  
5. Aghevli, B., Boughton, J., Montiel P., Villanueva, D. and Wogglom, G (1990). The Role of 
National Saving in World Economy: Recent Trends and Prospects, IMF Occasional Papers, 
International Monetary Fund, Washington D.C.   
6. Blanchard, O. and Giavazzi, F. (2002). “Current Account Deficits in Euro Area: The End of 
Felstein-Horioka Puzzle,” The Brookings Institution, Vol. 2002, No. 2, 2002, pp.147-186.  
7. Boileau, M. and Moyen, N. (2009). “Corporate Cash Savings: Precaution versus Liquidity.” 
Working Paper in Social Science Research Network (SSRN), Dec. 2009.  
7. Bostworth, B. (1993). Saving and Investment in the Open Economy, The Brookings 
Institution, Washington DC.  
121 
 
8. Bracke, T. and Fidora M. (2008). “Global Liquidity Glut or Global Savings Glut? A 
Structural VAR Approach,” European Central Bank, Working Paper Series No 911/June 
2008. 
8. Carroll, C. and D. Weill (1993). “Saving and Growth: A Reinterpretation,” NBER Working 
Paper No. 4470, September 1993.  
9. Collin, S. (1991). “Saving Behavior in Ten Developing Countries,” in D. Bernheim and 
J.Shoven (eds), National Saving and Economic Performance, Chicago, NBER, University of 
Chicago Press pg. 349-376. 
10. Edwards, S. (1995). “Why are Saving Rates so Different across Countries?” Working 
Paper No. 5097, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), Cambridge, Mass.  
11. Edwards, S. (2002). “Does the current account matter?” in S. Edwards and J.A. Frankel, 
eds. Preventing Currency Crises in Emerging Markets. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
12. Fry, M. (1988). Money, Interest and Banking in Economic Development, Johnns Hopkins 
University Press, Baltimore. 
13. Kaminsky, G. and Schmukler, L. (2007). “Short Run Pain, Long Run Gain: Financial 
Liberalization and Stock Market Cycles,” Review of Finance, Vol. 12, pp. 253-292.  
14. Schmidt-Hebbel, K., Loayza, N. and Serven, L. (1998). “What Drives Saving across the 
World?” Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 82, pp. 165-181.   
122 
 
15. Lamberte, M. (2009). “Some Positive Consequences of the Global Economic Crisis,” 
Asian Development Bank Institute (ADBI), June 1
st
 2009.  
16. Leff, N. (1968). Economic Policy-Making and Development in Brazil, Wiley, 1947-1964, 
NY.  
17. Modigliani, F. (1980). “The Life Cycle Hypothesis of Savings Twenty Years Later,” in M. 
Parkin (ed.), Contemporary Issue in Economics, Manchester, Manchester University Press.  
18. Obstefeld, M. and Rogoff, K. (Nov. 2009) “Global Imbalances and the Financial Crisis: 
Products of Common Causes (2009),” paper prepared for the Federal Reserve Bank of San 
Francisco Asia Economic Policy Conferences, Santa Barbara, CA, Oct.18
th
 -Oct. 20
th
 2009. 
19. Portes, R. (2009). “Global Imbalances,” in Macroeconomic Stability and Financial 
Regulation: Key Issues for the G20, ed. by Mathias Dewatripont, Xavier Freixas, and Richard 
Portes, Center for Economic Policy Research, London, Feb. 2009.   
20. Reddy Y.V. (2006). “Global Imbalances – An Indian Perspective,” in Key Note address 
by Dr. Y. Reddy, Governor, Reserve Bank of India at The Financing for Development (FED) 
Office, Department of Economic and Social Office (DESA), United Nations, New York, May 
11
th
 2006.  
21. Ramajo, J., Garcia, A. and Ferret, M. (2007). “Explaining Aggregate Private Saving 
Behaviour: New Evidence from a Panel of OECD Countries,” in Applied Financial 
Economics Letter, Feb. 2007. 
123 
 
21. Serven, L. and Nguyen, H. (2010) “Global Imbalances Before and After the Global 
Crisis,” Policy Research Working Paper Series 5354 for World Bank, June, 2010.  
22. Schmidt – Hebbel, K., Webb, S. and Corsetti, G. (1992). “Household Savings in 
Developing Countries,” The World Bank Economic Review Vol. 6 (3), pp. 529 – 547. 
23. Stiglitz, E. and Blinder, S. (1983) “Money, Credit, and Economic Activity,”  
 
American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings 73, pp. 297–302, May, 1983. 
 
24. Tan, E. (1997). “Financial Liberalization, Saving Mobilization and Banking Innovations,” 
Discussion paper No. 9709 for School of Economics, University of Philippines.  
25. Taylor, B. (2009). “The Financial Crisis and the Policy Responses: An Empirical of What 
Went Wrong,” Working Paper No. w14631, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), 
Cambridge, Mass., Jan. 2009. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
124 
 
CHAPTER 2 
The Impact of Macroeconomic Policies on Poverty Incidence Using Financial 
Computable General Equilibrium Method: Case Evidence of Thailand 
1. Introduction 
This research paper is looking at the impact of Thailand macroeconomic policies on the 
poverty line and income of the poor households. A lot of studies have shown that economic 
growth is an important factor in reducing poverty. In order to achieve the economic growth, it 
is necessary for a country to have macroeconomic stability. While, we agree that 
macroeconomic stability promotes growth, we find it rather ambiguous to conclude that this 
will also improve a country’s poverty situation. There is another factor that is often being 
overlooked in describing the poverty and that is income of the poor households. Due to this, 
when macroeconomic stability impacts GDP growth and price, the implication on poverty is 
uncertain since poverty is critically determined by both income of the poor households and 
the poverty line.  
In Figure 2.1, when there is either a positive monetary shock such as Fed moves to lower the 
interest rate or a fiscal shock such as government increases its spending, then the AD curve 
will shift up, to the right. This will increase the GDP (stimulate growth) and increase the price 
(higher inflation). The poverty line will increase since the poverty line is a function of price 
but the magnitude will depend on the elasticity of the curve. An increase in poverty line 
ceteris paribus would mean an increase in the number of people that fall below the poverty 
threshold. Simultaneously, an increase in GDP will increase the income of the poor but the 
magnitude of the shift depends on the elasticity of income. In this situation, we have growth 
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that improves the income of the poor but at the same time increase the country’s poverty line. 
A favorable situation is reflected by the darker line in the third quadrant where we have a 
small increase in poverty line but higher increase in average income of the poor.  
 
 
Source: Azis (2009) 
 
Figure 2.1: The Impact of Positive Aggregate Demand Shock on Poverty Line and 
Income of the Poor 
 
In Figure 2.2 below, if we have contractionary economic policy that resulted in the shift of 
AD curve down, then the GDP (growth) and price (inflation) will decline.  As a result, the 
poverty line will decline but income of the poor households will also decrease. The magnitude 
of change varies depending on the elasticity of these curves.  The worst situation is depicted 
by the darker shaded line whereby the decrease in income of the poor dominates the small 
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decrease of poverty line implying that most likely more households will fall below the 
poverty line.  
 
Source: Azis (2009) 
 
Figure 2.2: The Impact of Negative Aggregate Demand Shock on Poverty Line and 
Income of the Poor 
 
 
Here, we are taking another step further from Azis (2009) that is in linking the poverty line 
and income of the poor with the aggregate supply and aggregate demand curves empirically. 
Azis has set up the framework hypothetically and has only constructed the aggregate demand 
and aggregate supply in the first quadrants empirically for Thailand and Indonesia. Since Azis 
has argued the impact of macro stability on poverty line and income of the poor, we will 
advance his argument by testing this empirically using Thailand’s data. Furthermore, Azis has 
shown a convex and concave relationship in quadrant-2, quadrant-3 and quadrant-4, and using 
our data, we will investigate if this hold true for Thailand.  
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In addition to the graphical approach described above, we will extend our investigation of the 
impact of fiscal and monetary shocks on poverty line and income distribution using Financial 
Computable General Equilibrium (FCGE) Model. Furthermore, we will illustrate in detail the 
data used and the construction of the FCGE. Unlike our graphical evidence, in FCGE we 
could trace the channel of a shock before it hit our final target and our aim is to calculate 
whether the percentage change in income distribution (relative income of the poor households 
to the rich households) or the percentage change in the poverty line has greater effect as a 
result of fiscal or monetary policies. As we had mentioned earlier, any growth policy should 
take into account two aspects: income inequality/ income distribution and poverty line. By 
examining the impact using FCGE as a support to our graphical approach, we will have a 
solid conclusion on the changes in poverty line versus changes in income distribution. 
 
1.2. Problem Statement and Hypotheses 
From the above broad conceptual framework presented by Azis (2008), we are testing the 
following hypothesis empirically using case study of Thailand.  
1. What is the impact of macroeconomic policy choices on poverty line and income 
distribution using both graphical evidence and Financial Computable General 
Equilibrium (FCGE) Method? 
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2. Literature Review 
A lot of studies have been done on growth and its impact on poverty. Dollar and Kray (2000) 
in their study of 92 countries in the past four decades have shown that growth on average 
benefits the poor as much as others in the society and so standard growth enhancing policies 
should be at the center of any effective poverty reduction strategy (pg. 27). However, they 
don’t deny the effect on the income share of the poorest quantile but were unable to relate 
them to any changes across countries and over time. Ames, Brown, Devarajan and Izquierdo 
(2001) argued that economic growth is the single most important factor influencing poverty 
and macroeconomic stability is essential for high and sustainable growth. Nevertheless, 
according to them this will work effectively in some situation than others depending on the 
impact of growth on poverty measured by distributional income and sectoral composition of 
growth. Another study by Lin (2003) argued that the selection of growth policies should 
maximize the sum of income and inequality using a new poverty reduction index. By drawing 
an example of China, she showed that although the economic growth implemented between 
1985 and 2001 has successfully reduced the poverty, the effectiveness of poverty reduction 
Policy Choice (AS and AD based policies) 
Output          
 Price  
 
Income of the Poor        Poverty 
Line 
Poverty Incidence 
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was declining due to the rising in income inequality. Bourguignon (2004) established the 
poverty-growth-inequality triangle and acknowledge that the real challenge in establishing 
development strategy to reduce poverty is the interactions between growth and distributions 
and not the interactions between growth and poverty or poverty and inequality separately. 
This implies that the mechanism of linking growth to poverty and inequality is more complex 
and not direct. Fan et.al (2004) research on government spending and poverty reduction in 
Vietnam has shown that government investment in agricultural research followed by roads 
and education has the largest poverty reduction. The same conclusion was reached for rural 
Uganda by Fan et.al (2004). In investigating the contractionary policy such as the reduction in 
government spending, Buiter (1988) has shown the importance in distinguishing between the 
cuts in public consumption expenditure and public sector capital formation since they would 
have different effect on deficit. 
Azis (2009) has linked hypothetically the macroeconomic policies that stimulate growth to 
poverty line and income of the poor households. He further used Indonesia Financial 
Computable General Equilibrium (FCGE) model to illustrate the possible impact on poverty 
line and income of the poor households when there is a macroeconomic shock. In his model, 
the economic growth has caused the poverty incidence to rise due to the higher decline in 
income distribution that dominates the slight increase in poverty line. The usage of 
Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model is one of the most popular approaches in 
investigating the impact of economic shocks such as policy changes and exogenous events on 
poverty and inequality. Robinson and Lofgren (2005) were among the two leading scholars in 
developing/extending the approaches of using FCGE in macro models and poverty analysis. 
In their specifications, they cautioned that the ability of CGE to analyze at macro-end 
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depended on its macro closures and due to limited data and information on the processes that 
underlie the portfolio choices and expectations formation, the impact on short run equilibrium 
and its distributional impact remained limited. Earlier study for instance by Cockburn (2001) 
models all the households from the national representative households survey data in 
investigating the impact of fiscal reforms and trade liberalization on poverty and inequality. 
Others such as Schweickert et.al (2005) instead looked at specific shock in the CGE model 
that was exchange rate policy in the dollarized Bolivia economy. Their finding showed that 
the nominal devaluation of exchange rate after a negative shock depended on the wage 
indexation and has no significant effect on poverty alleviation. Another study by Mahjabeen 
(2008) that have refined the specification in CGE model investigated the impact of 
microfinancing in Bangladesh and concluded that microfinance institutions indeed help to 
increase the income and the consumption of households, enhance the welfare and reduce 
inequality. Finally, Taylor and Resensweig (1984) were the among the earliest study using the 
Thailand CGE to analyze the effect of exchange rate, fiscal and monetary policies on 
economic growth, investment and national income. In addition to Hazledine (1992) various 
usage of CGE/FCGE in investigating the economy-wide impact, one still has to be cautioned 
of the limitation that such model imposed. In particular, as mentioned by Hazledine (1992) 
that among the weaknesses of CGE/FCGE are weaknesses or shortages of data, micro 
foundations and the macro closures defines in closing the big aggregated model. Another 
critique by Devarajan and Robinson (2002) has outlined several arguments in which the CGE 
model has enlightened the debate on policy analysis but at the same time they considered the 
misuse of CGE in policy analysis. One of the interesting points that they mentioned was the 
‘Black Box’ syndrome in which the results of the policy changes are not transparent/opaque.  
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Nevertheless, our research will contribute further to existing literatures that have used FCGE 
by testing Azis’s claim empirically using Thailand as our case study. As mentioned earlier, it 
is not a straight-forward solution in determining the impact of growth on poverty line and 
average income of the poor. These effects are inter-related and occur simultaneously and 
sometimes due to limited data and information underlying our portfolio choices, the short run 
equilibriums obtained may be limited. However, the choice of using FCGE is still the best 
option in looking at growth and poverty analysis that requires using the multi-sectoral, multi 
class model and here we accompanied our FCGE approach with the graphical approach 
described earlier. 
 
  3. Data and Methodology 1: 
Our first methodology is to construct the four quadrants similar to Figure 2.1 and 2.2 above.  
3.1. Construction of Quadrant - 1: Aggregate Demand and Aggregate Supply Curves 
In the first quadrant, we are estimating the aggregate supply and demand (AS-AD) curves 
using structural vector auto regression (SVAR) approach. The method was first proposed by 
Blanchard and Quah (1989) that identified the restrictions on SVAR by imposing long run 
restrictions on its disturbances. Using GNP and unemployment, they concluded that the 
fluctuations in these two variables were due to orthogonal shocks of supply
35
 shocks and 
demand
36
 shocks. From the result, they have shown that demand shocks have only temporary 
effect on output (GNP) while supply shocks have a permanent effect. However, both shocks 
                                                          
35
 Examples of supply shocks include increase in energy price, bad weather and etc. that would affect the 
supply.  
36
 Examples of demand shocks include fiscal policies (taxation and government spending) and monetary policies 
(reserve requirement, open market operations, interest rate).  
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do not have long run effect on unemployment. Following B&Q’s line, Gamber (1996) instead 
used CPI and real GDP to decompose them into supply and demands shocks that are 
orthogonal to each other. He investigated whether B&Q’s methodology yield ‘textbook’ 
aggregate supply and aggregate demand curves (Gamber, 1996). His result using US post war 
data from 1949 quarter 1 until 1992 quarter 2 showed aggregate supply and aggregate demand 
derived using this method did in fact corresponded to  historical aggregate supply and 
aggregate demand shocks. Taking further step, Azis (2009) combined B&Q model with 
macroeconomic policies implemented by Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia and Korea during 
1997 Asian financial crisis. Azis concluded that given the slopes of AS-AD curves, 
appropriate economic policy response can be chosen. For instance, during 1997 Asian 
financial crisis, Indonesia had followed IMF policies of tightening monetary policies such as 
increased the interest rate and cut the government spending. However, by decomposing AS 
and AD components, it has revealed that since AS curve is relatively flatter than AD curve; 
demand based policies are effective in stimulating growth but not in controlling inflation. 
Furthermore, the decomposition has shown that the high price during crisis was due to a 
supply shock and hence IMF policies on contractionary of aggregate demand were not 
effective. This is illustrated below: 
 
Price           Price 
   AD(new)  AD(old)                                                                                             AD 
             AS(old) 
                                                                         AS                                                                         AS(new) 
 
  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
GDP                                                                                              GDP 
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From these two graphs, we can see that when AS curve is flat relative to AD curve and our 
objective is to control the inflation as in 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, tight monetary policies 
as prescribed by IMF would reduce the growth but has little impact in reducing the inflation. 
On the other hand, increasing the aggregate supply would stimulate the growth and reduce the 
inflation significantly more.  
In order to construct the AD-AS curves for the first quadrant, we’ve collected yearly data on 
GDP and consumer price index (CPI) from the Economic Intelligence Unit (EIU) database 
ranging from 1980 to 2009. The longer period of observation is required to ensure consistency 
and accuracy of the curves. Based on the shocks that have been generated, we truncated it 
only to a period that matched with the period we have for poverty line and average income of 
the poor households. 
 
3.1.1. Blanchard & Quah Decomposition in this Framework
37
 
Let Yt  =  (∆lnGDP, Inflation)
T 
According to Blanchard and Quah Decomposition method, we first need to define regular 
vector autoregression, VAR (p) model: 
                 
                    (1) 
Var(V)=Ω 
where Vt  = residuals with  covariance matrix Ω 
                                                          
37
 Some of these derivations and notations are adapted from document compiled by Nattapong Puttanapong 
and Yiou Zhu.  
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 L  = lag operator  
 p  = number of lags that are included in the model 
Next, we invert this VAR(p) model into moving average representation, 
               ∑       
 
                                         (2) 
           Var(V)=Ω 
Since the innovations Vt ‘s are contemporaneously correlated, this implies that Cj’s will not 
exhibit independent responses to any innovations. Hence, Ω is a full matrix. However, under 
B&Q assumptions, we can decompose these innovations into two orthogonal effects: supply 
innovation and demand innovation, in which equation (2) will become: 
               ∑       
 
                                             (3) 
           Var(e)= ∑ 
Where e = uncorrelated shock pair (ed,es)
T
 
           ∑ = diagonal covariance matrix.  
The relationship between (2) and (3) are as follow: 
                                                              (4) 
   ∑    
                                                            (5) 
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Therefore, we need to identify A0 in order to solve for (3). Let ωij and σij represent elements in 
matrix Ω and ∑ respectively, then equation (5) can be written as: 
[
      
      
] [
    
    
] [
      
      
]  [
      
      
]                                                               (6) 
There are three restrictions impose by Equation (6) on the four elements of A0: 
   
        
                    (7) 
                                            (8) 
   
        
                                                                                                           (9) 
 We normalize ∑ to be identity matrix, implying that          . Since we have four 
unknowns,                  and three equations, (7) – (9), we need to impose another 
restriction to ensure that A0 is unique. This is where we redefine our VAR model into 
structural VAR in which we will use economic theory to identify the elements in A0. The long 
run restriction imposed by Blanchard and Quah stated that there are no long run impact from 
aggregate demand shock on the growth of output. This implies that aggregate demand shock 
is a transitory shock and that our output will go back to natural rate of output. Thus, the 
additional constraint is: 
∑           
 
    ∑           
 
                        (10) 
since we define the element a11,j in  Aj matrix to reflect the impact from demand shock on real 
GDP growth in period j. Hence the accumulated effect of demand shock on real GDP in the 
long run will be    ∑   
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Now, we can solve for equation (6) - (10) (with          ) that will give the A0 matrix in 
which equation (3) can be derived. In order to obtain the aggregate demand curve, we will set 
the supply shock to zero (Equation 11) and similarly, to obtain the aggregate supply curve, we 
will set the demand shock to zero (Equation 12). From here, we will obtain our AS-AD curve. 
  
   ∑      [
      
 
]    ̂
   
    (11) 
  
   ∑      [
 
      
]    ̂
   
    (12) 
Another Procedure of Blanchard & Quah Decomposition using Choleski Decomposition 
Matrix is in Appendix 1.  
This procedure is adapted by earlier literature on vector autoregression (VAR) method. 
 
3.1.2. Construction of Quadrant - 2: CPI and Poverty Line 
In the second quadrant, we will find the relation between poverty line and price (CPI) simply 
by plotting the graph. In our case study of Thailand, we managed to obtain yearly data from 
1988 to 2002 for the poverty line and poverty incidence from Thailand National Economic 
and Social Development Board (NESDB). For the poverty line data, we took an average 
across the regions in Thailand to find an estimate of the country’s poverty line.  Thailand’s 
official poverty line is defined as the cost of basic needs for food and non-food items. A 
household is considered as poor if his or her per capita income is less than the defined poverty 
line. 
Thailand Poverty Line = Food Poverty Line + Non-Food Poverty Line 
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Food Poverty Line
38
: 
The food poverty line is estimated from the cost of food baskets which contain the minimum 
calorie requirements for an individual household. The per capita household calorie 
requirement is defined as the aggregated required calories per day of each household member 
with respect to their age and sex. Then this minimum calorie requirement for a household is 
converted into money metric terms: amount of calories that one bath can buy.  
Step 1:       ∑         
Step 2:        (     )  (∑
   
   
       )   
Step 3:       
    
       
 
Where c = conversion vector that translates the amount of each food items consumed into 
calorie unit 
          qs  = quantity vector of food basket in region s 
          Ers = total food expenditure in region s using the price of region r 
         The food baskets and spatial price indices of 1992 are used to construct the cost of 
calories. Moreover, the cost of calories is based on average sanitary basket in different regions 
rather than using municipal baskets since they are most cost efficient. The cost of calories is 
then being updated using the food price indices. The food poverty line is then defined by: 
                                                          
38
 Source: NESDB 
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Food Poverty Line = [Calorie Requirement from Step 1 * 30 Days] / [Calories Obtained per 
Bath from Step 2] 
Non-Food Poverty Line: 
According to NESDB, the calculation for non-food poverty line is using Engle’s ratio. The 
estimated food to total expenditure ratio is used in calculating the non-food poverty line and 
in Thailand, it is assumed that food consumption is 60% of total consumption at the poverty 
lines before adjusted for regional price differences. The non-food poverty line is two third of 
food poverty line  
Total Poverty Line: 
Poverty Line = Food Poverty Line + Non-Food Poverty Line 
                
              (  
 
 
 
      
     
) 
where        = non – food spatial price index for region r 
                  = food spatial price index for region r 
Azis (2009) has defined the poverty line as: 
∑(                                                           ) 
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In Azis’s conceptualization, there is a relation between price index and poverty line because 
there’s a basic need bundle whose price will change when there is a macroeconomic shock 
that will affect the demand. The data that we obtained on poverty line is as derived above and 
included non-food poverty line. 
After plotting the graph of price index and the poverty line directly without any modification, 
we will then use impulse response function to trace out the time path of the effect of structural 
shocks on the dependent variables of the model
39
. The impulse response will be applied after 
we have estimated the relation of CPI and poverty line using Vector Auto Regression of lag 
p
40
. In other words, we can see the response of dependent variable to the shocks over time. 
We will use the Cholesky decomposition in assuming that dependent variable at time (t) does 
not have a contemporaneous effect on independent variable at time (t). In our case, we assume 
that any shock in price index at time (t) will only affect the poverty line at time (t+1) and vice 
versa.  
 
3.1.3. Construction of Quadrant - 3: Poverty Line and Average Income of the Poor 
The third quadrant depicts the relation between poverty line and the income of the poor as a 
result of macroeconomic shock. This can be traced out from the equilibrium in the second and 
the fourth quadrant.  
 
                                                          
39
 The structural shocks and dependent variables trace out the impulse response function of both CPI and 
Poverty Line. When there is a structural shock from CPI, then we can see the impulse response of poverty line 
as the dependent variable; vice versa when there is a structural shock of poverty line, then we can trace the 
impulse response of CPI.  
40
 Refer to Equation 1 of 4.1.1. Instead of CPI and Real GDP, we now have VAR (p) of CPI and Poverty Line. 
140 
 
3.1.4. Construction of Quadrant - 4: GDP and Average Income of the Poor 
In the fourth quadrant, we will again directly plot the graph of GDP and the average income 
of the poor without any modification. As in construction of the second quadrant, we will then 
use the impulse response function to see the impact of a unit shock on independent variable 
over time as explained above.    
 
          
4. Results and Analysis I 
4.1. Results for General Economy in Thailand using Real GDP, CPI, Poverty Line and 
Average Income of the Poor 
The following graph showed that Thailand’s inflation (Figure 2.3) has been moving up and 
down during the period of 1988 until 1997. It reached the peak in 1998 before dropped 
significantly in 1999. This is consistent with the decline in economic GDP growth (Figure 
2.4) from 1995 until 1998 before bouncing back in 1999. Thailand has experienced a U-
shaped recovery after the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) 1997 and although it recovered after 
1999, the growth was not as high as prior to 1995. One factor that could be attributed to the 
decline in Thailand’s GDP growth in 1995 was the devaluation of Chinese yuan in 1994. This 
devaluation had made export from China cheaper and hence a decline in the demand for 
Thailand’s export.    
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Source: EIU 
 
Figure 2.3: Thailand’s Inflation (%) 
 
 
 
 
Source: EIU 
 
Figure 2.4: Thailand’s GDP Growth (%) 
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In Figure 2.5, it showed that despite the ups and down in the inflation rate and the GDP 
growth, the poverty line in Thailand had been steadily increasing from 1988 until 2002. 
Meanwhile, the average income of the poor (Figure 2.6) increased tremendously from 1988 – 
1991 before declining to the lowest point in 1996 and gradually increased until 2000.  
 
Source: NESDB 
 
Figure 2.5: Thailand’s Official Poverty Line 
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Source: NESDB 
 
Figure 2.6: Thailand’s Average Income of the Poor (%) 
 
 
4.2. Results for Quadrant – 1: Aggregate Demand and Aggregate Supply Curves 
In Figure 2.7, we can see that there is almost a linear relationship between CPI and GDP 
except for the point where the arrow is pointing which is the period of 1997-AFC. During this 
period of 1997 to 1998, the GDP declined but the price kept on increasing.  
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Source: EIU 
 
Figure 2.7: CPI versus GDP – Thailand (1981 – 2009) 
 
 
Next, we run our data for the Blanchard and Quah Decomposition explained earlier using 
Gauss Software and Figure 2.8 showed the long run restrictions we have imposed. For the 
impulse response to transitory shock (demand shock) on the left hand side in Figure 2.8, we 
can see that the response of green line (output growth) will eventually dies off by converging 
to the zero horizontal line while the response of blue line (price) will keep on fluctuating and 
not dies off.  For example, when there is a cut in government spending (transitory/demand 
shock), the output growth (green line) will be affected temporarily but in the long run it will 
revert back to the natural rate of output. On the other hand, this demand or transitory shock 
has a long lasting effect on the price.  
On the right hand side, it shows the impulse response to permanent shock (supply shock). A 
supply shock will not cause high increase in the price level (blue line) but high response from 
y = 0.0206x + 20.983 
R² = 0.9575 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 4000 4500 5000
C
P
I 
GDP 
CPI: URBAN Linear (CPI: URBAN)
145 
 
the output growth. For instance, a productivity shock or improved in the labor market will not 
affect the price too much, in fact the price will fluctuate and not dies off  but the output will 
be very much affected at the beginning and eventually converge to a certain level. 
 
 
Figure 2.8: Impulse Response of Output Growth and Price to Demand Shock (left hand 
side) and Supply Shock (right hand side) 
 
 
In Figure 2.9 and Figure 2.10 below, we have obtained the results from our Blanchard and 
Quah Decomposition. In Figure 2.9, it shows that a movement from the demand shock will 
trace out the aggregate supply curve and the movement from the supply shock will trace out 
the aggregate demand curve. From the slope of these curves, we can see that the aggregate 
demand curve is steeper than aggregate supply curve. Hence, since aggregate supply curve is 
flat relative to aggregate demand curve, then if the objective is to raise output, it would be 
more effective to use aggregate demand shock otherwise the supply shock is used if the 
objective is to reduce price. In Azis (2009), he has used the data from 1997Q1 – 2007Q2 to 
construct the AS-AD curves. The slope of AS curve he has obtained is 0.01 and the slope of 
AD curve is -0.799. In our research, we have used yearly data from 1980-2009 and our results 
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have shown that the slope of our AS curve is 0.0003 and AD curve is -0.0017. It is obvious 
that Azis has obtained steeper slopes for both AD and AS curve, but nevertheless the 
conclusion is the same that in the case of Thailand, the average AS slope is relatively flatter in 
comparison to the average AD slope. Furthermore, due to the yearly data of poverty line and 
average income of the poor, we are unable to emulate Azis in using the quarterly data for CPI 
and GDP. 
 
Figure 2.9: Aggregate Supply Curve – Thailand (1985-2009) 
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Figure 2.10: Aggregate Demand Curve – Thailand (1985-2009) 
 
However, since the slopes we have obtained above only shows the average slope from 1981-
2009, we next plot the dynamic slopes over time in Figure 2.11. 
 
 
Figure 2.11: Thailand Dynamic Slopes (1991 – 2009) 
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We can see that in 1997, the magnitude of slope for aggregate demand is higher than for 
aggregate supply curve, and so IMF policies during the crisis would result in higher decline in 
output than in price reduction. Hence, to stimulate output during this period, it would be more 
effective to use demand shock (monetary and fiscal policy) while to reduce price inflation, it 
would be more effective to use supply shock (productivity, labor market and etc). 
 
                                                                                 
In Figure 2.12 and Figure 2.13, we showed the sensitivity of output and price to demand and supply 
shock. For instance, during 1997-AFC, the response of price to supply shock is greater than its 
response to demand shock, hence supporting our argument that in order to control inflation, it 
would be more effective to use the supply shock (Figure 2.12).  In other words, the supply shock 
dominated the sharp fluctuation during 1997 – 1999 periods. In Figure 2.13, we can conclude that 
the source of the sharp fluctuation in output especially in 1998 originated from the supply shock due 
to the higher magnitude than the magnitude shocks from demand shock. The supply shocks caused 
the source of the sharp fluctuations of price in Thailand from 1997 - 1999.  
Price           Price 
   AD(old)  AD(new)                                                                                                          AD 
                 
                                                                                                                                             AS(old) 
                                                                         AS                                                                AS(new)                                       
 
  
                                                                          GDP                                                                                        GDP                                                                                                                                                                                       
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Figure 2.12: Response of Price to Demand and Supply Shocks – Thailand (1985-2009) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.13: Response of GDP Output to Demand and Supply Shocks – Thailand 
 (1985 -2009) 
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4.3. Results for Quadrant – 2: CPI and Poverty Line 
Figure 2.14 shows the result for the second quadrant that is the relation of consumer price 
index against the poverty line. As it shows, the relationship is linear from 1988 to 2002.  
 
Figure 2.14: Consumer Price Index against the Poverty Line – Thailand 
 (1988 -2002) 
 
Since linear regression only captured the response of dependent variable to the independent 
variable, in this case CPI to Poverty Line, we applied Vector Autoregression  (VAR) of lag p 
to see the reverse response. In Figure 2.15 below, it showed VAR (2) for Thailand poverty 
line and cpi. We took VAR (2) since the results showed more statistically significant relation 
for Response of CPI to Thai Poverty Line and Response of Thai Poverty Line to CPI than to 
use VAR (1). The equation for VAR (2) is as follow: 
PovertyLinet =α10+α11Poverty Linet-1 + α12CPIt-1 + α13Poverty Linet-2+α14CPIt-2 + 
ε1t    
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CPIt =α20+α21Poverty Linet-1 + α22CPIt-1 + α23Poverty Linet-2+α24CPIt-2 + ε2t  
 For Response of Thai Poverty Line to CPI, we can conclude that as price (CPI) increases the 
poverty line will immediately increase statistically significant
41
 throughout time. While in the 
Response of CPI to Thai Poverty Line, the negative relation implies that when Thai poverty 
line increases, the CPI will decline after the third period.  
 
Figure 2.15: VAR (2) for Thailand Poverty Line and CPI 
 
                                                          
41
 The two red lines in the graphs are the asymptotically estimated standard error and the blue line is the 
estimated response of the dependent variable. If the two red lines fall in the same quadrant (below or above 
the zero horizontal line, this indicates that the response of the blue line is statistically significant, otherwise if 
for example one red line is above the zero line and the other red line is below the zero line, then the response 
of the blue line is statistically insignificant.  
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4.4. Results for Quadrant – 4:  
In Figure 2.16, we could see that from 1994 to 1996, average income of the poor decreased as 
GDP increased. From 1997 to 2000, annual GDP declined but average income of the poor 
increased. This was the period during and posts Asian Financial Crisis in Thailand that began 
in July 1997. One reason for this was the fact that during the crisis period, the exchange rate 
in Thailand depreciated badly and farmers (as part of the poor households group) benefited as 
the demand for their agricultural products/ exports increased. After 2000, the pattern went 
back to its initial trend that is average income of the poor decreases as the annual GDP 
increases.  
 
Figure 2.16: Average Income of the Poor against GDP – Thailand 
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In Figure 2.17 below, it showed the short run estimated vector auto regression VAR(1) for 
GDP output and average income of the poor in Thailand. The equations for VAR (1) as we 
have explained earlier are:  
GDPt = α10 + α11GDPt-1 + α12AvrgIncPoort-1 + ε1t    
AvrgIncPoort = λ10 +  λ21GDPt-1 + λ22AvrgIncPoort-1 + ε2t   
From the result of lower left graph, that is Response of Avrgincomeofthepoor
42
 to GDP, we 
can see that when GDP increases, the average income of the poor tend to decline significantly, 
but over time (from period 4 to period 8) it shows significantly positive relation. We can 
conclude that for Thai economy, an economic shock that lead to an increase in GDP would 
not immediately benefit the poor households but after a period of time, the average income of 
the poor will increase significantly. On the other hand, the GDP doesn’t response to any shock 
on the average income of the poor (Graph Response of GDP to Average Income of the Poor) 
                                                          
42
 Avrgincomeofthepoor is the abbreviation for Average Income of the Poor 
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 Figure 2.17: VAR (1) for Thailand GDP and Average Income of the Poor 
 
4.5 Results for Quadrant – 3:  
Figure 2.18 showed the results of three quadrants that we have constructed above. The 
equations for each relation are: 
Aggregate Supply: CPI = 0.0003 (GDP) + 0.5385 
Aggregate Demand: CPI = -0.0017(GDP) + 0.2922 
Poverty Line:            CPI = -0.0073(Poverty Line) + 9.348 
Average Income of the Poor: Average Income of the Poor = 0.0535(GDP) – 349.89 
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In Figure 2.18, the relation between poverty line and CPI is linear with adjusted R-Square of 
0.9996. The best relation between average income of the poor and GDP is also linear with 
adjusted R-Square of 0.507 (changing to polynomial relationship will not improve the 
adjusted R-Square). Moreover, in Azis conceptual framework, he showed that an increase in 
GDP will lead to an increase in the average income of the poor, however, in the case of 
Thailand, our result showed differently. When there is a shock that results in higher GDP, the 
average income of the poor tend to decline.  
Next we can see the impact of macroeconomic shocks on the poverty line and average income 
of the poor in Figure 2.19. When there is contractionary aggregate demand that shifts from 
AD1 to AD2, the average income of the poor improve tremendously while the poverty line 
decreases a little. In other words, the change in average income of the poor dominates the 
change in the poverty line. This implies that any economic growth in Thailand will increase 
the poverty line but the average income of the poor will decrease more, which will worsen the 
economy of the poor households. This could perhaps be the case that most poor households in 
Thailand are farmers and when a crisis hits, the agricultural sector is not affected much but in 
fact act as a buffer to Thai’s economy. However, during booming period, most economic 
growth and expansionary policies are in manufacturing sector, real estate and financial sector 
which will not benefit the poor households.  
Finally, the results in our third quadrant from the economic shocks depict a convex 
relationship between poverty line and average income of the poor. It can be seen that when 
poverty line increases, the average income of the poor decreases which is unlike Azis’s 
framework that shows when poverty line increases, average income of the poor increases. In 
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summary, putting all these pieces together, we can see that when there is expansionary in 
aggregate demand to stimulate growth, the poverty line will increase but at smaller magnitude 
than the decrease in average income of the poor and vice versa when we have contractionary 
aggregate demand policy. Thailand is an example of a country where at least from our result 
shows that there is no trade-off between poverty line and average income of the poor. 
 
     Figure 2.18: Relation of Aggregate Demand and Aggregate Supply with Poverty Line       
        and Average Income of the Poor (3 Quadrants) - Thailand 
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Figure 2.19: Relation of Aggregate Demand and Aggregate Supply with Poverty Line 
and Average Income of the Poor (4 Quadrants) - Thailand 
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5. Data and Methodology II: 
The data used in constructing our FCGE is Thailand’s Financial Social Accounting Matrix 
(FSAM). We will use the FSAM to develop the Financial Computable General Equilibrium 
(FCGE) model. The FSAM is a combination of Flow-of-Funds and Social Accounting Matrix 
(SAM).  
 
5.1. A 2004 Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) for Thailand 
In this paper, we will be using the SAM of 2004 shown in Table 2.1 below. SAM is a 
snapshot of an economy activity for one particular year and all the values shown are the 
aggregated amount of transactions taken place from one sector to another. The SAM was 
constructed by Thailand Development Research Institute (TDRI) and it included 114 
production factors, two types of factors of production (labor and capital), the private sector 
(households and enterprise), the government, and the rest of the world. Puttanapong (2008) 
compressed the 114 production factors into 3 main sectors, agricultural, manufacturing and 
services and using this, we disaggregated the household sector into five categories of 
households based on their income level; HHH5 referred to the top 20% of households with the 
highest income, HHH4 referred to the next top 20% of households with the second highest 
income, HHH3 referred to the next top 20% of households with the third highest income, 
HHH2 referred to the next top 20% of households with the fourth highest income and finally 
HHH1 referred to the bottom 20% of households with the lowest income in the economy. The 
main objective of disaggregating the household sector is to see the impact of any shocks on 
income distribution – define as the ratio of HHH1 to HHH5. Table 2.1 below shows the SAM 
of Thailand for the year of 2004 along with the interpretation of each cell.  
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Table 2.1: Thailand’s Social Accounting Matrix in 2004 (billions of bath) 
 
 
ABBREVIATIONS: AGRI: Agricultural, MANU: Manufacturing, SERVICE: Service, LABOR: Labor, CAP: 
Capital, HHH1: Households with income at the lowest 20% of income scale, HHH5: Households with income at 
the highest 20% of income scale, ENTP: Enterprise, GOV: Government, DIRTAX: Direct Tax, INDTAX: 
Indirect tax, TARIFF: Tariff, SUBSIDY: Subsidy, KA: Capital Account, ROW: Rest of the World 
Interpretation of the data in Social Accounting matrix: 
1. For cells (1, 1)
43
 to (3, 3): In cell (2, 1) the value 160.133455 means the agricultural sector 
pays $160.133455 billions of bath to manufacturing sector for its product to use as 
agricultural sector intermediate input.  
2. For cell (4, 1) to (5, 3): In cell (4, 1) the value 431.282409 means the agricultural sector 
pays $431.282409 billions of bath to the labor sector for the labor input (value added). 
Similarly, in cell (5, 3) the value 1684. 386782 means the service sector pays $1684.386782 
billions of bath to the capital sector for its used of capital input.  
3. For cell (14, 1) to (14, 3): In cell (14, 2) the value 386.539758 means the manufacturing 
sector pays $386.539758 billions of bath as indirect tax.  
4. For cell (15, 1) to (15, 3): In cell (15, 1) the value 1.220490 means the agricultural sector 
pays $1.220490 billions of bath for its import tariff. 
                                                          
43
 Cell (i,j) refers to row i and column j 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
AGRI MANU SERVICE LABOR CAP HHH1 HHH2 HHH3 HHH4 HHH5 ENTP GOV DIRTAX INDTAX TARIFF SUBSIDY KA ROW
1 AGRI 84.274744 471.540458 78.794234 0 0 9.919662 17.292070 30.028021 67.891606 142.798697 0 1.578735 0 0 0 0 1.358319 66.185458
2 MANU 160.133455 4479.596924 1384.850347 0 0 59.928313 104.467736 181.410281 410.158081 862.699278 0 66.026459 0 0 0 0 1094.215672 3838.969818
3 SERVICE 96.178828 1455.457117 3537.715760 0 0 60.222464 104.980504 182.300711 412.171292 866.933733 0 653.708806 0 0 0 0 666.296011 682.704724
4 LABOR 431.282409 423.216932 1468.128171 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 CAP 125.307077 1677.361946 1684.386782 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 HHH1 0 0 0 85.991395 22.839473 0 0 0 0 0 79.053156 0 0 0 0 0 0 -8.774931
7 HHH2 0 0 0 149.901206 39.814967 0 0 0 0 0 137.805454 0 0 0 0 0 0 -15.296562
8 HHH3 0 0 0 260.306395 69.139474 0 0 0 0 0 239.301884 0 0 0 0 0 0 -26.562780
9 HHH4 0 0 0 588.537600 156.320324 0 0 0 0 0 541.047625 0 0 0 0 0 0 -60.056899
10 HHH5 0 0 0 1237.890916 328.793793 0 0 0 0 0 1138.003679 0 0 0 0 0 0 -126.319696
11 ENTP 0 0 0 0 2810.361774 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
12 GOV 0 0 0 0 59.786000 1.319104 2.299478 3.993088 9.028140 18.989214 0 0 422.622000 600.221880 93.582681 0 0 4.874009
13 DIRTAX 0 0 0 0 0 7.483229 13.044852 22.652642 51.216304 107.724973 220.500000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
14 INDTAX 0 386.539758 213.682122 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
15 TARIFF 1.220490 92.355241 0.006950 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
16 SUBSIDY 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
17 KA 0 0 0 0 0 40.236321 70.140425 121.800230 275.383227 579.222797 454.649976 495.401594 0 0 0 0 0 -274.964560
18 ROW 73.265001 3656.387988 351.105584 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Thailand Social Accounting Matrix (2007)
160 
 
5. For cell (18, 1) to (18, 3): In cell (18, 1) the value 73.265001 means the agricultural sector 
pays $73.265001 billions of bath for its import from the rest of the world.  
6. For cell (6, 4) to (12, 5): In cell (6, 3), the value 85.991395 means the labor sector pays 
$85.991395 billions of bath to household 1 for their labors (labor income). Similarly, for cell 
(6, 4) the value 22.839473 means that the capital sector pays $22.839473 billions of bath to 
household 1 for using their capital (capital income). In cell (12, 5), the transaction between 
the capital sector and the government sector represents the factor income paid to the 
government. In other words, $59.786000 of factor income from the capital sector was paid to 
the government.  
7. For cell (1, 6) to (3, 10): In cell (1, 6) the value 9.919662 means the household 1 sector 
pays $9.919662 billions of bath to agricultural sector for the sales of agricultural products. 
8. For cell (12, 6) to (12, 10): In cell (12, 6) the value 1.319104 means the household 1 sector 
pays the government $1.319104 billions of bath for tax purpose (eg. income tax). 
9. For cell (13, 6) to (13, 11): In cell (13, 6) the value 7.483229 means the household 1 sector 
spends $7.483229 billions of bath on direct tax. 
10. For cell (17, 6) to (17, 12): In cell (17, 6) the value 40.236321 means the household sector 
total saving is $40.236321 billions of bath. In cell (17, 11) the enterprise total saving is 
$454.649976 billions of bath and in cell (17, 12) the government total saving is $495.401594 
billions of bath.  
11. For cell (6, 11) to (10, 11): In cell (6, 11) the enterprise pays $79.053156 billions of bath 
to household 1 sector for its labor input.  
12. For cell (1, 12) to (3, 12): In cell (1, 12), the government consumption of agricultural 
sector is $1.5788735 billions of bath. 
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13. For cell (12, 13) to (12, 15): These cells show the amount of direct tax, indirect tax and 
tariffs that the government has collected. For instance, in cell (12, 13) the total value of direct 
tax collected by the government is $422.622000 billions of bath.  
14. For cell (1, 17) to (3, 17): In cell (1, 17) the total investment in the agricultural sector is 
$1.358319 billions of bath. 
15. For cell (1, 18) to (3, 18): In cell (1, 18) the rest of the world exports $66.185458 billions 
of bath of the agricultural product from the agricultural sector. 
16. For cell (6, 18) to (12, 18): In cell (6, 18) the value -8.774931 refers to the remittance or 
net foreign payments from the rest of the world to Thailand and since the value is negative, 
this means that there is outflow of payments/transfer to the rest of the world. In the cell (12, 
18), this refers to the foreign grants from the rest of the world to the government is $4.874009 
billions of bath.  
17. In cell (17, 18): This cell represents the current account balance for Thailand which is the 
difference between total exports and total imports. In the case of Thailand, the current account 
balance is positive, indicating negative foreign saving (capital outflow) for an amount of 
$274.964560 billions of bath.   
 
5.2. A 2004 Flow-of-Funds (FoF) Accounts of Thailand  
The flow-of-fund is constructed using the balance sheet for 10 institutions and 13 financial 
assets and one fixed asset. Since flow-of-funds represent the changes in assets and liabilities, 
we have to take the difference of the balance sheet items in 2004 and 2003 to construct it. 
These values are then categorized into two separate tables; sources of funds (liabilities) and 
users of funds (assets). Take note that in the flow-of-funds accounts, the demand and the 
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supply of each asset are equal. Table 2.2 below shows the standard flow-of-funds table 
publicly available on the website of Thailand Office of National Economic and Social 
Development Board (NESDB). However, for the households’ accounts, we have 
disaggregated them into five separate categories similar to our approach in the SAM table. In 
addition, we have combined the account for the central government and the local government 
into one account (government) and combined the account for incorporated business (BINC) 
and state enterprise business (BSE) into one account (enterprise) to make it compatible with 
the institutions that we have in the our SAM table.  
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Table 2.2: Flow-of-Funds Account of Thailand in 2004 
 
Abbreviations: HH : Households, GC: Central Government, GL: Local Government, RW: Rest of the World, 
Fin. Con: Financial Corporation, BSE: State Enterprise, Binc: Incorporated Business 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FLOW-OF-FUNDS ACCOUNTS OF THAILAND, 2004P
(MILLIONS OF BAHT)
HH BINC GC GL BSE R/W FIN.CON TOTAL
A. NON FINANCIAL ACCOUNT 
1. GROSS SAVING 324,212 764,255 301,303 99,458 217,970 (265,812) 347,234 1,788,620
2. TRANSFER 0
3. GROSS CAPITAL FORMATION 137,360 1,143,724 117,363 102,113 216,474 44,836 1,761,870
4. PURCHASE OF LAND (NET) (29,193) 13,410 7,240 995 5,136 2,412 0
5. STATISTICAL DISCREPANCY 49,564 (22,814) 26,750
6. TOTAL SURPLUS OR DEFICIT (-) (1+2-3-4-5) 216,045 (442,443) 176,700 (3,650) (3,640) (265,812) 322,800 0
B. FINANCIAL ACCOUNT
I. ACQUISITION OF FINANCIAL ASSETS 553,318 215,390 132,276 28,628 143,401 4,782 1,031,115 2,108,910
   1. CURRENCY 53,051 5,634 (14,903) 0 (800) 0 42,982
   2. DEPOSITS 142,798 88,346 21,991 28,517 55,875 (13,640) 323,887
   3. PUBLIC AUTHORITY SECURITIES 96,062 71,974 26,716 0 (17,290) 46,474 223,936
   4. GOVERNMENT NON-BUDGETARY ACCOUNTS 890 8,008 0 (20) (263) (373) 8,242
   5. CREDIT AND CAPITAL MARKET INSTRUMENTS 260,517 41,428 98,472 131 105,879 4,782 998,654 1,509,863
       5.1 SHORT-TERM LOANS 819 120 22,831 (9) 39 16,816 40,616
       5.2 LONG-TERM LOANS 5 7 (10,073) (99) 3,924 515,260 509,024
       5.3 COMMERCIAL BILLS (35,544) (45,542) 1,187 0 50,176 130,450 100,727
       5.4 SHARE CAPITAL 209,824 78,484 20,816 6 37,351 (22,363) 324,118
       5.5 DEBENTURES (3,343) 8,497 0 0 0 31,338 36,492
       5.6 LIFE ASSURANCE AND PENSION FUNDS 90,873 0 0 0 0 0 90,873
       5.7 MORTGAGES 0 0 0 0 0 171,812 171,812
       5.8 DEBTORS 3,564 18,404 17 0 24,915 261 47,161
       5.9 HIRE PURCHASE DEBTS 0 73,720 0 0 (173) 46,896 120,443
       5.10 INTERNATIONAL RESERVE POSITION 0 0 0 0 0 229,927 229,927
       5.11 FOREIGN DEBTS AND CLAIMS 0 11,686 (1,289) 0 (9,475) 4,782 (11,751) (6,047)
       5.12 OTHERS (5,681) (103,948) 64,983 233 (878) (109,992) (155,283)
II. INCURRENCE OF LIABILITIES 492,685 372,582 170,751 970 144,509 219,098 708,315 2,108,910
   1. CURRENCY 2,342 0 0 40,640 42,982
   2. DEPOSITS (13,640) 0 0 337,527 323,887
   3. PUBLIC AUTHORITY SECURITIES 195,894 0 15,658 12,384 223,936
   4. GOVERNMENT NON-BUDGETARY ACCOUNTS 8,242 0 0 0 8,242
   5. CREDIT AND CAPITAL MARKET INSTRUMENTS 492,685 372,582 (22,087) 970 128,851 219,098 317,764 1,509,863
       5.1 SHORT-TERM LOANS (3,719) (11,255) 14,379 305 21,611 19,295 40,616
       5.2 LONG-TERM LOANS 172,877 316,411 6,037 323 20,738 (7,362) 509,024
       5.3 COMMERCIAL BILLS 21,702 84,968 20,095 0 3,701 (29,739) 100,727
       5.4 SHARE CAPITAL 0 111,635 0 0 22,645 189,838 324,118
       5.5 DEBENTURES 0 27,291 0 0 8,747 454 36,492
       5.6 LIFE ASSURANCE AND PENSION FUNDS 0 0 0 0 2,987 87,886 90,873
       5.7 MORTGAGES 144,540 27,272 0 0 0 0 171,812
       5.8 CREDITORS 9,128 15,666 382 0 19,838 2,147 47,161
       5.9 HIRE PURCHASE DEBTS 111,708 8,735 0 0 0 0 120,443
       5.10 INTERNATIONAL RESERVE POSITION 0 0 0 0 0 229,927 0 229,927
       5.11 FOREING DEBTS AND CLAIMS 0 (63,843) (59,989) 0 (9,797) (10,829) 138,411 (6,047)
       5.12 OTHERS 36,449 (144,298) (2,991) 342 38,381 (83,166) (155,283)
III. FINANCIAL SURPLUS OR DEFICIT (I-II) 60,633 (157,192) (38,475) 27,658 (1,108) (214,316) 322,800 0
C. SECTOR DISCREPANCY (A6.-BIII.) 155,412 (285,251) 215,175 (31,308) (2,532) (51,496) 0 0
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5.3. A 2004 Financial Social Accounting Matrix (FSAM) of Thailand  
Using both the data from our SAM table and flow-of-funds table, we can construct the FSAM 
table which will be the basis of our FCGE model. The row and column 17
th
 of Table 2.1 
earlier shows the capital account (KA) which is the saving and investment of each institution 
in the economy. This account will be disaggregated into capital account for each institution; in 
other words we will add more rows and columns to our standard SAM table (Table 2.1) to 
include the assets and institutions data obtained from our flow-of-funds (Table 2.2). Each 
transaction in flow-of-funds are then being filled in its own corresponding cells of the ‘new 
extended’ SAM, producing our 2004 Financial Social Accounting Matrix or FSAM. The 
FSAM shows the inter-connection between the real sector activities and the activities in the 
financial market via saving-investment account. When an institution saves the income that 
they have obtained from the activities in the real sector (e.g. Profit or wages), these savings 
will be used to acquire financial assets or to invest in productivity activities. The transfer of 
these savings from real sectors activities to investment in the financial assets or the fixed asset 
is the linkage of SAM and Flow-of-Funds. Table 2.3 below shows an example of FSAM table 
depicting the transactions between the standard SAM table and the data obtained from the 
flow-of-funds accounts.  
 
 
 
 
 
165 
 
T
a
b
le
 2
.3
: 
S
tr
u
ct
u
re
 o
f 
F
in
a
n
ci
a
l 
S
A
M
 (
F
S
A
M
)4
4
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
44
 (Source: Puttanapong (2008)) 
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5.4. A 2004 Financial Computable General Equilibrium (FCGE) Model of Thailand  
The financial computable general equilibrium (FCGE) is a combination of computable 
general equilibrium (CGE) model and flow-of-funds transactions. Our construction of FCGE 
will follow closely the models developed by Azis (2002), Manopiniwes (2005) and 
Puttanapong (2008) with exception that we had extended our model to include the poverty 
line and income distribution between the rich and the poor households. Azis (2002) has 
developed the FCGE model for Indonesia followed by Manopiniwes (2005) who developed 
one for Thailand using 1998 financial SAM as its base data. Manopiniwes (2005) was looking 
at the impact of environmental policies in Thailand’s economy that has incorporated both 
financial market and real sectors. Puttanapong (2008) then proposed a structural FCGE that 
used 2004 financial SAM as its data in looking at the economy wide impact of shocks to 
foreign and domestic interest rate in addition to applying Monte-Carlo simulation technique to 
examine the volatilities in both financial and real markets. Our model is nevertheless an 
extension of what have been developed by Manopiniwes (2005) and Puttanapong (2008). We 
extended the existing model by incorporating poverty line and income distribution in order to 
analyze the impact of macroeconomic shocks such as government spending, interest rate, 
reserve requirement and wages on different categories of households. We illustrate here the 
basic equations used which are taken from Puttanapong (2008). Following his approach, we 
will divide the equations into two main categories, core module and financial module. The 
core module consists of all the activities and transactions that would essentially exist in the 
CGE model while the financial module shows the transactions in the flow-of-funds. At the 
end of both modules, we introduce our extension that is the poverty block which consists of 
poverty line equations and income distribution.  
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5.5. Core Module of FCGE 
The key specifications in the core model are: 
1. Three production sectors (agricultural, manufacturing and services), two factors of 
production (labor and capital), four types of taxes (direct tax, indirect tax, tariff and 
subsidy), nine institutions (government, rest of the world, enterprise and another five 
categories of households described earlier – HHH1, HHH2, HHH3, HHH4, HHH5). 
2. The exchange rate and the current account balance are endogenous variables (FSAV). 
3. The government spending is an exogenous variable while the government saving is an 
endogenous variable.   
4. The marginal propensity to save (MPS) is an endogenous variable while the 
investment (invest) is an exogenous variable.  
5. Labor and capital are mobile and while capital is at full capacity, the labor is not fully 
employed.  
The equations in the core model can be divided into five separate blocks: price block, 
production block, income block, expenditure block, and system constraint block . All the 
equations used in this FCGE model are listed in Appendix 2. 
 
5.5.1. Price Block 
The price block shows the equations for prices use in the model. Equations (1) and (2) define 
the domestic import price and the domestic export price that are affected by the world import 
price (PWMim) and the world export price (PWEie) along with endogenous exchange rate and 
taxes. Equation (3) shows the total amount of composite goods/goods in the domestic market 
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(PQi*Qi) for each sector as the summation of total goods produced locally and total goods 
imported. Equation (4) shows the value of total output produced as the summation of total 
goods produced domestically (consumed domestically) and total goods exported abroad. 
Equation (5) shows the price of value added as the difference of after-tax price of output and 
the share price of composite goods. The price index in Equation (6) is defined as the ratio of 
value-added GDP to the real GDP. Finally in Equation (7), we have the price of capital goods 
by sector of destination to be the share of price of composite goods. 
 
5.5.2. Production Block 
The production block shows the activities for each production sector and represents the supply 
side of our CGE model. The production process of Armington composite goods is described 
using the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function and the transformation of the gross 
domestic output into goods consumed domestically or goods exported abroad is described 
using constant elasticity of transformation (CET) function. In Equation (8) we have the total 
output produced by sector i as a Cobb-Douglas function of labor and capital. In Equation (9) 
we have derived the factor demand for labor and capital from our cost minimization of Cobb-
Douglas function. The optimal demand for labor and capital depends on wage rate and cost of 
capital. In Equation (10), the quantity of intermediate input goods is the share of input output 
coefficient on the total output produced by sector i. Equation (11) is based on the assumption 
of imperfect substitution/imperfect transformation between exports and domestic goods 
supply in addition to the assumption that the firms can transform their domestically produced 
goods into goods that are sold abroad (export) and sold domestically. The transformation 
process in Equation (11) is the CET function. Equation (12) shows the supply ratio that is the 
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relative demand of our exported goods to the domestically sold goods as a function of their 
prices, share parameters and parameter defined by elasticity of transformation. In Equation 
(13), we have the quantity of goods exported determined by the relative sectoral price of 
world exports and the sectoral price of world exports substitutes. Equation (14) is a 
production process using CES function that shows the quantity of Armington composite 
goods as a combination of imported and domestic goods. Finally, in Equation (15), the ratio 
of imported goods over the goods sold domestically is determined by their relative prices, 
input share coefficients and parameter defined by the elasticity of substitutions.  
 
5.5.3. Income Block 
The income block consists of equations that show the total income and the total saving of the 
economic players in our model. The income flows from value added (labor and capital) to the 
institutions and finally into the hands of households. Equation (16) shows the factor income 
for each labor and capital as the summation of the product of the demand for each factor 
across sector and their average wages or cost of capital. Equation (17) defines the total 
income for private institutions (households and enterprise) as the summation of income 
received from the supply of their labors (wages), capital (rent) and transfer from the 
government (e.g. subsidies) and the rest of the world (remittance) along with other inter-
institutional transfers. In Equation (18), the tariffs collected are defined as the proportion of 
imported tariff rate across sectors on aggregated value of imported goods. Equation (19) 
defines the aggregated indirect tax as a function of tax rate and aggregated total output. In 
Equation (20), the aggregated tax collected from the household sector is a summation of 
income tax rate across each category of households on their respective total income. Equation 
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(21) shows the total private saving that depends on their marginal propensity to save and its 
disposable income.  In Equation (22), we have the total government revenue as the summation 
of tariff, indirect tax, household tax and other transfers from other institutions to the 
government. Finally, in Equation (23) we define the aggregated saving as the summation of 
private saving and government saving less the saving from overseas. 
 
5.5.4. Expenditure Block 
The expenditure block completes the cycle of the core module by showing the equations that 
represent the consumption and investment of each economic player. Equation (24) defines the 
household consumption on good i that depends on marginal propensity to consume off their 
disposable income and the price of composite goods. In Equation (25), we have the total 
income of each private institution as the summation of their expenditure/consumption, saving, 
tax payment and inter-institutional transfers. Equation (26) defines the government 
consumption for each sector’s products as a fixed proportion of government total expenditure. 
Equation (27) shows the government revenue that depends on the government saving, transfer 
from the government to other institutions (e.g. subsidies, benefits) and the total value of 
government consumption on each sector. In Equation (28), we have the changes in inventories 
for each sector as a ratio of inventory investment to its output on the total output produced for 
each sector. In Equation (29), the aggregated fixed investment is defined as the total 
investment in the economy less the summation of the changes in inventory for each sector. 
Equation (30) defines the investment in each destination sector as a fixed proportion of total 
fixed investment. Finally, Equation (31) shows the amount of capital goods i used for 
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investment that depends on the capital matrix coefficients and the volume of investment in 
each destination sector.  
 
5.5.5. System Constraints Block 
The system constraints block shows the balance of supply and demand side for each market in 
the economy. In Equation (32) we have the equilibrium in the composite good i market as the 
summation of demand for intermediate inputs i, household’s consumption on good i, 
government’s consumption on good i, the amount of good i used for investment and the 
capital inventory of good i. Equation (33) shows the total factor demand employed as the 
summation of the demand for each factor across the sectors. Equation (34) shows the current 
account balance (FSAV) which is the difference between capital flowing in via exports and 
foreign transfers with the capital flowing out. The assumption of saving-investment balance is 
represented in Equation (35) where the total saving equals to total investment and a slack 
variable for correcting the model since the equilibrium price vector may not cleared all the 
markets. Equation (36) defines the nominal GDP using the value-added approach and finally 
in Equation (37), we have the real GDP computed using conventional way of summing across 
the consumption, investment, government expenditure and trade balance.  
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5.6. Financial Module of FCGE
45
 
The equations in the financial module show the behavioral specifications of six institutions
46
 
we have in the flow-of-funds, precisely the use and the source of their funds. The main 
assumption is that there is a market clearing mechanism in which total quantity supply of each 
asset equals to its total quantity demand (quantity clearing concept). Furthermore, there exist 
exogenous factors that would determine the quantity supplied and quantity demanded and the 
market will clear with at least one endogenous variable. In Figure 2.20, we have the linkage of 
core module and financial module through saving and investments transactions while Table 
2.4 shows the structure of financial module and its corresponding equations available in 
Appendix 2.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
45
 There are variables in the equations that have bar/line above it indicating that these are exogenous variables. 
46
 The six institutions are Bank of Thailand (BOT), government, Rest-of-the-World (ROW), households (HHH), 
banks and enterprise.  
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Table 2.4: Financial Module Equations 
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5.6.1. Households’ Behavioral Specifications 
In Equation (38), we defined the households’ portfolio (HHPORTS) as its allocation in 
equities and bonds
47
. Due to imperfect substitutions between the financial assets, the main 
assumption in portfolio decision is that it is based on hierarchical process. In other words, 
households need to make pairwise comparisons between one particular asset vis-a-vis other 
assets. Equations (39) to (42) calculate the relative return of investing in different types of 
bonds and using these, one can establish the weighted average return of investing in each 
asset. For instance, in Equation (43), GH1 illustrates the proportion of households’ portfolio 
invested in equity assets based on its return on equity versus its weighted average return of 
investing in the other five bonds. Similarly for Equations (44) to (47) whereby the proportions 
of households’ investment in a particular financial asset is based on its return from that asset 
versus its weighted average return of investing in others (hierarchical process). In Equations 
(48) to (53), we have households demand for these assets financed by bank loans (SOF_SLO,HH 
in Equation 54), non-listed equities (SOF_SEQNL,HH in Equation (55)) that include household 
savings, income from the interest rate (INTEXPADJHH in Equation (56)) and capital gains 
from the investment in foreign assets (EXRADJHH in Equation (57)). Equations (58) to (60) 
show the households demand for foreign assets induced by the exchange rate, real GDP and 
interest rate differential between domestic interest rate and foreign interest rate. In Equation 
(61) we have the households demand for fixed assets (UOF_FFIXED,HH) and in Equation (62) is 
its cash holding (UOF_F_DCH,HH). 
 
                                                          
47
 There are five type of bonds in our module: Government Bonds (GB), Bank of Thailand Bonds (BOTB), 
Financial Institutional Development Fund Bond (FIDFB), State-Owned Enterprise Bond (SOEB) and Corporate 
Bond (CBOND). 
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5.6.2. Enterprise’ Behavioral Specifications 
The enterprise demands for financial assets are specified in Equations (63) for fixed assets 
(UOF_SFIXED, ENTP), in Equation (64) for deposit (UOF_SDE, ENTP), in Equations (75) to (76) for 
foreign assets (UOF_SFA,ENTP) and in Equation (78) for cash (UOF_SCH,ENTP). The source of 
financing comes from loans (SOF_SLO, ENTP in Equation (65)), listed equities (SOF_SEQL,ENTP  
in Equation (66)), bonds (SOF_SSOEB, ENTP   in Equation (68) and SOF_SCBOND, ENTP  in 
Equation (71)), non-listed equities (SOF_SEQNL, ENTP in Equation (72)), net interest on its 
financial investment (INTEXPADJENTP in Equation (73)) and capital gains on foreign assets 
(EXRADJENTP in Equation (74)). The price of equity listed in Equation (67) and the price of 
bonds in Equations (68) and (69) are set as endogenous variables that equilibrate the supply 
and the demand for each asset.  
 
5.6.3. Banks’ Behavioral Specifications  
In Equation (79), we have the banks’ portfolio defined as the summation of the banks 
demand/investment in equity and bonds. Following the structure of households’ behavioral 
specifications, we defined the relative return of investing in combination of assets to its total 
value (Equations (80) to (83)). Using these, we can construct the proportion/weighted average 
of return on banks allocation to each asset defined in Equations (84) to (88). In Equation (89) 
to (94), the banks will make pairwise comparison of investing in a particular asset vis-à-vis 
other assets. For instance in Equation (90), UOF_SGB, BANK  specifies the banks investment in 
government bonds that are influenced by the return on government bonds itself (GB2) and the 
weighted average of return from investing in other available assets other than equity (1-GB1). 
The source of banks financing comes from non-listed equity (SOF_SEQNL,BANK in Equation 
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(95)) , net interest on banks investment (INTEXPADJBANK  in Equation (96)) and capital gains 
from investing in foreign assets (EXRADJBANK in Equation (97)). Finally, Equations (98) to 
(100) specify the total amount of banks investment in foreign assets as a function of exchange 
rate, interest rate differential and real GDP.  
 
5.6.4. Government’s Behavioral Specifications 
The main function of the government is in policy-making and in order to investigate the effect 
of fiscal policies in our model, we have to set the policy instruments such as government 
spending and taxes as exogenous variables. In Equations (101) and (103), we have defined the 
source of government funds in the financial market that come mainly from issuing bonds. 
There are two types of bonds that Thailand government issues: government bonds and 
Financial Institution Development Fund Bonds (FIDFB). The government bonds are issued to 
finance the government expenditures while FIDFB are issued to inject capital into financial 
institutions that are affected from the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. These equations are 
derived by equalizing the total supply and the total demand while the prices of these bonds in 
Equations (102) and (104) govern the market equilibrium for the bond market. Other source 
of government funds come from non-listed equities that include the net interest income from 
holding various financial assets (INTEXPADJGOV) and the net capital gain on foreign assets 
(EXRADJGOV). Finally in Equation (107), the cash that the government holds come from its 
own saving and net interest on its financial assets. 
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5.6.5. Bank of Thailand (BoT)’s Behavioral Specifications 
In Equation (108), we have the total supplied of BoT bonds that is equals to its total demand. 
One of the sources of BoT’s funds come from issuing bonds and in Equation (109), we have 
defined the prices of these bonds that provide equilibrium in the bond markets. In Equation 
(110) to (112), we have other sources of funds for BoT that come from its non-listed equities 
(SOF_FEQNL,BOT) , net interest from the return of its assets (INTEXPADJBOT) and capital gain 
from foreign assets (EXRADJBOT).  The deposit held in Equation (116) comes from the banks 
deposit with BoT including reserve requirements and other type of deposits. In Equations 
(117) to (120), we constructed the money multiplier that determines the money supply, M2 in 
Equation (121). One of the objectives of monetary authority is to control inflation through 
price stabilization. Hence, the amount of cash that BoT decides to hold in Equation (122) will 
be determined by the loan interest rate and the real GDP in the economy. Any inflation 
targeting policy is done through bond repurchased market in Equation (123).  
 
5.6.7. Rest of the World (RoW)’s Behavioral Specifications 
In our model, the RoW is linked to other domestic institutions through capital account. The 
demand for Thailand’s domestic assets for the year of 2004 in Equations (124) to (128) 
depend on the expected exchange rate and the interest rate differential, that is the difference 
between interest earned from holding that particular asset and foreign interest rate
48
. Finally, 
in Equation (129) to (133), we have the total stocks of financial assets that are held by RoW 
as the summation of its current year (2004) investment and the aggregated investment from 
the previous year.  
                                                          
48
 In Puttanapong (2008), the foreign interest rate is set as the average Fed Funds Rate in 2004.  
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5.6.8. System Constraint Specifications 
In Equations (134) and (135), we have aggregated assets and liabilities stocks for the current 
year as the summation of previous year stocks and the current year flows. Equations (136) and 
(137) showed the equilibrium for each institution uses and sources of its funds. In Equation 
(138), we defined total investment as the aggregated investment in fixed assets across all the 
institutions. Equation (139) shows the uncovered interest parity (UIP) relation in which the 
interest rate differentials depend on the expected exchange rate and exchange rate itself. 
Equation (140) defined the interest rate spread as the difference between the loan interest rate 
and the deposit interest rate while in Equations (141) to (145), we have the relative return of 
investing in each financial asset over depositing the cash with the banks. If the relative return 
is positive, then investors would choose the alternative than to save their cash. Equations 
(146) and (147) provide the linkage between the core module and the financial module 
through savings of both households and enterprises that depend on marginal propensity to 
save, income and direct tax. The government saving in Equation (148) depends on 
government income and its expenditure. Finally, the current account balance (FSAV) and the 
exchange rate influence the rest of the world saving in Thailand’s economy (Equation 149).  
 
5.6.7. Poverty Block Specifications 
The main reason of introducing the poverty block is to calculate the poverty line and the 
income distribution. In Equation (150), we first defined the average price of domestic goods 
(PDAVG) and in Equation (151), we constructed the poverty line as a function of average 
price of domestic goods, price index, sectoral share parameter and the aggregated domestic 
prices for the sectors used in our model. Finally, Equation (152) showed the income 
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distribution as the relative income of the lowest 20% of household in the economy to the top 
20% of households in the economy.  
 
6. Results and Analysis II 
We have done series of shocks including both the expansionary and contractionary fiscal and 
monetary policies to investigate their impact on poverty line and income distribution. Our 
main goal is to construct Quadrant-2 and Quadrant-4 of Azis’s framework and the standard 
income distribution in an economy is depicted in Figure 2.21 below: 
 
             Figure 2.21: Income Distribution of a Population 
 
Where Z = Poverty Line, A2-A1 = Income Inequality, µ = the mean income of the population 
Our framework that is based on Azis argument is looking at the shift in Z and the spread of 
A2-A1, precisely trying to see which of these two are more affected to the economic shocks in 
our model.  
              f(y) 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                           y 
                                         Z           A1    µ            A2 
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6.1. Shock 1: Increase in Government Expenditure 
In this shock, we increased the government expenditure (GDTOT) to see its impact on poverty 
line and income distribution. In Figure 2.22, we have the poverty line that increases as the 
government expenditure increases. As expected, when the government increases its spending, 
the aggregate demand curve would shift to the right (outward) leading to an increase in price 
and GDP. Since the poverty line is a function of price, an increase in price leads to an increase 
in poverty line which is shown below (Figure 2.22).  
 
Figure 2.22: Level of Poverty Line (Index) in Thailand 
 
In Figure 2.23, we have the income distribution of the bottom 20% of the population to the 
top 20% of the population and since income of the bottom 20% of the population increases at 
a rate higher than income of the top 20% of the population, the income distribution improves. 
Take note that the impact of initial percentage of shock (up to 5%) causes steeper changes to 
these variables than the subsequent increments. This is because in CGE model, our baseline 
model has exogenized certain variables and when we shock the model, some of these initial 
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exogenized variables are being endogenized. This is one of the critiques of CGE model as 
mentioned by authors such as Hazledine (1992) about the macro issues that arise when 
closing the model in aggregate.In Figure 2.24, we have the income of the bottom 20% of the 
population and the level of RGDP (Figure 2.25)  that increase as the government increases its 
expenditure.  
 
Figure 2.23: Income Distribution of the Bottom 20% of the Population to the Top 20% 
of the Population - Thailand (%) 
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Figure 2.24: Income of the Bottom 20% of the Population - Thailand (billions of bath) 
 
 
Figure 2.25:  The Level of RGDP as the Government Increases its Spending - Thailand 
(billions of bath) 
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Since our main goal is to investigate the poverty incidence, we now look at Figures 2.26, 2.27 
and 2.28. The trend lines for these graphs show that a 1% increase in RGDP leads to 0.1998% 
increase in the income of the bottom 20% of the population (Figure 2.28) but only 0.0008% 
increase in the price index (Figure 2.26). The increase in the price index is almost negligible 
that it almost has no effect on the increase in the poverty line (Figure 2.27).  
 
Figure 2.26:  Price Index across the RGDP – Thailand 
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Figure 2.27: (Construction of Quadrant – 2) Price Index across the Poverty Line – 
Thailand 
 
 
Figure 2.28: (Construction of Quadrant – 4) Income of the Bottom 20% of the 
Population across RGDP - Thailand (billions of bath) 
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Now, instead of looking at elasticity, our next approach is to calculate the magnitude of 
change for poverty line and income of the bottom 20% of the population. First we constructed 
the split linear function for the graphs. 
From Figure 2.26, we have: 
Price Indexsteep = 0.0534*RGDPsteep + 652.3936
49
 
Price Indexflat = 0.0532*RGDPflat + 654.2929
50
 
From Figure 2.27, we have: 
Price Indexsteep = 1.4627*PovertyLinesteep – 462.68 
Price Indexflat = 1.4626*PovertyLineflat – 462.55 
From Figure 2.28, we have: 
Y
Poor
steep = 3.0702*RGDPsteep – 19787.9842 
Y
Poor
flat = 3.0690*RGDPflat – 19780.1817 
 
Analysis I: Steeper part of the Graph 
A $1 billion increase in RGDPsteep leads to an increase in Price Indexsteep by 0.0534 and an 
increase in the income of the bottom 20% of the population (Y
Poor
steep) by $3.0702 billions of 
bath. An increase in Price Indexsteep by 0.0534 leads to an increase in PovertyLinesteep by 
0.0365.  
Analysis II: Flatter part of the Graph 
A $1 billion increase in RGDP leads to an increase in Price Indexflat by 0.0532 and an increase 
in the income of the bottom 20% of the population (Y
Poor
flat) by $3.069 billions of bath. An 
increase in Price Indexflat by 0.0532 leads to an increase in PovertyLineflat by 0.0363.  
                                                          
49
 Any equation with subscript ‘steep’ refers to the steep part of the graph. 
50
  Any equation with subscript ‘flat’ refers to the flatter part of the graph. 
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Since our two approaches of using elasticity and split linear functions have shown significant 
improvement of income distribution to the increase in government spending and an almost 
negligible response of poverty line to the same shock, we conclude that the poverty incidence 
has improved.  
The results show that in our FCGE model, when the government increases its total 
expenditure (GDTOT), the final demand of government consumption for agricultural, 
manufacturing and services sectors’ products will also increase (GDi in Equation (26)) which 
will affect the total domestic consumption (Qi in Equation (32)). An increase in total domestic 
consumption will affect the prices (Equation (3)), the composition of imported goods (M) and 
domestic goods (D) (Equations (13) and (14)) and the total output for each sector (PX*X in 
Equation (4)). The increase in the prices will also affect the household consumption (Equation 
(24)). This will ultimately affect the real GDP (Equation (36)) and the value added GDP 
(Equation (37)). Since the price index (PINDEX) is the ratio of value added GDP over the real 
GDP (Equation (6)), the change in this ratio affects the price index and the poverty line 
(Equation (151)). The effect on the total output of each sector (Xi) will affect the wages and 
the rent (Equation (9)) which means affecting the factor income for labor and capital (YFCTRf 
in Equation (16)). Some of these factor incomes would be saved and some will be invested 
back into the productivity sector (Invest in Equation (29)). The amount that will be saved and 
invested in these real sectors will then be linked to our financial sector (Equations (137) and 
(138)). This will affect the enterprise portfolio (UOF_SFIXED,ENTP in Equation (63)) and 
households portfolio (UOF_FFIXED,HH in Equation (61)). The change in their portfolio will 
finally determine the total income of domestic institutions (YHdprivt in Equation 25). From this, 
we could determine the income distribution as the ratio of total income of the bottom 20% of 
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the population to the total income of the top 20% of the population (Equation (152)). Finally, 
take note that the income of the bottom 20% of the population in Figure 2.24 is converging to 
a certain level (diminishing marginal return) as the government keeps on increasing its 
expenditure.  
6.2. Shock 2: Decrease in Government Expenditure 
One of the contractionary fiscal policies that we have in the model is to reduce the 
government spending. In Figure 2.29 below, we have the poverty line declining as the 
government decreases its expenditure. In the standard economic theory, any contractionary 
fiscal policy would shift the aggregate demand curve to the left (downward) resulting in the 
decrease of price and GDP. Since poverty line is defined as a function of price, a decrease in 
price leads to a decrease in poverty line.  
 
 
Figure 2.29: Level of Poverty Line (Index) in Thailand 
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In Figure 2.30, our model shows that the income distribution improves although the income of 
the bottom 20% of the population is declining (Figure 2.31). Unlike in Shock 1, whereby the 
increase in government expenditure would benefit the income of the bottom 20% of the 
population, the contractionary fiscal policy however, would lower their total income. The 
income distribution improves because the declined in the income of the top 20% of the 
population is greater than the declined in the income of the bottom 20% of the population.  
 
 
Figure 2.30: Income Distribution of the Bottom 20% of the Population to the Top 20% 
of the Population - Thailand (%) 
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Figure 2.31: Income of the Bottom 20% of the Population - Thailand (billions of bath) 
 
Our next step is to calculate the poverty incidence as a result of this shock. In Figure 2.32, the 
trend line shows that a 1% increase in the RGDP leads to 0.0022% increase in the price index, 
which means that the change in the poverty line would almost surely is negligible as well 
(Figure 2.33). Similarly, the elasticity of income to the output in Figure 2.34 also shows a 
very insignificant change. A 1% increase in the RGDP leads to null (0.0000%) increase in the 
income of the bottom 20% of the population. 
As mentioned in Shock 1 earlier, take note that the impact of initial percentage of shock (up to 
5%) causes steeper changes to these variables than the subsequent increments. This is because 
in CGE model, our baseline model has exogenized certain variables and when we shock the 
model, some of these initial exogenized variables are being endogenized. This is one of the 
critiques of CGE model as mentioned by authors such as Hazledine (1992) about the macro 
issues that arise when closing the model in aggregate. 
179.108800
179.108850
179.108900
179.108950
179.109000
179.109050
179.109100
179.109150
0.00% 5.00% 5.50% 6.00% 6.50% 7.00% 7.50% 8.00%
Reduction in Government Expenditure (%) 
 
191 
 
 
Figure 2.32:  Price Index across the RGDP – Thailand 
 
 
Figure 2.33: (Construction of Quadrant – 2) Price Index across the Poverty Line – 
Thailand 
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              Figure 2.34: (Construction of Quadrant – 4) Income of the Bottom 20% of the 
Population across RGDP - Thailand (billions of bath) 
 
Similar to the earlier analysis, we will now calculate the change in the magnitude of poverty 
line and income of the bottom 20% of the population when government decreases its 
spending. The split linear functions for each graph are as follow: 
From Figure 2.32, we have: 
Price Indexsteep = 0.2509*RGDPsteep -632.0393
51
 
Price Indexflat = 0.2516*RGDPflat -636.4129
52
 
From Figure 2.33, we have: 
Price Indexsteep = 1.1524*PovertyLinesteep – 152.4242 
Price Indexflat = 0.2509*PovertyLineflat – 632.0393 
From Figure 2.34, we have: 
Y
Poor
steep = 0.000007375*RGDPsteep + 179.0611 
Y
Poor
flat = 0.000007472*RGDPflat + 179.060479 
                                                          
51
 Any equation with subscript ‘steep’ refers to the steep part of the graph. 
52
  Any equation with subscript ‘flat’ refers to the flatter part of the graph. 
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Analysis I: Steeper part of the Graph 
A $1 billion decrease in RGDPsteep leads to a decrease in Price Indexsteep by 0.2509 and a 
decrease in the income of the bottom 20% of the population (Y
Poor
steep) by $0.000007375 
billions of bath ($7375 bath). A decrease in Price Indexsteep by 0.2509 leads to a decrease in 
PovertyLinesteep by 0.2178.  
 
Analysis II: Flatter part of the Graph 
A $1 billion decrease in RGDP leads to a decrease in Price Indexflat by 0.2516 and a decrease 
in the income of the bottom 20% of the population (Y
Poor
flat) by $0.000007472 billions of bath 
($7472). A decrease in Price Indexflat by 0.2516 leads to a decrease in PovertyLineflat by 
1.0027.  
Hence, based on our two approaches, we concluded that contractionary fiscal policy does not 
improve the level of income for the bottom 20% of the population despite the decline in the 
poverty line. The impact on poverty incidence is ambiguous. 
 
In our FCGE model, when the government decreases its total expenditure (GDTOT ), the final 
demand of government consumption for agricultural, manufacturing and services sectors’ 
products will also decrease (GDi in Equation (26)) which will affect the total domestic 
consumption (Qi in Equation (32)). A decrease in total domestic consumption will affect the 
prices (Equation (3)), the composition of imported goods (M) and domestic goods (D)  
defined in Equations (13) and (14) and the total output for each sector (PX*X in Equation (4)). 
The decrease in the prices will also affect the household consumption (Equation (24)). This 
will ultimately affect the real GDP (Equation (36)) and the value added GDP (Equation (37)). 
Since the price index (PINDEX) is the ratio of value added GDP over the real GDP (Equation 
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(6)), the change in this ratio affects the price index and the poverty line (Equation (151)). The 
effect on the total output of each sector (Xi) will affect the wages and the rent (Equation (9)) 
which means affecting the factor income for labor and capital (YFCTRf in Equation (16)). 
Some of these factor incomes would be saved and some will be invested back into the 
productivity sector (Invest in Equation (29)). The amount that will be saved and invested in 
these real sectors will then be linked to our financial sector (Equations (137) and (138)). This 
will affect the enterprise portfolio (UOF_SFIXED,ENTP in Equation (63)) and households 
portfolio (UOF_FFIXED,HH in Equation (61)). The change in their portfolio will finally 
determine the total income of domestic institutions (YHdprivt in Equation (25)). As in the 
earlier shock, the income of the bottom 20% of the population in Figure 2.31 is converging to 
a certain level (diminishing marginal return) as the government keeps on decreasing its 
expenditure.  
 
6.3. Shock 3: Increase in Interest Rate 
Our third shock that is an increment in the interest rate is one of the contractionary monetary 
policies. We would expect that an increase in the interest rate would shift the aggregate 
demand curve to the left (downward) resulting in lower GDP and lower price. Since the 
poverty line is a function of price index, a decrease in price index leads to a decrease in 
poverty line (Figure 2.35). In Figure 2.36, we can see that the income distribution worsens 
before diminishing to a constant level and income of the bottom 20% of the population in 
Figure 2.37 also drops significantly as a response to the initial shock before 
converges/diminishes to a constant level. This shows that unlike contractionary fiscal policy 
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described earlier, contractionary monetary policy has negative effect on both income 
distribution and income of the bottom 20% of the population.  
 
 
Figure 2.35: Level of Poverty Line (Index) in Thailand 
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   Figure 2.36: Income Distribution of the Bottom 20% of the Population to the Top 20% 
of the Population - Thailand (%) 
 
 
     Figure 2.37: Income of the Bottom 20% of the Population - Thailand (billions of bath) 
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Our main task is to investigate the poverty incidence as a result of this shock.  
From Figure 2.38: 
Price Index = 0.2639*RGDP – 720.3344 
From Figure 2.39, we have: 
Price Index = 1.1397*PovertyLine – 139.6201 
From Figure 2.40, we have: 
Y
Poor
steep =2.4732*RGDPsteep – 15905.2560 
Y
Poor
flat = 137.1184 
As the interest rate increases by 100 basis points (1 percent), the RGDP decreases. A decrease 
by $1 billion in RGDP leads to a declined in Price Index by 0.2639 and income of the bottom 
20% of the population (Y
Poor
) to decrease by $2.4732 billion of bath for the steeper part of the 
graph in Figure 2.40 and a declined to $137 billion of bath which is a drop by $42 billion bath 
for the flatter part of the same graph. A declined in Price Index by 0.2639 leads to a decline in 
Poverty Line by 0.2315. Due to this, we conclude that the poverty incidence worsens since the 
bottom 20% of the population will lose significant amount of income compares relatively to a 
small number of people that will be above the poverty line.  
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Figure 2.38:  Price Index across the RGDP – Thailand 
 
 
Figure 2.39: (Construction of Quadrant – 2) Price Index across the Poverty Line – 
Thailand 
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Figure 2.40: (Construction of Quadrant – 4) Income of the Bottom 20% of the 
Population across RGDP - Thailand (billions of bath) 
 
In our model, any changes in the level of targeted interest rate (RRN “Lo”) would affect the 
amount of money supply (M2) in the economy defined in Equations (118) and (122). The 
amount of money (SOF_SCH,BOT in Equation (122)) coming from Bank of Thailand (BoT) 
declines and hence M2 will also decline. In addition, the loan interest rate also affects the 
amount of bank loans that households and enterprises could borrow from the banks defined in 
Equations (54) and (65). Since the interest rate is rising, the demand for bank loans declines 
and the deposit interest rate also increases (Equation (140)) due to the fixed interest spread 
that we have set in our model. The relative return from investing in other financial assets will 
decrease since the deposit interest rate increases (Equations (141) to (145)). The exchange 
rate appreciates (Equation (139)) but the demand for Thai’s loan from the rest of the world 
will decline (Equation (129)).  At the same time, the changes in the interest rate would also 
determine the households and enterprises’ decisions to invest in the fixed assets (Equations 
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(61) and (63)) and the net return that they will obtain from their investment across different 
financial assets (Equations (56) and (96)).  Since the compositions of their portfolio have 
changed, the total amount invested in the real sector has also changed (Equation (138)). The 
share distribution of investing in these real sectors is defined in Equation (29) and the effect 
on the prices and the quantities are defined in Equations (7) and (31). Finally, these changes 
will affect the RGDP in Equation (37) and the value added GDP  in Equation (36).  
Furthermore, we have assumed that the wages are fixed but the labor supply is unlimited due 
to migration. However, the rent is an endogenous variable but it is operating at full capacity. 
As described earlier, the increase in interest rate affects the prices and the quantities of goods 
in the economy. The total output for each sector (Xi) and the prices declines (Equation (7)) 
causing the labor supply (FDSC) and the rent to decrease (WFcapital ) in Equation (9). The 
decrease in the rent causes the income of the enterprises to decrease (Equation (17)). As 
income of the enterprises is reduced, its transfer (DTRANS) to households and government is 
reduced as well. The reduction in the transfer from enterprises, the lower cost of capital and 
the lower labor supply causes the income of the households to reduce as well (Equation (17)). 
Since the effect of this reduction depends on the share parameter of each household 
(FSHARE), some households would have more impact than others, explaining the income 
distribution between the two groups of households. 
Finally, it is to be noted that similar to the previous two shocks, the highest impact arises at 
the beginning of the shocks (first 1%) due to endogeneizing certain variables that we have 
initially exogenized in the baseline model. Furthermore, the effect exhibits diminishing 
marginal return as the shock continues consistent with the economic theory and Azis’s 
framework.  
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6.4. Shock 4: Decrease in Interest Rate 
In this shock, we are looking at one of the expansionary monetary tools, decreasing the 
interest rate. One would expect that when the level targeted interest rate decreases, the 
aggregate demand curve will shift to the right (upward) resulting in an increase in the price 
index and GDP. In Figure 2.41, the poverty line is increasing as the interest rate decreases 
since the poverty line is defined as an increasing function of price. The income distribution 
improves when interest rate decreases up until 150 basis points before declining and 
eventually level out when the interest rate reaches 250 basis points. The income of the bottom 
20% of the population follows the similar pattern of income distribution. This intuitively 
suggests that decreasing the interest rate while does improve the income distribution in an 
economy will eventually have diminishing effect as the shock continues. 
 
Figure 2.41: Level of Poverty Line (Index) in Thailand 
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Figure 2.42: Income Distribution of the Bottom 20% of the Population to the Top 20% 
of the Population - Thailand (%) 
 
 
Figure 2.43: Income of the Bottom 20% of the Population - Thailand (billions of bath) 
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Our next task is to calculate the impact on poverty incidence as a result of this shock.  
 
From Figure 2.44, we have: 
Price Index = 0.2578*RGDP -676.5786 
From Figure 2.45, we have: 
Price Index = 1.1748*PovertyLine – 174.8355 
From Figure 2.46, we have: 
Y
Poor
increasing = 2.0977*RGDPincreasing – 13463.558 
Y
Poor
decreasing = -6.2458*RGDPflat + 40899.3485 
Y
Poor
level = 179.080  
 
 
Figure 2.44:  Price Index across the RGDP – Thailand 
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Figure 2.45: (Construction of Quadrant – 2) Price Index across the Poverty Line – 
Thailand 
 
 
Figure 2.46: (Construction of Quadrant – 4) Income of the Bottom 20% of the 
Population across RGDP - Thailand (billions of bath) 
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Analysis I: Increasing part of the Graph in Figure 2.46 
We assume that the interest rate decreases only up to 150 basis points. A $1 billion increase in 
RGDP leads to Price Index increases by 0.2578 and income of the bottom 20% of the 
population to increase by $2.0977 billion bath. The increase in the Price Index by 0.2578 
leads to an increase in the Poverty Line by 0.2194.  
 
Analysis II: Decreasing part of the Graph in Figure 2.46 
We assume that the interest rate continues to decrease more than 150 basis points. A $1 
billion increase in RGDP leads to a decline in Price Index by 0.2578 and income of the poor 
(Y
Poor
) decreases by $6.2458 billion bath.  
 
Analysis III: Level Part of the Graph in Figure 2.46 
Now we assume that the interest rate continues to decrease above 250 basis points. The only 
change here is the drop in the income of the bottom 20% of the population to a level $179.080 
billion bath, which is its initial level prior to the shocks. 
 
In our model, when the level of targeted interest rate decline, it increases the amount of Bank 
of Thailand money supply in Equations (121) and (122). It also increases the amount of loan 
demand by enterprise in Equation (65) and by households in Equation (54). At the same time, 
the amount of investment in the fixed assets will increase (Equations (61) and (63)). Since the 
fixed assets is defined as the investment in agricultural, manufacturing and services sectors, 
Equation (138) relates this changes in financial market to the real sector. Equation (30) shows 
the impact of an increase in fixed investment to the composite prices in the economy and 
since the interest rate is lower, there is a higher demand for Thai’s export and a decline in 
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their import which subsequently will affect the real GDP in Equation (37) and value-added 
GDP in Equation (36). The rise in investment leads to higher transfer from enterprises to 
households. As the interest rate continues to decrease, the cost of borrowing becomes cheaper 
for enterprises (Equation (65)) and for households (Equation (54)) and there will be a 
continuous rise in the demand for fixed assets. However, since we have defined in our model 
that the capital is utilized at its maximum capacity (Equation (63)), the decline in the interest 
rate will be offset by the decline in the fixed assets investment by the enterprise due to the 
crowding out effects. Up until 150 basis points, the income of the bottom 20% of the 
population is increasing because of an increase in the labor supply and the cost of capital 
along with higher transfers from the enterprises (Equation (9)). However, as the interest rate 
continues to decline beyond 150 basis points, the decline in the fixed assets investment causes 
the labor supply to decrease and the income of the bottom 20% of the population to decrease 
as well until eventually it converges to an equilibrium level which is the level before the 
shocks.  
 
6.5. Shock 5: Increase in Reserve Requirement 
One of the contractionary monetary tools that we tested in our model was an increased in the 
reserve requirement. An increase in reserve requirement shifts the aggregate demand curve 
leftward, resulting in a decrease in price index and real GDP. As mentioned in our earlier 
analysis, the poverty line will decrease since it is a function of price index (Figure 2.47). The 
income distribution improves gradually (Figure 2.48) although there is no change in the 
income of the bottom 20% of the population (Figure 2.49). This is because the income of the 
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top 20% of the population is declining while the income of the bottom 20% of the population 
is unchanged.  
 
Figure 2.47: Level of Poverty Line (Index) in Thailand 
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Figure 2.48: Income Distribution of the Bottom 20% of the Population to the Top 20% 
of the Population - Thailand (%) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.49: Income of the Bottom 20% of the Population - Thailand (billions of bath) 
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Following our earlier approach, our next task now is to calculate the impact of this shock on 
poverty incidence.  
From Figure 2.50, we have: 
Price Index = 0.2516*RGDP -636.4624 
From Figure 2.51, we have: 
Price Index = 1.15*PovertyLine – 150.0949 
From Figure 2.52, we have: 
Y
Poor
 = 179.109093 
 
Figure 2.50:  Price Index across the RGDP – Thailand 
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Figure 2.51: (Construction of Quadrant – 2) Price Index across the Poverty Line – 
Thailand 
 
 
Figure 2.52: (Construction of Quadrant – 4) Income of the Bottom 20% of the 
Population across RGDP - Thailand (billions of bath) 
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Our model has shown that a decrease by $1 billion bath of RGDP leads to a decline in Price 
Index by 0.2516 and no impact on the income of the bottom 20% of the population. Since the 
Price Index declines by 0.2516, the Poverty Line will decline by 0.21881, implying that the 
improvement is too small that in our conclusion for this shock, the impact on poverty 
incidence is negligible.  
 
When the reserve requirement is increased, the deposit by banks (Uof_FDE,BANK)  with BOT 
will increase but the source of deposit (Sof_FDE,BANK) with the banks will decrease (Equation 
(153)). It also affects the amount of money supply in Equations (119) to (120). Since the 
amount of deposit with BOT by banks has increased in Equation (116), this leads to a decline 
in the loans available for households and enterprises (Equations (54) and (65)). From 
Equation (137), the used of flows of assets must equals to the source of the flows of assets and 
the aggregated saving. Hence, the change in the composition of these sources flows due to 
lower sources of loans (SOF_SLO) will also change the amount invested in the fixed assets 
(Equation (138)). The amount invested in the fixed assets will then affect the volume of 
investment by sector of destination (DK) and the prices of capital goods (PK) by sector of 
destination in Equation (30). These effects will further impact the amount of capital goods in 
each sector used for investment (ID) and the prices of composite goods (PQ) before reaching 
the value added GDP in Equation (36) and real GDP in Equation (37).  
Although the income of other groups of households decline, the income of the bottom 20% of 
the population is unchanged (Figure 2.49) because the increase in the transfer from enterprises 
to households 1 offsets the decline in the labor supply and the cost of capital in Equation (9). 
One possible explanation for the increase in the transfer from enterprises to households 1 is 
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that there is an increase in the domestically produced goods from agricultural sector (labor 
intensive) and manufacturing sector (capital intensive) while the services sector shows a 
significant drop. Since the agricultural and manufacturing sectors employed mostly 
households 1, we can see a greater transfer from enterprises to this group but a drop in the 
services sector output lead to a decline in the labor demand for this group resulting in the 
unchanged of households 1 level of income.  
 
6.6. Shock 6: Decrease in Reserve Requirement 
Another shock that we have tested in this model is to decrease the reserve requirement. Since 
this is an expansionary monetary policy, a decrease in reserve requirement will shift the 
aggregate demand rightward and increase the money supply. In Figure 2.53, we have the level 
of poverty line that is increasing as the reserve requirement decreases since poverty line is a 
function of price index. In Figure 2.54, it shows the income distribution declines as the 
reserve requirement continues to decrease and gradually converges to a lower level.  Although 
the income of the bottom 20% of the population is unchanged due to the shock (Figure 2.55), 
the increase in the income of the top 20% of the population causes the income distribution to 
declines to a level where the marginal effect diminishes.  
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                            Figure 2.53: Level of Poverty Line (Index) in Thailand 
 
 
 
Figure 2.54: Income Distribution of the Bottom 20% of the Population to the Top 20% 
of the Population - Thailand (%) 
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Figure 2.55: Income of the Bottom 20% of the Population - Thailand (billions of bath) 
 
In calculating the impact of these shocks on poverty incidence, we have the following 
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From Figure 2.56: 
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From Figure 2.57: 
Price Index = 1.1672*PovertyLine – 167.1982 
From Figure 2.58: 
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Figure 2.56:  Price Index across the RGDP – Thailand 
 
 
Figure 2.57: (Construction of Quadrant – 2) Price Index across the Poverty Line – 
Thailand 
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Figure 2.58: (Construction of Quadrant – 4) Income of the Bottom 20% of the 
Population across RGDP - Thailand (billions of bath) 
 
From this model, a $1 billion increase in the RGDP leads to an increase in Price Index by 
0.216 and an unchanged amount in the income of the bottom 20% of the population. An 
increase in the Price Index by 0.216 leads to an increase in the Poverty Line by 0.1851. In our 
point of view, the impact on poverty incidence is significantly very small that it is almost 
negligible. 
In this model, when we decrease the reserve requirements, the deposits by banks 
(Uof_FDE,BANK)  with BOT will decrease and the source of deposits (Sof_FDE,BANK) with the 
banks will increase (Equation (153)). The amount of money supply will also be affected as 
defined in Equations (118) to (121). Since the amount of required deposits with BOT by 
banks has declined in Equation (116), the amount of loans supply to the households and 
enterprises will increase (Equations (54) and (65)). The higher increase in the amount of loans 
available will affect the investment in the fixed assets (Equation (138)). The amount invested 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
RGDP (billions of bath) 
217 
 
in the fixed assets will then affect the volume of investment by sector of destination (DK) and 
the prices of capital goods (PK) by sector of destination in Equation (30). These effects will 
further impact the amount of capital goods in each sector used for investment (ID) and the 
prices of composite goods (PQ) before reaching the value added GDP in Equation (36) and 
real GDP in Equation (37).  
In Figure 2.55, we have the income of the bottom 20% of the population that is unchanged. 
This is because the decrease in the transfer from enterprises to households offsets the increase 
in the labor supply and the cost of capital in Equation (9). Unlike the increase in reserve 
requirement that shows an increase in the domestic consumption of agricultural and 
manufacturing sectors, the decrease in reserve requirements on the other hands shows an 
increase in domestic output (X) of services sectors. This increase include an increase in 
domestic sales and exports of services products (Equation (4)) which least employed the 
bottom 20% of the population. Hence, the transfers from enterprises to this group of 
households in agricultural and manufacturing sectors decline but the rise of labor supply in 
services sectors (since the wages is fixed) and the rise of cost of capital due to the higher 
demand for investment in the fixed assets will offset one another.  
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7. Conclusion 
7.1 Concluding Remarks 
We started this paper with a claim that growth is not necessarily good for economic 
development especially when taking into account the poverty incidence. Our definition of 
poverty incidence looks at two factors: income inequality and poverty line. Motivated by Azis 
(2009) framework in dealing with such issues, we have taken two approaches to validate our 
claim. The first approach was to construct the four quadrants of the framework using 
Blanchard-Quah Decomposition for quadrant-1 and direct plot of the graphs using available 
data for Quadrant -2 and Quadrant -3. Our result using this first approach revealed that the 
poverty line is an increasing function of price while income of the poor is negatively related 
to the output from 1994 to 1997 and positively related to the output from 1997 to 2000. 
Furthermore, the elasticity of prices to poverty is lower than the elasticity of income to 
demand, meaning that any changes in the output will lead to higher changes in the income of 
the poor relative to the changes in poverty line.  
Our second approach is to extend the FCGE model developed by Puttanapong (2008) by 
introducing different group of households in the economy and defining new equations that 
will capture the poverty line and income distribution. The choice of using FCGE over CGE is 
more realistic in depicting the current economy in which any changes in the financial sector 
will have significant impact on the real sector. The FCGE can be used to analyze the 
interactions between real sectors and financial sectors via saving-investment linkages, for e.g. 
how monetary policy affects the behavioral of different economic agents while CGE only 
look at the interactions within the real sectors. 
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Next, we shocked our FCGE model with government and central bank policies to analyze the 
poverty incidence in the economy. Specifically, we looked at government spending (fiscal 
policy), interest rate and reserve requirement (monetary policies). Our results have shown that 
the impact on the poverty line as a function of price is as expected – when there are 
contractionary policies that reduce the price, the poverty line will also be reduced, and vice 
versa. However, the poverty line is relatively insensitive to the price suggesting that the 
magnitude of the effect is little. This is as expected since the effect on the prices take effect in 
the long run as a result of short run stabilization policies (Calmfors, 1982). 
 The increase in government expenditure (expansionary fiscal policy) will improve both the 
income of the bottom 20% of the population and the income distribution in Thai’s economy. 
The result is as expected since many recent and earlier studies have argued that government 
investments contribute to poverty reduction. Fan et.al (2004) research on government 
spending and poverty reduction in Vietnam has shown that government investment in 
agricultural research followed by roads and education has the largest poverty reduction. The 
same conclusion was reached for rural Uganda by Fan et.al (2004). We concluded that an 
increase in government spending policy would improve the poverty incidence since it 
contributed additional $3 billion baths to the income of the bottom 20% of the population 
while the response of poverty line to price was almost negligible in our model, suggesting that 
the additional number of people that fall below the poverty line is insignificant.   
On the other hand, it is interesting to note that decreasing the government spending 
(contractionary fiscal policy) do not have the reverse effect to increasing the government 
spending. Both the effect on poverty line and income of the bottom 20% of the population are 
220 
 
very small that it is negligible. The income distribution does improve due to the fact that 
income of the top 20% of the population is declining more than the income of the bottom 20% 
of the population. Since the impact on income and poverty line are relatively very small, we 
conclude that the impact on poverty incidence is inconclusive. In our model, we have shocked 
the aggregated government expenditure while according to Buiter (1988), distinguishing 
between the government cuts in different activities would have different repercussion on 
deficit.  
 Now, in investigating the two monetary policies, we found that decreasing the interest rate up 
to150 basis points would improve the income distribution and income of the bottom 20% of 
the population. However, continuous shock beyond 150 basis points would cause the positive 
impact to decline and eventually converge to the baseline level. Hence, decreasing interest 
rate only up to a certain level would improve the poverty incidence but eventually it will 
worsen the welfare in an economy. On the other hand, increasing the interest rate as expected 
would worsen the income of the bottom 20% of the population and also widen the income 
distribution as higher interest rate would most likely benefits those that have financial assets. 
Under the shock of increasing the interest rate, we conclude that the poverty incidence 
worsens.  
Another monetary policy that we have shocked in our model is decreasing the reserve 
requirement which has no effect on income of the bottom 20% of the population but income 
distribution widens after 100 basis points due to an increase in the income of the top 20% of 
the population. On the other hand, increasing the reserve requirement would gradually 
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improve the income distribution despite no impact on the income of the bottom 20% of the 
population.  
In looking at the monetary policy, Romer & Romer (1998) have argued that its effect on 
output, unemployment and inflation are temporary and although expansionary monetary 
policy will lead to temporary boom and temporary reduction in poverty and income 
distribution, this effect will be reversible as the inflation continues to rise or unemployment 
returning to its natural rate of unemployment. They suggested that comprehensive monetary 
policy that aims at low inflation and stable aggregate demand will most likely improve the 
conditions of the poor in long run. Some theories that have make comparison between the 
effectiveness of fiscal policies and monetary policies would argue in favor of one over the 
other in affecting the aggregate demand. The standard theory of Keynesian model argued that 
fiscal policy is more effective regardless of the exchange rate regime while Mundell-Fleming 
model that integrated flexible exchange rate into multi-market equilibrium argued in favor of 
monetary policy. A recent study by Weeks (2008) using empirical evidence of trade shares 
and interest rate differentials showed that fiscal policy is more effective than monetary policy 
for most countries in affecting aggregate demand. Weeks (2008) assumed flexible exchange 
rate but unlike Mundell and Fleming model, he included the price effect. Another support for 
this is Yao (2010) that argued on the effectiveness of fiscal policy than monetary policy in 
stimulating the economy as a response to the current financial crisis.  
Hence, in concluding our results, we have to ask ourselves “Which policy-making is effective 
in improving the poverty incidence?” Admittedly, it is risky to derive an implications of each 
policy based solely on this model, but nevertheless we believe that three conclusions about the 
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interaction between the fiscal and monetary policies with poverty incidence is warranted.  
Ideally, we would want to narrow the gap between the top 20% of the population and the 
bottom 20% of the population while improving the level of income for the bottom 20% of the 
population and ensuring that the number of people that falls below the poverty line is at 
acceptable level. 
First, we conclude that in a short run the expansionary fiscal policy (increase in government 
spending) is more effective than the expansionary monetary policy in narrowing the income 
distribution and improving the income of the bottom 20% of the population. As mentioned by 
Weeks (2008), the effectiveness of monetary policy depends on the trade elasticity and 
interest rate differentials under the assumption of perfect capital mobility. Unfortunately, our 
result in Chapter 1 for Feldstein-Horioka regression has shown that there is no such perfect 
capital mobility in influencing the corporation investment despite the flexible exchange rate 
assumption in our model. Using expansionary monetary policy such as decreasing the interest 
rate or the reserve requirement in the hope that easy credit will entice businesses to invest in 
human capital will no longer work due to the alternatives that businesses have such as 
investment in financial instruments that we have shown in Chapter 1.  
Secondly, using expansionary monetary policies in a short run would improve the income 
distribution and income of the bottom 20% of the population only until certain threshold 
before the effects are reversible. We have suggested one possible explanation for this 
reversible effect in our model is due to disproportionate transfer to agricultural, manufacturing 
and services sectors that would affect the income distribution. Romer & Romer (1998) agreed 
that the expansionary monetary policy improved the conditions of the poor in the short run 
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due to the temporary cyclical boom but this effect is not permanent. In the long run, monetary 
policy that aimed at low inflation and stable aggregate demand would permanently improve 
their conditions. Although our model provides only short run equilibrium, it is to note that 
excessive expansionary monetary policy shocks is detrimental to the welfare of the bottom 
20% of the population.  
Finally, our analysis suggests that if monetary policy were to be pursued for instance in 
curbing the inflation, it should be accompanied by other policies that ensure the effect to the 
bottom 20% of the population is not worsens. For instance, although the interest rate is 
increased, the government effectiveness in terms of its investment in the sectors that targeted 
the poor or investment in human capital will narrow the income distribution.  
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APPENDIX 
Appendix 1 
Let:    yt = Real GDP growth [ln(RGDPt)-ln(RGDt-1)] 
          Πt = Inflation [ln(CPIt) – ln(CPIt-1)] 
1. Define the following econometric equations: 
yt = α10 + α11yt-1 + α12πt-1 + ε1t   (1.1)   
πt = λ10 +  λ21yt-1 + λ22πt-1 + ε2t  (1.2)     
2. This can be represented in matrix form as: 
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3. Rearranging the terms: 
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4. Introduce lag operator 
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5. Define Identity matrix I = 
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6. Transforming into moving average representation:     
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                                                                                                                                                    (1.3) 
7. Now, we need to satisfy economic conditions and econometric property for (1.3).  
Economic Condition: There is contemporaneous effect of output on price but not price on 
output. 
yt → πt  But  not  πt → yt     
Econometric Condition: The residuals should be orthogonal to each other.  
8. In order to satisfy the orthogonality condition for residuals, let’s suppose we have the 
following residual matrix, e. Then,  
variance-covariance matrix = (e)(e')   = 
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In order to satisfy orthogonality condition, we need: 
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9. Next, premultiply (1.3) with lower triangular matrix, B  = 
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Equation (1.5) implies that both economic condition and econometric condition for (7) hold: 
- Economic condition: From the left hand side, this implies that there is no contemporaneous 
effect of price on output. 
 b11yt  and b21 yt + b22 πt 
In other words, there is no effect on yt (output) at time t by πt.(price level) but yt (output) can 
affect πt.(price level) at time t. 
- Econometric condition: from the right hand side, we have 
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To satisfy orthogonality property, we need: 
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(B ε) (B ε)'    = 
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     . Now we can set up Choleski Matrix Decomposition to satisfy the 
orthogonality condition.  
An example of Choleski Matrix Decomposition application is to decompose matrix Ω into 3 
matrices as follow:           
Ω = P Λ P' ,    or   
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where  P = Lower Triangular Matrix  
            Λ = Identity Matrix        
To see how (B ε) (B ε)'  = 




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01
matches the Choleski Decomposition, let us define Ω = ε 
ε'. 
We have: 
Ω = ε ε' = D Λ D' 
Moving D to the left hand side gives: 
      D
-1
 ε ε' = Λ D' 
Again moving D' to the left hand side yields: 
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Define D
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We want to solve for b11, b21 and b22.  But from (1.6) we have only two equations. Hence, we 
need to form another equation.  Applying macro-economic concept, in the long run the 
demand shock affects only price, but not output (because output will revert back to its natural 
level). Then, from (1.5),  
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Thus, there are 4 components that affect yt : 
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11b ty  = 11c 011b  + 12c ( 022021  bb  ) + 11c tb 111  + 12c ( tt bb 222121   )                                  (1.8) 
 
Since AD shock does not affect output in the long run, the sum of coefficients of t2  is set to 
zero. 
12c ( tb 222 )    = 0                                           (1.9) 
Thus, this is the third equation that we are looking for. Considering equations (1.6) and (1.8), 
we can now solve for b11, b21 and b22. 
After obtaining values of b11, b21 and b22, we can regenerate output by using each shock. 
Case 1: Time series of output and price driven by aggregate supply shock are computed from: 
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 which sets series of aggregate demand shock, t2 , to zero.  
 
Case 2: Time series of output and price driven by aggregate demand shock are computed 
from: 
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 which sets series of aggregate supply shock, t1  , to zero.  
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Appendix 2 
The model is an extension from Azis (2002), Manopiniwes (2005) and Puttanapong (2008); 
hence most of the notations and equations used are similar. This model contributes to the 
existing model by introducing poverty index and income distribution involving different 
categories of households.  
 
I. Set of Notations 
 
Core CGE module 
  Set of Production Sectors (i) 
   i = {AGRI, MANU, SERVICE} 
     AGRI: Agriculture 
     MANU: Manufacturing 
     SERVICE:  Service sectors 
   
 Set of Factors of Production (f) 
  f = {labor, cap} 
     labor: Labor 
     cap:  Capital 
 
Set of Domestic Institutions (dinst) 
 dinst = {HHH1,HHH2,HHH3,HHH4,HHH5, ENTP, GOV} 
      HHH1: Households in the lowest income quintile (the lowest 20% of the economy) 
      HHH2: Households in the second lowest income quintile (the second lowest 20% of the  
     economy) 
     HHH3: Households in the third lowest income quintile (the third lowest 20% of the  
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     economy) 
      HHH4: Households in the second highest income quintile (the second highest 20% of the   
     economy) 
      HHH5: Households in the highest income quintile (the top 20% of the economy) 
        ENTP: Enterprise (including state-owned enterprise) 
      Gov: Government 
      Subset of dinst 
      dprivt = {HHH,HHH2, HHH3, HHH4, HHH5,ENTP}   dinst 
      dprivt: Domestic private institutions 
      HHH = {HHH, HHH2, HHH3, HHH4, HHH5}   dinst 
      HHH: Households institutions 
 
Set of Foreign Institution (finst) 
  finst = {ROW} 
 
Financial module 
  Set of Institutions (inst) 
   dinst = {BOT, Bank, HHH1, HHH2, HHH3, HHH4, HHH5, ENTP, GOV, ROW} 
      HHH1: Households in the lowest income quintile (the lowest 20% of the economy) 
       HHH2: Households in the second lowest income quintile (the second lowest 20% of the   
      economy) 
      HHH3: Households in the third lowest income quintile (the third lowest 20% of the  
      economy) 
       HHH4: Households in the second highest income quintile (the second highest 20% of the  
       economy) 
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       HHH5: Households in the highest income quintile (the top 20% of the economy) 
        ENTP: Enterprise (including state-owned enterprise) 
         Gov: Government 
 
        Subset of inst 
        dominst {BOT, Bank, HHH1, HHH2, HHH3, HHH4, HHH5, ENTP, GOV}  inst 
        dominst: Domestic institutions 
 
  Set of Assets (asset) 
   asset = {CH,LO,DE,RP,GB,BOTB,FIDFB,SOEB,CBOND,EQL,FA,OTH,EQNL,FIXED} 
        CH: Cash 
        LO: Loan 
        DE: Deposit 
        RP: Bond-repurchased market 
        GB: Government bond  
        BOTB: Bank of Thailand bond 
        FIDFB: Financial Institution Development Fund bond 
        SOEB: State-owned enterprise bond 
        CBOND: Corporate bond 
        EQL: Listed equity 
        FA: Foreign asset 
        OTH: Other asset 
        EQNL: Non-listed equity 
        FIXED: Fixed asset 
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    Subset of asset 
        asset_a = {CH,LO,DE,RP,GB,BOTB,FIDFB,SOEB,CBOND,EQL,OTH, FIXED}  asset 
        asset_a: A set of assets for equation (132)    
        asset_l = { CH,LO,DE,RP,GB,BOTB,FIDFB,SOEB,CBOND,EQL,OTH}   asset 
        asset_l: A set of assets for equation (133)    
        asset_nf = { CH,LO,DE,RP,FA ,EQL,OTH}   asset 
        asset_nf: A set of assets for equation (134)    
 
II. List of Coefficients 
Core CGE model 
ai,j  IO table coefficients 
aci          Armington function shift parameter 
adi          Production function shift parameter  
αi,f       Factor share parameter-production function  
ati          CET function shift parameter   
δi Armington function share parameter  
econi        Export demand constant  
γi       CET function parameter  
fsharedinst,f   Share of each type of factor 
clesi,dprivt     Private consumption share 
dstri Ratio of inventory investment to gross output  
ηi Export demand price elasticity  
glesi  Government consumption shares  
kshri  Shares of investment by sector of destination  
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ρci Armington function exponent   
ρti CET function exponent  
tei   Export tax rate 
thdprivt Household tax rate  
tmi Tariff rates on imports  
bi,j  Capital share 
txi  Indirect tax rate 
mpsdprivt Marginal propensity to consume  
alphapov        Poverty share 
 
Financial Module 
τh1 Household's share of composite asset [level 1] 
τh2 Household's share of composite asset [level 2] 
τh3 Household's share of composite asset [level 3] 
τh4 Household's share of composite asset [level 4] 
τh5 Household's share of composite asset [level 5] 
σh1 Household's elasticity of composite asset [level 1] 
σh2 Household's elasticity of composite asset [level 2] 
σh3 Household's elasticity of composite asset [level 3]  
σh4 Household's elasticity of composite asset [level 4] 
σh5 Household's elasticity of composite asset [level 5] 
ph0 Shift parameter (household’s demand for loan)  
ph1 Elasticity to bank’s total deposit (household’s demand for loan) 
ph2 Elasticity to loan interest rate (household’s demand for loan) 
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fh0 Shift parameter (household’s demand for fixed asset) 
fh1 Elasticity to loan interest rate (household’s demand for fixed asset) 
ch0 Shift parameter (household’s demand for cash) 
ch1 Elasticity to saving (household’s demand for cash) 
ch2 Elasticity to deposit interest rate (household’s demand for cash) 
fahh0 Shift parameter (household’s demand for foreign asset) 
fahh1 Elasticity to interest rate differential (household’s demand for foreign asset) 
fahh2 Elasticity to real GDP (household’s demand for foreign asset) 
pf0 Shift parameter (enterprise’s demand for fixed asset) 
pf1  Elasticity to interest rate differential (household’s demand fixed asset) 
pf2 Elasticity to real GDP (household’s demand fixed asset) 
de0 Shift parameter (enterprise’s demand for deposit) 
de1 Elasticity to saving (enterprise’s demand for deposit) 
pp0 Shift parameter (enterprise’s demand for loan) 
pp1 Elasticity to bank’s total deposit (enterprise’s demand for loan) 
pp2 Elasticity to loan interest rate (enterprise’s demand for loan) 
ce0 Shift parameter (enterprise’s demand for cash) 
ce1 Elasticity to saving (enterprise’s demand for loan) 
ce2 Elasticity to deposit interest rate (enterprise’s demand for loan) 
faent0 Shift parameter (enterprise’s demand for foreign asset) 
faent1 Elasticity to interest rate differential (enterprise’s demand for foreign asset) 
faent2 Elasticity to real GDP (enterprise’s demand for foreign asset) 
τb1 Bank's share of composite asset [level 1] 
τb2 Bank's share of composite asset [level 2] 
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τb3 Bank's share of composite asset [level 3] 
τb4 Bank's share of composite asset [level 4] 
τb5 Bank's share of composite asset [level 5] 
σb1 Bank's elasticity of composite asset [level 1] 
σb2 Bank's elasticity of composite asset [level 2] 
σb3 Bank's elasticity of composite asset [level 3]  
σb4 Bank's elasticity of composite asset [level 4] 
σb5 Bank's elasticity of composite asset [level 5] 
fabnk0 Shift parameter (Bank’s demand for foreign asset) 
fabnk1 Elasticity to interest rate differential (Bank’s demand for foreign asset) 
fabnk2 Elasticity to real GDP (Bank’s demand for foreign asset) 
govch Fixed ratio of government’s cash  
fabot0 Shift parameter (BOT’s demand for foreign asset) 
fabot1 Elasticity to interest rate differential (BOT’s demand for foreign asset) 
fabot2 Elasticity to real GDP (BOT’s demand for foreign asset) 
botdeoth Deposit at BOT - which is a not a reserve requirement   
rratio Ratio of reserve requirement to total deposit  
cratio Ratio of cash to total deposit 
botc0 Shift parameter (BOT’s demand for cash) 
botc1 Elasticity to interest rate (BOT’s demand for cash) 
botc2 Elasticity to real GDP (BOT’s demand for cash) 
rwde0 Shift parameter (ROW’s demand for deposit) 
rwde1 Elasticity to interest rate differential (ROW’s demand for deposit) 
rwde2 Elasticity to expected exchange rate (ROW’s demand for deposit) 
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rwlo0 Shift parameter (ROW’s preference to lend to Thai institution) 
rwlo1 Elasticity to interest rate differential (ROW’s preference to lend to Thai 
institution) 
rwlo2 Elasticity to expected exchange rate (ROW’s preference to lend to Thai 
institution) 
rwgb0 Shift parameter (ROW’s demand for Thai government bond) 
rwgb1 Elasticity to interest rate differential (ROW’s demand for Thai government 
bond) 
rwgb2 Elasticity to expected exchange rate (ROW’s demand for Thai government 
bond) 
rwcbond0 Shift parameter (ROW’s demand for Thai government bond) 
rwcbond1 Elasticity to interest rate differential (ROW’s demand for Thai government 
bond) 
rwcbond2 Elasticity to expected exchange rate (ROW’s demand for Thai government 
bond) 
rweql0 Shift parameter (ROW’s demand for equity listed in Thai stock market) 
rweql1 Elasticity to interest rate differential (ROW’s demand for equity listed in Thai 
stock market) 
rweql2 Elasticity to expected exchange rate (ROW’s demand for equity listed in Thai 
stock market) 
 
 
III. List of Variables 
Endogenous variables 
Xi Total output of sector i 
INTi Sector i's demand for intermediate inputs  
Di Domestically produced good 
Qi Domestic Good Supply (Composite Good) 
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Ei Exports  
Mi Imports 
PINDEX Price index (GDP deflator) 
GDPVA Value-added (in market price) GDP 
RGDP Real GDP 
PXi Price of output 
PDi Price of domestic good 
PQi Price of composite good 
PEi Domestic price of export  
PMi Domestic price of import 
PVi Price of Value-Added 
PWEie World export price (in US$) 
PKi Price of capital goods by sector of destination 
WFcap Return on capital 
YHdprivt Total income of dprivt 
YFCTRf Total factor income rewarded from employing f 
FDSCi,f Sector i’s demand for factor f 
GR Government’s total revenue 
PRIVSAV Saving of private sector 
DIRTAX Total direct tax 
TARIFF Total amount of tariff 
INDTAX Total indirect tax 
GOVSAV Government saving 
FSAV Foreign saving 
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EXR Exchange rate 
SAVING Total saving 
CDi Household’s consumption on good i 
GDi Government’s consumption on good i 
IDi Capital good i used for investment 
GOVSAV Government saving 
DSTi Inventory investment  
DKi Volume of investment by sector of destination 
FXDINV Fixed capital investment 
INVEST Total investment 
FSlabor Total labor employed 
WALRAS Slack variable for Walras’s law 
HHPORTS Household’s portfolio of bonds and listed-equity 
UoF_Sasset,inst Stock of asset which is a use of fund of inst 
SoF_Sasset,inst Stock of asset which is a source of fund of inst 
UoF_Fasset,inst Flow of asset which is a use of fund of inst 
SoF_Fasset,inst Flow of asset which is a source of fund of inst 
RRH1 
Weighted average return of assets in level 1 (Household’s portfolio 
decision) 
RRH2 
Weighted average return of assets in level 2 (Household’s portfolio 
decision) 
RRH3 
Weighted average return of assets in level 3 (Household’s portfolio 
decision) 
RRH4 
Weighted average return of assets in level 4 (Household’s portfolio 
decision 
GH1 Proportion of equity in household’s portfolio 
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GH2 Proportion of government bond in household’s portfolio 
GH3 Proportion of BOT bond in household’s portfolio 
GH4 Proportion of FIDF bond in household’s portfolio 
GH5 Proportion of SOE bond in household’s portfolio 
RRNDE Deposit interest rate 
RRNGB Gap between the return of government bond and deposit interest rate 
RRNBOTB Gap between the return of BOT bond and deposit interest rate 
RRNFIDFB Gap between the return of FIDF bond and deposit interest rate 
RRNSOEB Gap between the return of SOE bond and deposit interest rate 
RRNCBOND Gap between the return of corporate bond and deposit interest rate 
UOF_F_Dinst Flow of foreign asset demanded by inst 
SAVinst Saving of inst 
EXRADJinst Adjustment in net worth of inst due to a change in exchange rate  
INTEXPADJinst Adjustment of net interest income due to a change in interest rate  
PEQ Price index of listed equity  
PGB Price index of government bond 
PBOTB Price index of BOT bond 
PSOEB Price index of SOE bond 
PCBOND Price index of Corporate bond 
BANKPORTS Bank’s portfolio of bonds and listed-equity 
RRB1 Weighted average return of assets in level 1 (Bank’s portfolio decision) 
RRB2 Weighted average return of assets in level 2 (Bank’s portfolio decision) 
RRB3 Weighted average return of assets in level 3 (Bank’s portfolio decision) 
RRB4 Weighted average return of assets in level 4 (Bank’s portfolio decision 
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GB1 Proportion of equity in bank’s portfolio 
GB2 Proportion of government bond in bank’s portfolio 
GB3 Proportion of BOT bond in bank’s portfolio 
GB4 Proportion of FIDF bond in bank’s portfolio 
GB5 Proportion of SOE bond in bank’s portfolio 
BM Base money (or high-power money) 
M2 Broad money supply 
EXPEXR Expected exchange (i.e. the forward rate) 
PDAVG        Average price of domestic goods 
RSRVRQRM        Reserve Requirement 
 
Exogenous variables 
WFDISTi Sector i's  distortion on return on factor f 
WFlabor Average wage 
PWSEi World price of export substitute  
PWMim World import price (inUS$) 
DTRANSdinst,dinst1 Domestic transfers (from dinst1 to dinst) 
FTRANSdinst,finst Foreign transfers (from finst to dinst) 
CAPUTILZT Capacity utilization  
RNF Return on foreign asset (the Fed Fund rate) 
RRNLO Loan interest rate 
INTSPREAD Spread between the deposit interest rate and the loan rate 
POVLINE               Poverty Line 
 
INCDIST                Income distribution 
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IV. List of Equations 
 
Core CGE model 
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Financial Module 
 
Household’s behavior equations 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE ECONOMICS OF GROUP LENDING: ITS IMPACT, SUSTAINABILITY AND  
GROWTH – CASE STUDY OF KWPGBM IN LOMBOK, INDONESIA 
1. Introduction  
Does everything in this world need government supervision or intervention to work? Is there 
anything that can be self-regulated and work without external interference? In other words, 
can an organization or institution survived on its own without aid from government or NGOs? 
In answering these questions, most critics often believe that government intervention is 
necessary in ensuring a success of an institution. Nevertheless, this upholds Keynes theory 
that advocates government intervention in the economy to be the only method of ensuring 
economic growth and stability.  
Due to this argument, our research brings a unique case study of one microfinance institution 
in Lombok, Indonesia that has survived for more than 20 years without any government 
interference or donors’ funds. This microfinance institution is Koperasi Wanita Pengerajin 
Gerabah Banyu Mulek (KWPGBM) that consists of a group of 72 women whose main source 
of income is making pottery. Furthermore, despite the fact that its clients are poor households 
with no credit history, low income, low education and no collateral, it has maintain a non-
performing loan of zero percent using its unique group lending mechanism. Due to this, our 
research will focus on the group lending it has adapted that we perceived as an essential tool 
in its success and survivorship.  
258 
 
Although there are many theoretical and empirical study on group lending that have been 
done, none to the knowledge of the author that shows an existence of group lending 
mechanism in the microfinance institutions that is very flexible, self- organized, unsubsidized 
or independent from governments’ funds or donors’ funds and manage to be sustainable for 
more than two decades. Even some of the most well-known microfinance institutions like 
Grameen Bank in Bangladesh took more than 30 years before they can be self-sufficient 
through savings mobilization without government’s subsidy to cover the high cost of 
operation. Hence, the exploration of KWPGBM provides evidence that it is possible for a 
group of villagers to establish their own lending group to help each other financially and 
socially. As in any other study on group lending in MFIs, our research will show the net 
impact of KWPGBM on its borrowers, its sustainability in the future and its attempt to grow 
and outreach to potential borrowers from outside villages/ districts that in our opinion risk the 
possibility of failure.  
 
1.1.Problem Statement and Hypotheses 
There are three hypotheses that we are testing in this research paper: 
1. KWPGBM provides positive net impact on its borrowers 
2. KWPGBM is a sustainable institution in the long run 
3. KWPGBM should not grow or outreach under certain circumstances due to possibility 
of failures 
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We will test the first two hypotheses empirically using Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) 
and the third hypothesis using standard optimization method. The third hypothesis will then 
be supported empirically using the data we have collected.  
For our research purpose, we find that it is important to evaluate the above research 
hypotheses. Although KWPGBM is the only MFI that exists in its district which give it 
advantage to operate, it is relevant for us to see and understand from its borrowers’ point of 
view the impact and change it has brought to their life throughout its 20 years of operation. 
This is to provide support that just like any other MFIs whose main objective is to eradicate 
poverty; our hope is that their existence has improved the well-being of their clients 
economically. Our next research question on its financial sustainability in the long run is 
crucial in concluding whether their savings mobilization and interest rate charged is sufficient 
to cover their operational costs and lending without receiving any outside grants. In most 
cases, there are high doubts that such MFIs will survive long without external financial aid 
and most studies have underlined the importance of savings mobilization in microfinance. 
Due to this, their clients’ opinion in terms of the interest rate charge and KWPGBM savings 
facilities play an imminent role to assess its sustainability. Our final hypothesis that 
investigates the potential risks of growth and outreach for such small scale MFIs like 
KWPGBM is important in identifying whether this could be the end to its 20 years of 
survivorship. Their decision to expand without proper guidance and technology could 
increase the potential problem of moral hazard, domino effect, free riding, collusion and etc.  
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1.2. Literature Review 
The development of MFIs worldwide have gained growing research interest in understanding 
the financial lending and borrowing to the poor households in what is perceived as one of the 
most effective way to eradicate poverty. To better understand this, many studies have 
analyzed the various measures of impact of MFIs to its clients and evaluate its financial 
sustainability in the long run. Some have attributed the success of MFIs to its group lending 
mechanism that impose social sanction without any sizeable collateral requirement while 
others claim that microfinance is beyond group lending.  
Robinson (2001) covers extensively on the impact of microfinance that has help economically 
active poor to expand and diversify their enterprises and increase their income by drawing 
examples from countries like Indonesia, Philippines, Uganda, Kenya, Honduras, Nicaragua 
and Senegal. She argued that microfinance has increased the options and the self confidence 
of poor households, improve the quality of their lives and create job opportunity in the face of 
unemployment and underemployment. Fuglesang and Chandler (1987), Hossain (1988), 
Auwal and Singhal (1992), Rahman (2001) are among many researchers that have looked at 
various aspects of Grameen Bank  including its positive impact in alleviation of rural poverty, 
empowerment of women and creation of formidable knowledge based and expertise in 
Bangladesh society. On the other hand, a recent study from Calles (2005) draws an example 
of a new microfinance institution in Bangladesh, SafeSave that works in quite different way 
than Grameen Bank but can reach the poor in a better way through its more flexible services 
than traditional MFIs. However, unlike Grameen Bank and other traditional MFIs in 
Bangladesh, SafeSave concentrate on urban areas, targeting clients of both men and women. 
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From these standard literatures, we have gained further insight into the various measures of 
net impact of MFIs around the world that were establish and design differently based on their 
targeted clients. As a result, this helps us in making comparison with our research on 
KWPGBM. 
Other studies have focused on financial sustainability of MFIs defined by Havers (1996) as 
the income receivables from fees and interest charged that is able to cover the costs of funds, 
operating costs, loan write-offs and inflation. In addition, he claimed that very few 
organizations working with the poor have achieved such standard. Adongo and Stork (2005) 
reiterated the definition of financial sustainability as the ability to cover costs independent of 
external subsidies from donors or government. They tested empirically for factors that 
influenced the financial sustainability of selected MFIs in Namibia and concluded that there 
was high degree of financial unsustainability for multipurpose co-operatives providing 
microfinance but positive correlation of donor involvement in providing start-up funds for the 
loan portfolio and financial sustainability. Khankher, Khalily and Khan (1994, pg.8) study 
instead looks at sustainability not only from financial and economic viabilities but argue that 
its management and decision making system is equally important to Grameen Bank’s 
sustainability. Hulme and Mosley (1996)  as quoted in FOCUS further correlate the financial 
sustainability with recognized ‘best practise’ design features such as high interest rate, the 
availability of voluntary savings facilities, the frequency of loan collection, and the existence 
of material incentives to borrowers and lending staffs to maximize repayment. These 
characteristics discussed present information for us in assessing the sustainability of MFIs that 
help us in better designing our survey questions for KWPGBM so as to meet with the 
standard requirements of sustainability.  
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Further research then started to look at the mechanisms to achieve these characteristics and 
one distinct mechanism which MFIs implement that conventional lending institution lack of, 
is group lending. Many have argued that this is one of the most common and effective tools in 
lending to the poor without any collateral requirement. Stiglitz (1990) and Varian (1990) 
showed the informational advantages of group lending through peer monitoring that would 
reduce moral hazards among borrowers. Both have shown through models that the cost of 
monitoring could be delegated to the group members and hence lead to lower cost of 
borrowing: lower interest rate (Varian, 1990) or larger amount of loan and higher repayment 
rates (Stiglitz, 1990). From the work of Besley and Coate (1993) we get further insight of the 
role of group lending that influence repayment rates which improve when there exists social 
sanction. In their famous game theory repayment setting (Figure 3.1 below), they have shown 
that without social sanction one borrower would free ride on his partner and let the other 
borrower repay the entire loan. In this setting, although the non-defaulting borrower is capable 
of repaying the loan, he will most likely not repay the entire group loan. In their second game 
theory setting (Figure 3.2 below) in which they introduce social sanction, they have concluded 
that when a sufficiently severe social sanction is impose on each borrower, then the only 
equilibrium is where both borrowers contribute their shares. The existence of sufficiently 
severe penalty makes it less likely that an individual with a higher project return will have to 
repay the entire loan. Armendariz and Morduch (2005) however claimed that group lending 
can be both costly and beneficial. Among the disadvantages of group lending are the high cost 
of monitoring group members especially when they live far from each other, costly to 
implement, collusion among borrowers against the banks may exists and loan terms that are 
limited to what the group feels it can jointly guarantee. In addition, they highlighted 
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Montgomery example of social sanction and strong pressure in group lending that can lead to 
exclusion of clients that fail to repay due to out-of-control problems and are forced to give 
their personal belongings. In light of this information, it is obvious that in the quest for MFIs’ 
sustainability through group lending, there are consequences that will affect individual 
borrowers and should not be overlooked. Therefore, we have used these as guidance in our 
research survey to take into account both the pros and cons of KWPGBM in determining its 
net impact and sustainability through group lending.  
Our final hypothesis that KWPGBM should not grow or outreach under certain circumstances 
due to possibility of failures have brought us into literatures on public goods and theory of 
groups by Olson (1960). Olson  has argued that the collective good will be provided if the 
cost of the collective good at the optimal point for any individual in the group is so small in 
relation to the gain of the group as a whole from that collective good. In other words, the total 
gain exceeds the total cost by as much as or more than the gain to the group exceeds the gain 
to the individual (pg. 25). He had shown that as individual’s value as a fraction of the group’s 
value diminishes, the less the individual would want to contribute in providing the collective 
good. Following in line to his method in the context of group lending in MFI, we take the 
public good to be the total amount of loan to the group in which its costs and benefits will 
increase as the number of group members increase.  
Our research contributes to the existing literature on microfinance by providing coverage and 
exploration of a small scale MFI in rural area of Indonesia that possess many of the 
characteristics typically display by large MFI. Almost all studies that we have found focus on 
well-known and well established MFI, but KWPGBM has proven that it is possible for a 
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small institution to operate for more than 20 years without government intervention and 
donor’s subsidy. From the literatures above, we have discussed on savings mobilization, 
interest rate charged, management, etc. as important elements for any MFIs’ sustainability and 
success, yet KWPGBM managed by a group of women with little education have 
implemented these elements since the very beginning of its establishment in 1988. This 
conclude that it is possible to establish independent MFIs in rural areas to reach the poorest of 
the poor but its structure has to differ based on the environment, main source of income 
within the area, targeted clients etc. Due to this, we further contribute another methodology 
that can be applied in research on microfinance and that is Analytical Hierarchy Process 
(AHP) and a simple optimization method on MFI growth based on Theory of Groups.  
 
Figure 3.1: Besley and Coate Repayment Game Model 
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  where c = borrower will make her payment of r 
   n = borrower will not make her payment and hence will incur a penalty of P(θi) 
         R = borrower decides to pay on behalf of her group member who is defaulting on her  
       loan                       
   D = borrower decides not to pay on behalf of her group member hence defaulting on  
                  the entire group 
P(θi) = penalty for player i, i=1, 2  
θi = payoff for player i,i=1,2 
 r = amount of loan to pay for each player 
 
Figure 3.2: Besley and Coate Repayment Game (With Social Sanction) 
where c = borrower will make her payment of r 
       n = borrower will not make her payment and hence will incur a penalty of P(θi) 
         R = borrower decides to pay on behalf of her group member who is defaulting on her  
       loan                       
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D = borrower decides not to pay on behalf of her group member hence defaulting on   
                    the entire group 
P(θi) = penalty for player i, i=1, 2  
θi = payoff for player i,i=1,2 
r = amount of loan to pay for each player 
s() = social sanction imposed by the group members upon failure to pay the loan 
 
2. Overview of KWPGBM 
KWPGBM was established in 1988 by a group of 72 women in a village called Banyu Mulek 
in Lombok, Indonesia
53
. During that time, the primary source of income for these women was 
making ‘gerabah’ (earthenware vessel). These ‘gerabah’ would either be exported overseas or 
sold locally.  Traditionally, this pottery was used in the village households to store rice, water, 
salt and spices. The process of making ‘gerabah’ from clay is described below and is usually 
dominated by women
54
 (Appendix1). 
Since they depended heavily on the making of ‘gerabah’ as their main source of income, they 
often faced with financial difficulty in buying the fire woods to burn the ‘gerabah’ as 
described in ‘Burning the Gerabah’ process in Appendix 1. This led them to form seven 
groups consisting of these 72 women with their main objective of helping any group member 
that have financial difficulty in buying the fire woods. Minimum number of participants in a 
group was seven people and maximum number of people in a group was eleven people. Each 
group elected its own leader from among the group members as the representative of the 
                                                          
53
 The name ‘KWPGBM’ was given only in 2003 and prior to that, they didn’t have any specific name to their 
organization as this was established on mutual understanding among the group members. 
54
 Source: Promotes the culture of pottery life in Bayat, Klaten, Central Java of Indonesia. 
http://budiatijavapottery.biz/new/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=12&Itemid=26 
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group in the monthly meeting with the management. The management consists of eight 
women who were typically relatives to some of these 72 women.  
These women were trained on variety of ‘gerabah’ designs that they could create by 
representatives from New Zealand as part of the joint program between the Indonesian 
government and the New Zealand government
55
. The training lasted from 1988 after these 
groups have been formed until 1999 when the joint training program ended. When these 
representatives left, they had recognized the success of these groups in producing world class 
exquisite pottery and rewarded them with some financial amount. The total amount of their 
savings and the reward given as of today is Rp 91 250 000 (USD9617.41). 
 
2.1. Lending Mechanism of KWPGBM: 
1. In 1988, each group was assigned its own fund and each member in the group had to make 
compulsory contribution of Rp1000 (USD0.105) per month. This was considered as their 
compulsory savings. In addition to this compulsory savings, the members could also make 
voluntary contributions and this was considered as their voluntary savings.  
2. The management then collected the money from these seven funds and managed them on 
behalf of the members. There were eight members on the management board that supervised 
these seven groups: Chairman, Secretary, Treasurer, Supervisor, two Board Members, and 
two Debt Collectors. 
                                                          
55
 Only three districts that was chosen for the training program: Banyu Mulek (West Lombok), Masbagik (East 
Lombok) and Penujah (Central Lombok). 
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3. If any of the members needs to borrow the money to buy the fire woods, she could take out 
a loan from the pooled fund upon approval from the management. The minimum amount of 
loan was Rp25000 (USD2.6539) and the maximum amount of loan was Rp50000 
(USD5.3079). The principle was that, those members with extra cash could help those 
members who were in need of cash to buy the fire woods. The interest rate charged on the 
loan was set upon agreement by the management and the groups using the bank loan rate as 
their benchmark. 
4. There were no stated rules and regulations, no joint liability or collateral requirement for 
each group. In other words, the mechanism of group lending by KWPGBM was very flexibly 
self-regulated. This was the uniqueness of KWPGBM; the practice of such group lending that 
was unlike the simultaneous group lending by BancoSol or sequential group lending by 
Grameen Bank yet their non-performing loan was 0% throughout their practice of this group 
lending from 1988 until 2003
56
.  
5. Aside from managing the savings and loans from group members, the organizer also helped 
to market the ‘gerabah’ produced on behalf of the group members. These ‘gerabah’ were send 
to local buyers in Sriwijaya who would then either sell them locally or internationally. The 
amount of money received from this sale would be distributed to the group members 
accordingly. However, for those members who have any outstanding loan, the proceeds from 
the sale of their ‘gerabah’ will be deducted and the balance will be returned to them. The 
incomes from the sales of this ‘gerabah’ were used to support their daily consumption, the 
                                                          
56
 In 2003, they have changed their operation into registered cooperative so that they can expand their 
outreach and get assistantship from the government agency overlooking the cooperative’s operation. They are 
still operating until today.  
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children’s education and other necessities. Any extra cash would be kept as part of their 
voluntary savings with the management. 
6. There were no specific problems such as defaulting on their loans and etc. that have risen 
among these 72 members throughout their participation in this group lending mechanism. 
Even up until today, these 72 women are still members of KWPGBM. Furthermore, the non 
performing loan (NPL) of this organization has always been maintained at 0% all these while. 
 In 2003, the organization had chosen to register itself with ‘Dinas Koperasi’ or Department 
of Cooperative. This move would enable them to get financial assistance from the government 
agency and training needed in order for them to move forward. The group lending mechanism 
that was in practice before had been abandoned and being an absolute cooperative body, the 
membership is now open to anyone
57
 on an individual basis. Furthermore, KWPGBM has 
divided its membership into members and non-members. As of 2009, there are 303 members
58
 
and 600 non-members in KWPGBM. Furthermore, the reason for taking a loan now is no 
longer for buying the fire woods but totally up to the borrowers. When the cooperative was 
first formally established in 2003, the startup capital was Rp7 million (USD743). In 2004, the 
net profit was Rp16 million (USD1698.51), in 2005 the net profit increased to Rp48 million 
(USD5095.54) and in 2006 it increased further to Rp92 million (USD9766.45). The 
cooperative is no longer marketing any products of new members except for the initial 72 
members that produce the ‘gerabah’.  
                                                          
57
 Anyone here is referring to both man and woman. As of 2009, there are 90% female borrowers and 10% 
male borrowers.  
58
 The membership is currently closed to only 303 members. 
270 
 
For members joining KWPGBM, they are required to have ‘simpanan pokok59  or initial 
savings, ‘simpanan bulanan’ or monthly savings and ‘simpanan sukarela’ or voluntary 
savings. For ‘simpanan pokok’, it is obligatory for members to deposit certain amount of 
money every month with the co-op whereas for ‘simpanan sukarela’, the amount is optional60. 
The members also participate in the co-op annual meeting ‘Rapat Anggota Tahunan (RAT)’, 
has a voting right and their say in the management of the cooperative, entitle to receive a 
dividend and selecting the cooperative management board (the chairman, the secretary and 
etc.). In other words, they own the co-op as much as the shareholder of a company would.  
On the other hand, non-members are only allowed to have ‘simpanan sukarela’ or voluntary 
saving and are not entitled to other benefits or obligations like the members do. Both 
members and non-members are allowed to take loans from the co-op but with one condition; 
that is they need to provide any tangible assets as collateral whereby the value of this 
collateral should be higher than the amount of loan that they take. The interest charge on this 
loan is fixed at 2.5% (in 2009) while to set the dividend payout, the management uses the 
conventional banks’ dividend as the bench mark and would set the dividend that is higher than 
what the banks would typically offer.  
When a familiar known borrower applies for a loan, it typically takes up to 3 business days to 
access the profile and evaluate the credibility of this borrower. Once the loan is approved, the 
borrower is then required to put either his/her land certificate, motorcycle or anything else that 
                                                          
59
 ‘simpanan pokok’ or initial saving  is required at the beginning when one decides to join the cooperative. This 
fixed amount is the same for every member and cannot be withdrawn as long as he is still a member of the 
coop.  
60
 Just like the initial savings, the members are not allowed to withdraw any money as well from their monthly 
savings as long as he is still a member of the co-op. Members can only withdraw money from their voluntary 
savings at anytime.  
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is of higher value than the value of the loan s/he has applied for with the co-op. The collateral 
needs to be brought to the co-op and remain there until the entire loan is paid. The interest rate 
is fixed at 2.5% per month and the term of the loan is set based on the amount of loan s/he has 
requested. In addition to the collateral requirement, 2.75% of the loan amount will be 
deducted for the administrative costs. The maximum duration of any loan is two years. The 
minimum amount of the loan is Rp100 000 and the maximum amount of loan is Rp8 million. 
The borrower then needs to fill up a paper work and name another person as his guarantor. 
The guarantor is usually his spouse or his parents. On the other hand, if the borrower is 
somebody unfamiliar to the management, for instance a potential borrower from other 
districts or villages, then the assessment process could take up to two weeks. The chairman 
and her assistance would travel down to that borrower’s house and conduct an interview with 
his/her neighbors and family members to access on his/her credit history, potential of 
defaulting and etc. If the loan is approved, then s/he has to fulfill the collateral and 
guarantor’s requirements.  
The management board members would routinely go to both the members and non-members 
house on daily basis to collect any money for either savings purpose or paying up their loan. 
This provides convenience for depositors and borrowers of this co-op. When there are more 
borrowers than savers, the management board would raise the interest rate charge on the loan. 
After three days past the due date, the borrowers will receive notification on their due 
payment and any late payment after one month from the due date will be charged 7.5% 
penalty on the outstanding loan balance. Any withdrawal of membership from the cooperative 
requires one week advance notification. 
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There are currently eight members in the management board that manage about 1000 
members and non-members (in 2009). The management are still operating using manual book 
in recording any transactions and do not have any computer skills to do so. Furthermore, any 
expansion and outreach outside their village would be very costly for the management since it 
involves high transportation costs. The requirement for any collateral would mean that this 
co-op is unable to reach the poorest of the community since the poorest people usually do not 
have any assets to begin with. The initial 72 members are still registered with the co-op until 
today but have withdrawn Rp92 million of their money that had been saved since the co-op 
was established. The co-operative fund is now short of this big amount due to the withdrawal 
that prompted the management for the first time to seek a loan of Rp100 million from ‘Dinas 
Koperasi’ or Co-op Ministry at interest rate of 0.3% per month. However, the amount granted 
was only Rp30 million. The move by the co-op to take external funding for the first time after 
their existence of 15 years motivates the research on the future survivorship of KWPGBM. 
It is to be emphasized here that our research is focusing on their group lending mechanism 
that was introduced in 1988 and lasted until 2003 when they decided to register as co-op. 
From 2003 onwards, there doesn’t exist anymore their group lending practice, but for the sake 
of our research hypotheses above, we will hypothetically assume that it still exists until today. 
In other words, our methodology in testing KWPGBM impact, sustainability and growth is 
based on their unique group lending practice that we hypothetically assume still in practice.  
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3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) in General: 
In order to test the hypothesis for this research paper, I will be using a modeling technique 
called Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP). AHP was developed by Prof. Thomas Saaty and 
is often referred to as Saaty’s Method. It is widely used and very popular especially in the 
military analysis although its application can be applied in any decision making problems. 
Furthermore, it is one of the famous multi criteria decision making (MCDM) that chooses the 
best of a discrete set of alternatives. The usage of AHP allows the participants to express their 
own opinion, judgment and experiences by giving them freedom to rank their intangible 
preferences in the survey questions that are handed out. A general form of AHP structure is 
shown in Figure 3.3: 
 
Figure 3.3: A General Structure of AHP
61
 
Level 0 describes the goal of our decision making problem, Level 1 gives the multi criteria to 
achieve the goal and it consists of several choices and Level 2 is the alternatives choices. The 
lines connecting these levels indicate the relation between them. At Level 1, respondents will 
                                                          
61
 Source: http://people.revoledu.com/kardi/tutorial/AHP/AHP-Example.htm 
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make pair wise comparison between the four factors with respect to the goal and hence we 
have four by four matrixes here. At Level 2, we have three choices with respect to each factor, 
so there will be four pair wise comparison matrix of size three by three. In other words, with 
respect to each factor, what is the relative preference of respondents (Between Choice X and 
Choice Y, Choice X and Choice Z, Choice Y and Choice Z).  
The respondents will first make pair wise comparisons in the survey questions that are given 
to them and their evaluation will be inputted into the pair wise comparison matrix (or 
reciprocal matrix) in AHP. They will use the scale from one to nine to rank their preferences 
as shown in Appendix 1. One of the most important elements of pair wise comparison is 
consistency, meaning that respondents’ choices need to satisfy the transitivity conditions. The 
transitivity condition states that if  and  then . In the AHP pair wise 
comparison matrix, this is represented by aijajk = aik for all i, j and k. Furthermore, AHP 
will provide the consistency index that shows how much of these transitivity conditions in the 
survey questions that have been violated and in general, the acceptable level of inconsistency 
is less than 0.1. The inconsistency index is calculated from the principal Eigen value. Finally, 
the pair wise comparison matrix will calculate the normalized Eigen vector and gives the 
priority vector. This priority vector represents the ranking of individual’s preferences.  
We illustrate the application of AHP calculation in one of our questionnaires (Questionnaire 
3). In this questionnaire, we are asking a group of respondents about the sustainability of 
KWPGBM since this is one of our hypotheses. The sustainable period is for 10 years and we 
consider KWPGBM as a sustainable institution if this group of 20 borrowers would use the 
services from KWPGBM for more than 10 years and vice versa. In AHP, we need to specify 
275 
 
our goal and the choices we have. In selecting our choices to achieve the goal, we have 
several criteria that we have to weight. These criteria are chosen based on our discussed 
literatures above that we think meet the situation of KWPGBM. Hence, the general 
framework of AHP for Questionnaire 3 is in Figure 3.4: 
In Figure 3.4, we specified the goal as sustainability of KWPGBM and the choices are 
between using their services for more than 10 years (>10years) or less than 10 years (<10 
years). We classified the criteria to decide into two main criteria: Loan Characteristics and 
Growth. This is a simple model setting since our respondents were a group of women from 
rural area in Lombok with minimal education level. Under the loan characteristics, the group 
has to rank among loan interest rate, loan size, loan procedure and loan duration. Similarly 
under the growth of KWPGBM, the group has to rank which of the services of KWPGBM 
that they think are the most important to the very least importance. The elements of growth 
criteria are deposit facilities, promotion or marketing of their products and co-op 
management. Finally, with respect to each element in these two criteria, they have to decide 
whether to stay for more than 10 years or less than 10 years.  
After we have constructed our AHP framework, we asked the respondents to complete 
Questionnaire 3 (Appendix 3) and use the scale specified in Appendix 1 as their guideline. 
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The step by step process of AHP calculation is as follow: 
A. With respect to our goal of sustainability of KWPBGM, which is more important to 
you, loan characteristics or growth? Next, by how much it is important?  The group 
choice is as follow:  
       Table 3.1: Loan Characteristics versus Growth 
 
 
 
From this, we can see that the group chooses loan character to be more important than 
growth in determining the sustainability of KWPGBM. However, they rated it as 
moderately more important than growth.  
Next, we will transform this into reciprocal matrix form as shown below.  
 
Step 1: 
Reciprocal Matrix 
 
Growth Loan Character 
 
Growth 1 1/2 
 
Loan Character 2 1 
 
Sum: 1 1/2 3 
    
278 
 
The importance of growth to growth and loan character to loan character is 1. 
However, the group has specified that loan character is more important than growth by 
2. The matrix is symmetric; loan character is two times more important than growth 
implying that growth is ½ times more important than loan character. Next, we sum 
across the columns.  
In step 2 below, we will normalize each element with the column sum such that the 
sum across column is 1.  
Step 2: 
 
Growth Loan Character 
Normalized each element 
with the column sum 
Growth 1/3 1/3 
Loan Character 2/3 2/3 
 
Sum: 1 1 
 
Finally, we will average across the row and obtain the relative weight that the group 
has chosen. This weight is called the normalized principal eigen vector or priority 
vector as shown below.  
 
 
Step 3: 
   
Average across the row. 
This is the normalized 
principal eigen vector or 
priority vector.  
Growth (1/2)*(2/3) = 1/362  
Loan Character (1/2)*(4/3) = 2/3 
   
    
B. Next, we will ask the group, with respect to growth of KWPGBM, what is their 
relative preference of the importance of deposit facilities, marketing or promotion of 
                                                          
62
 These results are shown in Results for Questionnaire 3 below.  
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their product and co-op’s management. The answers that the group has chosen are as 
follow: 
   
             Table 3.2: Comparison of Characteristics with respect to Sustainability node in     
                                                                         Growth Cluster 
 
 
From Table 3.2 above, we can see that the group thinks KWPGBM’s management is 
four times more important than deposit facilities and six times more important than 
promotion or marketing of their product in determining the growth of KWPGBM.  
When comparing between deposit facilities and promotion or marketing of their 
product, the group thinks that deposit facilities are moderately important. We can see 
that the group put highest priority on the co-op’s management in determining its 
growth for sustainability. Following Step 1 until Step 3 above, we have: 
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Step 1: 
Reciprocal 
Matrix 
 
KWPGBM's 
Management 
Deposit 
Facilities 
Promotion
/Marketing 
of Product 
With 
respect to 
growth 
KWPGBM's 
Management 1 4 6 
 
Deposit Facilities 1/4 1 2 
 
Promotion/Marketing 
of Product 1/6 1/2 1 
 
Sum: 1 3/7 5 1/2 9 
Step 2: 
 
KWPGBM's 
Management 
Deposit 
Facilities 
Promotion
/Marketing 
of Product 
Normalized 
each element 
with the column 
sum 
KWPGBM's 
Management 12/17 8/11 2/3 
Deposit Facilities 3/17 2/11 2/9 
 
Promotion/Marketing 
of Product 2/17 1/11 1/9 
 
Sum: 1 1 1 
 
Step 3: 
   
Average across the row. 
This is the normalized 
principal eigen vector or 
priority vector.  
KWPGBM's 
Management   7/10 0.700 
Deposit Facilities   6/31 0.194 
Promotion/Marketing 
of Product   5/47 0.107 
Sum:      1           1       
 
The final values that we have obtained above are the un-weighted values. If we were to take 
into account the priority between growth (0.333) and loan character (0.667) that we have 
done earlier, we would multiply each of this with 0.333 since these are choices in growth 
category.   Here, we will take another step in calculating the consistency ratio. As mentioned, 
in AHP, it is very important that transitivity condition holds to ensure the consistency of the 
result. However, AHP allows for 10% level of inconsistency ratio and if it’s above this, we 
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might need to ask the respondents to evaluate their preferences. In order to obtain the 
inconsistency ratio, we first need to calculate the inconsistency index. To do this, we have to 
calculate the principal eigen value and this is obtained from the product of normalized 
principal eigen vector and sum across column of reciprocal matrix.  
λmax = (10/7)*(0.700) + (11/2)*(0.194) + (9)*(0.107) = 3.03 
Prof. Saaty in his book
63
 has proven that the largest eigen value is equals to the size of the 
reciprocal matrix in order to obtain a consistent reciprocal matrix, λmax = n. Next, we 
calculate the consistency index as a deviation using the following formula: 
Consistency Index = (λmax – n)/ (n-1) = (3.03 – 3)/ (2) = 0.015 
Then, we will compare this value with Random Consistency (RI) Index Table which is 
generated using sample size 500 matrices
64
. The Random Consistency Index is considered as 
the most appropriate index for comparison to the consistency index that has been obtained. 
The table is shown below: 
Table 3.3: Random Consistency Index Table (RI) 
n 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
RI 0 0 0.58 0.9 1.12 1.24 1.32 1.41 1.45 1.49 
  
 
 
                                                          
63
 Theory and Applications of the Analytic Network Process: Decision Making with Benefits, Opportunities, Costs, and Risks 
64
 The table is given in Prof. Saaty’s book. 
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Finally, we’ll calculate the Consistency Ratio = Consistency Index / Random Consistency 
Index 
= 0.015/0.58 = 0.0258<0.1 implying that the choices made by the group is consistent.  
C. Similar to above, we will now ask the group on their preferences in Loan 
Characteristics category. Their rating is shown below in Table 3.4. 
            Table 3.4: Comparison with respect to Sustainability node in Loan Character   
                                                                                Cluster 
 
With respect to the group preference rating above, we can see that they don’t have any strong 
preference of one over the other. The group most likely thinks that these are all important 
elements of the loan characteristics that they will equally to moderately emphasize in ensuring 
the sustainability of KWPGBM. The calculation on the priorities and consistency index as 
described earlier will be given out by AHP software below (Table 3.5). As we can see, the 
inconsistency index is 0.0536 < 0.1, which implies that the preferences are consistent. 
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Furthermore, from Table 3.4, we can conclude that under the loan character category, the 
group thinks that the most important is loan size, then loan procedure, loan interest rate and 
loan duration.  
                       Table 3.5: Inconsistency Index with respect to Loan Characteristics 
 
 
 
D. Next, we will ask the group to make pair wise comparison of their alternatives with 
respect to each criterion that we have mentioned. For instance, in growth category, we 
have deposit facilities, KWPGBM’s management and promotion or marketing of their 
product while in loan characteristics category, we have loan interest rate, loan size, 
loan procedure and loan duration. For each element in each category, they will 
answer the following question, with respect to deposit facilities; will they use 
KWPGBM for less than 10 years or more than 10 years? The question impose is the 
same for all other elements. The calculation is the same as Step 1 to Step 3 described 
above.  
The results are shown below: 
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- With respect to KWPGBM’s management (Table 3.6): It shows that on a scale of 
five, the group will use KWPGBM for more than 10 years because of its 
management. In Table 3.7, it shows that our consistency index is satisfied and the 
priority vector is 0.8333 for more than 10 years and 0.16667 for less than 10 years  
 
                  Table 3.6: Comparison with respect to KWBGM’s Management on its   
                                                                        Sustainability 
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                   Table 3.7: Inconsistency Index with respect to KWPGBM’s Management 
 
 
- With respect to deposit facilities (Table 3.8): It shows that on a scale of seven, the 
group will use KWPGBM for more than 10 years because of its deposit facilities. 
In Table 3.9, it shows that our consistency index is satisfied and the priority vector 
is 0.875 for more than 10 years and 0.125 for less than 10 years.  
                              Table 3.8: Comparison with respect to KWBGM’s Deposit Facility on 
its Sustainability 
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  Table 3.9: Inconsistency Index with respect to KWPGBM’s Management 
 
 
- With respect to promotion or marketing of the products (Table 3.10): It shows that 
on a scale of two, the group will use KWPGBM for more than 10 years because of 
its services to promote or market their products. In Table 3.11, it shows that our 
consistency index is satisfied and the priority vector is 0.6667 for more than 10 
years and 0.3333 for less than 10 years  
                   Table 3.10: Comparison with respect to KWBGM’s Marketing Facility on its  
                      Sustainability
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    Table 3.11: Inconsistency Index with respect to KWPGBM’s Marketing  
                                                                 Facility 
 
 
- With respect to loan duration or repayment schedule (Table 3.12): It shows that on 
a scale of seven, the group will use KWPGBM for more than 10 years because of 
its loan duration. In Table 3.13, it shows that our consistency index is satisfied and 
the priority vector is 0.875 for more than 10 years and 0.125 for less than 10 years. 
 
Table 3.12: Comparison with respect to KWBGM’s Loan Duration on its                          
Sustainability 
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Table 3.13: Inconsistency Index with respect to KWPGBM’s Loan                                                                   
Duration 
 
 
 
- With respect to loan interest rate (Table 3.14): It shows that on a scale of four, the 
group will use KWPGBM for more than 10 years because of interest rate charged. 
In Table 3.15, it shows that our consistency index is satisfied and the priority 
vector is 0.8 for more than 10 years and 0.2 for less than 10 years  
 
                    Table 3.14: Comparison with respect to KWBGM’s Loan Interest Rate on  
                                                                            its  Sustainability 
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          Table 3.15: Inconsistency Index with respect to KWPGBM’s Loan    
                                                          Interest Rate 
 
 
- With respect to loan procedure (Table 3.16): It shows that on a scale of six, the 
group will use KWPGBM for more than 10 years because of its loan procedure. In 
Table 3.17, it shows that our consistency index is satisfied and the priority vector 
is 0.8571 for more than 10 years and 0.1429 for less than 10 years  
 
                         Table 3.16: Comparison with respect to KWBGM’s Loan Procedure on    
                                                                        its Sustainability                                                                                
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                 Table 3.17: Inconsistency Index with respect to KWPGBM’s  
     Loan Procedure 
 
 
- With respect to loan size (Table 3.18): It shows that on a scale of six, the group 
will use KWPGBM for more than 10 years because of the loan size. In Table 3.19, 
it shows that our consistency index is satisfied and the priority vector is 0.8571 for 
more than 10 years and 0.1429 for less than 10 years  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
291 
 
 
                          Table 3.18: Comparison with respect to KWBGM’s Loan Size on its  
    Sustainability          
 
   
                Table 3.19: Inconsistency Index with respect to KWPGBM’s   
                                                              Loan Size 
 
 
 
E. Finally, we will calculate the overall ranking of our alternatives, less than 10 years or 
more than 10 years for the sustainability of KWPGM. That is taken into account the 
weight for each category, growth and loan characteristics along with the weight for 
each element in the category, we obtained the final rating.  
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Loan Characteristics = 0.667 
 
Growth = 0.3333 
 
 
Loan 
Interest 
Rate 
Loan 
Size 
Loan 
Procedure 
Loan 
Duration 
Deposit 
Facilities 
Promotion 
of Product 
Co-op's 
management  
Priority 
Vector 
0.174 0.423 0.266 0.137 0.193 0.106 0.701 
 
< 10 Years 0.2 0.143 0.147 0.125 0.125 0.333 0.167 
 
> 10 Years 0.8 0.857 0.857 0.875 0.875 0.667 0.833 
 
Final Rating: 
< 10 Years =      0.667*(0.174*0.2+0.423*0.143+0.266*0.147+0.137*0.125)  
+ 0.333*(0.193*0.125+0.106*0.333+0.701*0.167) = 0.159 
> 10 Years = 0.667*(0.174*0.8+0.423*0.857+0.266*0.857+0.137*0.875)  
+ 0.333*(0.193*0.875+0.106*0.667+0.701*0.833) = 0.841 
3.2. Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) in KWPGBM Framework: 
There are two hypotheses that I am testing in this framework:; 
1. KWPGBM provides positive net impact to its borrowers 
2. KWPGBM is a sustainable institution in the long run 
Firstly, fifteen borrowers of KWPGBM were given three set of questionnaires and were asked 
to make pair wise comparison using a relative scale from 1 to 9 (Appendix 1). To ease their 
understanding in completing the questionnaires, we asked them to keep in mind these two 
questions when they answer each of the survey questions: 1) Which is more important, A or B 
and 2) By how much it is more important?  Based on their judgment, experiences and how 
they feel, they would rank one over the other.  
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Next, in testing the hypothesis that KWPGBM has improved the well-being of its borrowers, 
we gave the respondents two sets of questionnaires (Appendix 2 and Appendix 3). The first 
set of questionnaires (Questionnaire 1) allowed them to rank the benefits and positive impact 
of KWPGBM on themselves, their family and environment while the second set of 
questionnaires (Questionnaire 2) focused on the costs and negative impact of KWPGBM that 
could potentially arise from either themselves or KWPGBM itself. From these two set of 
questionnaires, we will apply the benefit cost ratio to analyze the net impact of KWPGM on 
their borrowers.  
The questionnaires were designed as simple as possible with only main choices or factors that 
in our opinion affect these borrowers. This is important in order to obtain a consistent result 
and to ease the understanding of the respondents. After they have completed these 
questionnaires, there are two approaches that we can precede. First approach is to calculate 
the geometric mean from the group evaluation for each question and use this geometric mean 
as the representative of the group preferences and input this geometric mean in AHP pair wise 
comparison matrix. The second approach is to input individual’s preferences in AHP pair 
wise comparison matrix and calculate the geometric mean from each individual priority 
vectors. In this framework, we will use the first approach.  
After we have inputted the group’s geometric mean in AHP pair wise comparison matrix, the 
results will then show the priority vectors for their preferences and the inconsistency index. 
Figure 3.5 showed the group ranking in terms of the positive impact of KWPGBM while 
Figure 3.6 showed the group ranking in terms of the negative impact of KWPGBM. Finally, 
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in order to calculate the net impact of KWPGBM, we will apply the Benefits/Costs ratio 
analysis.  
Next, in testing the second hypothesis that KWPGBM is a sustainable institution, the same 
group of respondents was given another set of questionnaires (Appendix 4) that focus on 
borrowers’ opinion of KWPGBM future growth. The benchmark used is 10 years and 
KWPGBM is considered as a sustainable institution if its borrowers choose to use its services 
for more than 10 years (long run) and is not sustainable if its borrowers choose its services for 
less than 10 years (short run). The results are shown in Figure 3.7. 
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4. Results and Analysis 
 
4.1.Results for Hypothesis 1: KWPGBM improves the wellbeing of its borrowers 
 
Figure 3.5: The Positive Impact and Benefits of KWPGBM on its Borrowers (Questionnaire 1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Goal (Benefits) 
Eradicate Poverty 
Impact of KWPGBM on Your 
Family/Environment (0.877) 
Inconsistency Index: 0.0488 
1.Children’s Education (0.550) 
Yes  0.800 
No  0.200 
 
2.Health Care(0.241) 
Yes  0.833 
No   0.167 
 
3.Improve Foods and Daily Needs(0.209) 
Yes  0.667 
No  0.333 
 
 
 
Impact of KWPGBM Personally on Borrowers 
(0.123) 
Inconsistency Index: 0.073 
1.Empower Decision Making (0.250) 
Yes  0.800 
No  0.200 
 
2. Increase Purchasing Power (0.627) 
Yes  0.800 
No  0.200 
 
3. Increase Savings (0.123) 
Yes  0.800 
No  0.200 
 
 
Alternatives 
1. Yes  (0.781)                 2. No   (0.219) 
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The objective of the first set of questionnaire was to evaluate the borrowers’ perspectives of 
the positive impact (benefits) of KWPGBM on their family/environment and on themselves 
individually. Figure 3.5 showed the AHP results for Questionnaire 1. We have classified the 
positive impact of KWPGBM on its borrowers into two categories: Firstly, the benefits on 
their family/environment and secondly the benefits on them personally. In the first category 
that was the benefits on their family and environment, we have narrowed down the choices to 
three: children’s education, health care and improvement of food consumption and daily 
needs. On the other hand, in the second category, that was the benefits to the borrowers 
themselves, we have listed the main choices as empowering the borrowers’ decision making, 
increasing her purchasing power and increasing her savings. From the results, we can 
conclude that the impact to the borrowers’ family/environment (0.877) is more important than 
the impact to themselves (0.123).  
In the first category, the borrowers ranked the children’s education as their top priority 
(0.555) followed by health care (0.241) and consumption of daily food and needs (0.209). In 
addition to these, the borrowers agree (yes) that the loans and services obtained from 
KWPGBM have helped them in improving their social welfare in these three factors: 
children’s education, health care and consumption of daily food and needs. This was 
supported with results from other MFIs that children’s education has always been top priority 
for borrowers. In the case of KWPGBM, it is possible that consumption of daily food and 
needs is the least important because Lombok itself is an agricultural area and some of these 
borrowers produce their own vegetables and raise poultry. In the second category, increasing 
the purchasing power (0.627) was the most important factor to these borrowers followed by 
empowerment of decision making (0.250) and increasing saving (0.123). From these choices, 
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we can conclude that increasing purchasing power was the most important factor for their 
clients since this usually would boost one’s confidence and status in society. Increasing 
saving through KWPGBM is not the most important factor perhaps because they already have 
obligatory savings with KWPGBM that they have to make on weekly basis and the extra 
income is usually converted into assets like buying a house or a motorcycle, spending on 
children’s education and etc.  Similarly as in the first category, the borrowers strongly agree 
(yes) that they have made significant improvement in each of this factor through the 
opportunity of obtaining loans and services from KWPGBM. Since KWPGBM, is the only 
MFI available within the district, these long time borrowers depend heavily in obtaining loans 
from them.  
The inconsistency index for each category is less than 0.1, indicating that overall the 
transitivity condition is satisfying. The final ranking shows that the borrowers agree that 
KWPGBM do provide positive impact to themselves and their family or environment. In their 
judgment, the positive impact is four times (0.781/0.219 = 3.56 ~4) more than the non- 
positive impact.  
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The objective of Questionnaire 2 was to evaluate the negative impact (costs) of KWPGBM’s 
loans and services to its borrowers that could arise either from the institution itself or from the 
individual borrower. The risks under the first category that is institution itself include 
pressure or sanction from the cooperative, management of co-op and lack of training from co-
op. In our point of view, these are among the most common factors that could potentially 
affect the borrowers negatively as we have discussed in the literature review section. For 
instance, management of co-op refers to lack of efficient management by the co-op such as 
longer duration to process a loan, lack of technology to access the borrowers’ repayment 
history, etc. could eventually lead to a decline in the number of customers and could increase 
the likelihood of bankruptcy to such co-op. Aside from this factor, lack of training especially 
to new borrowers could potentially lead to mismanagement of money and increase the default 
rate. Hence, we asked the borrowers of KWPGBM to consider whether they have obtained 
sufficient amount of training from the co-op to manage their money and businesses. One last 
factor in this category that Armendariz and Morduch (2005) have argued is pressure or 
sanction from co-op that can be seen as imposing negative reactions to borrowers who might 
be late in making their payment. The sanction by the co-op can lead to social sanction and 
isolation from other group members in the village which could potentially cause the late-
payment borrowers to migrate elsewhere in order to avoid the humiliation and embarrassment.  
In the second category that is the risks that could potentially arise from the individual 
borrower herself include high interest rate, small size of loan and short duration of loan. 
These factors are determined by the co-op and the borrowers have to accept them. However, it 
is possible that these factors are too stringent that could lead to borrowers defaulting on their 
loan. For example, if the interest rate charged is high, then some borrowers who hardly make 
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enough income or have seasonal income can be in deeper debt situation. Since the interest 
charged will be accumulated over time if they are unable to meet their loan payment as 
scheduled, then this could potentially lead to borrowers defaulting on their debt. Another 
factor that is, small size of loan could be attributed to a situation when borrowers find 
themselves unable to expand their businesses due to lack of business capital. Consequently, 
this could lead the current customers to shift to other MFIs that could offer them greater 
amount of loan. The last factor that we consider could be risky is short duration of loan in 
which the borrowers are unable to meet their scheduled payment in time and hence might shift 
to different MFIs or defaulting on their loans.  
From the result in Figure 3.6, we could see that the respondents believe that the risks from 
individual borrower are three times more important than the risks from co-operative itself. 
Under this category of risks from individual borrowers, the most important factor is the size of 
the loan that is small (0.594), followed by the short duration of loan (0.249) and the high 
interest rate charged (0.157). These independent risk factors could influence the borrowers to 
act negatively such as defaulting on their loans, late in meeting their payment schedule, 
shifting to different type of money lender, etc. However, out of these three elements, both 
short duration and high interest rate are considered not big risk factors to them. Their answer 
of no to these factors is 0.667. On the other hand, they think that small size of loan is a very 
big risk, 0.667 for yes and 0.333 for no. This could be the fact that interest rate charged is 
about the same as the market rate and that for entrepreneurs, the immediate need of sizeable 
loans are more important for them in order to roll over their businesses.  
301 
 
 In the second category of risks from co-operative itself, the respondents think that pressure 
or sanction from co-op (0.484) and management of co-op (0.349) are the biggest risks that 
will create negative impact on them. They believe the lack of training from KWPGBM to be 
the very least threat. This supports the argument by Montgomery that penalty from co-op that 
could lead to social sanction from other group members is the biggest concern for KWPGBM 
clients. In addition, they don’t think that they need further training from KWPGBM in 
managing their businesses since they have been operating them for many years. The 
management of KWPGBM is their second main concerned as they vote for trustworthy 
management board yearly.  
Overall, the respondents do agree that there are some factors within KWPGBM that create 
negative impact on them by 0.558 for yes and 0.442 for no. Since in the first questionnaires, 
we have asked the respondents about the positive impact of KWPGBM and in the second 
questionnaires we are looking at the respondents’ view of the negative impact of KWPGBM, 
we will now determine the net impact of KWPGBM on its borrowers. The method proposed 
in AHP methodology is to calculate the benefits and costs ratio to conclude which is the most 
dominant impact.  
Results= Benefits/ Costs  
Yes:  0.781/0.558 = 1.4 (Normalized value: 0.74) 
 No:   0.219/0.442 = 0.5 (Normalized value: 0.26) 
 
From the calculation above, we can conclude that by comparing these two questionnaires, the 
group still believes that KWPGBM provides positive impact to themselves and their 
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environment or family three times more important than the negative impact it creates.  This 
answers our first hypothesis that KWPGBM improves the wellbeing of its borrowers. 
Next, in testing our second hypothesis that KWPGBM will be a sustainable institution in the 
long run, we will use Questionnaire 3 in Appendix 4. In determining its sustainability, we 
have used two main factors: loan characteristics and growth.  For loan characteristics, the 
elements listed are loan interest rate, loan size, loan duration and loan procedure while for 
growth, we have deposit facilities, promotion or marketing of their product and co-op’s 
management. From our opinion and the literatures discussed above, the loan characteristics 
would determine if the borrowers will be loyal to KWPGBM and remain to use their services 
in the long run. Similarly, the growth of KWPGBM in terms of mobilizing savings through 
deposit facilities, helping in marketing of the clients’ products and the efficiency of its 
management will determine whether KWPGBM is a sustainable institution in the long run. 
The benchmark for duration of sustainability that we’ve used is 10 years and we consider 
KWPGBM is a sustainable institution if the borrowers would want to use its services for more 
than 10 years and vice versa. The result is shown in Figure 3.7 below: 
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4.2. Results for hypothesis 2: KWPGBM is a sustainable institution in the long run 
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In comparing between the loan characteristics and the growth as determining factors for 
sustainability, the group thinks that the loan characteristics (0.666) is twice more important 
than growth (0.333).In the loan characteristics category, the most important element is loan 
size (0.423), followed by loan procedure (0.266), loan interest rate (0.174) and finally loan 
duration (0.137). Moreover, with each of these factors, the group will still use the services 
from KWPGBM for more than 10 years. In the growth category, the ranking is as follow: Co-
op’s management (0.701), deposit facilities (0.193) and finally promotion or marketing of 
clients’ products (0.106). The group puts very much emphasize on the co-ops’ management 
for sustainability and the promotion of the products is the least important because not all 
borrowers rely solely on KWPGBM services to market their products. Similarly, in this 
category, the group will still use KWPGBM services for more than 10 years for each factor. 
Overall, the respondents will use KWPGBM’s services for more than 10 years (0.841) as 
compared to less than 10 years (0.159) which shows that KWPGBM is a sustainable 
institution in the long run from its borrowers’ point of view. As discussed earlier, loan size is 
still the factor that matters most to KWPGBM clients. In terms of growth, they feel that the 
co-op’s management is the most important factor in ensuring the sustainability of KWPGBM.  
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4.3. KWPGBM should not Grow or Outreach under Certain Circumstances due to 
Possibility of Failures     
We will show using simple optimization method
65
 that an independent small scale 
microfinance institution such as KWPGBM should maintain small number of borrowers than 
to increase it by extending its membership to borrowers from outside villages in order for it to 
be more sustainable. We are not determining the optimal size of group since this varies 
depending on the structural organization of each MFI: Garmeen Bank and BancoSol each 
requires five members per group while KSBW requires a minimum of 11 members up to a 
maximum of 25 members per group and KGPWBM has its groups ranging from seven to 
eleven members. Furthermore, a lot of studies have discussed on the optimal group size which 
to the author’s knowledge have shown different results. 
KWPGBM can grow in terms of its members through: 
1) admitting new groups into its institution 
 2) the existing group admitting new members.  
Here, we will prove theoretically for Case 2 and the proof still applies for Case 1: 
 
Let                         
                                                 
                                           
                               
                                                                            
                   
                                     
                                                          
65
 The set-up of our optimization problem is inspired by Mancur Olson (1965) approach in public goods and 
theory of groups. 
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From this proof that we have shown, we will use the data collected from KWPGBM’s 
borrowers and its balance sheet in determining whether the total costs will exceed the total 
benefits as the number of borrowers increases. The data that we’ve used were from 
Questionnaire 2 and Questionnaire 3 where we compared the benefits and the costs of 
KWPGBM to its borrowers. Our first approach here was to directly plot the graphs of the 
accumulated benefits and the accumulated costs as the number of borrowers in a group 
increases. In Figure 3.8, we can conclude that from the borrowers’ perspectives, the 
benefits will continue to out weight the costs as more and more members join in the 
group. This is not surprising given the fact that we are using the information that come 
from KWPGBM members who do not have an alternative to other sources of funding. In 
        Total Benefit (TB) /Total Cost (TC)              
                                                                          TC      TB 
                                      
                                         
 
                                                                                       
                                                                                       N (number of borrowers) 
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order to eliminate this biasness, our second approach was to use their balance sheet to 
access the financial strength of this institution. The financial ratios used are in Appendix 6 
and acting as an external evaluator, we will incorporate these financial ratios to our AHP 
costs structure developed earlier (Appendix 9). Similarly, we did the pairwise comparison 
except that the risks now not only coming from the individual borrower and the 
cooperative itself but could arise from liquidity ratios, solvency ratios and profitability 
ratios. We repeated our comparison selection in AHP three times using ratios from 2006 
to 2008 and our results in Figure 3.9 showed that the benefits/costs ratio was declining as 
the number of borrowers increased over these three year period.  
Hence, we conclude that although the borrowers feel the benefits of more new members 
joining in would out weight the costs, we found otherwise when the AHP costs/benefits 
structure incorporated the financial ratios that were calculated from KWPGBM’s balance 
sheet. 
 
Figure 3.8: The Benefits and the Costs across the Number of Borrowers in a Group 
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Figure 3.9: The Benefits Cost Ratio across the Number of Borrowers in KWPGBM  
(2006 – 2008) 
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7. Conclusion 
7.1. Concluding Remark 
The main objective of our research paper is to investigate some of the characteristics and 
mechanisms that are prevalent within KWPGBM as a small scale microfinance institution in 
Lombok Indonesia. The uniqueness of KWPGBM is its survivorship for more than 20 years 
without government’s funds or donors’ aid and the very flexible group lending mechanism 
that it adopts. From the results that we have obtained above, we can conclude that KWPGBM 
has provided net positive impact on its borrowers’ life especially to their family and 
environment. In regards to its benefits to the clients’ environment and family, the most 
significant impact is on their children’s education, followed by health care then food and 
daily consumption.  The benefits to the borrowers themselves include increasing their 
purchasing power, empowering their decision making and finally increasing their savings. 
From these ranking, we can see that the clients’ top priority of the loans and services they 
obtain from KWPGBM confirms with other research studies that the loan typically will be 
used to improve their family well-being especially the children’s education. It is important to 
note that increasing their savings through deposit facilities at KWPGBM is not their main 
priority when in fact mobilizing savings is one of the necessary elements for MFIs’ 
sustainability. This could perhaps due to the fact that they already have the obligatory savings 
with KWPGBM in which they have to deposit some amount every week and do not feel the 
need to prioritize on savings.  
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“Savings is the main funding source for sustainable growth because it is less costly than 
loans which many MFIs rely on, stable source of funding, and improves public image and 
confidence,” Kimantu Mutu66, (2011). 
For the negative impact of KWPGBM, the borrowers think that the pressure or social sanction 
is the main drawback to them than management of the co-op or lack of training from the co-
op. Although this is a concern to them, the clients feel that higher risk will likely arise from 
their own mistakes or problems rather than from the co-op itself, implying that they have high 
trust in the management of KWPGBM. The most likely problem that borrowers will face is 
small amount of loan that makes them unable to expand or roll over their businesses which 
eventually could lead to bankruptcy. The interest rate charged is not of main concern to them 
since it is set at the competitive level with the market interest rate. In terms of KWPGBM’s 
sustainability, the clients conclude that they will almost surely use the services from 
KWPGBM in the long run but express highest concern for the loan size they can make.  
In our opinion, although the social sanctions and the small size of loans are unfavorable to the 
borrowers, these could potentially be the main reasons for their successful performance all 
these years: e.g.  zero non-performing loans (NPL) of KWPGBM for over twenty years in 
operation. Many literatures including Besley and Coate (1993), Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and 
Bond and Rai (2002) supported the argument that social sanctions or peer pressure aid in 
repayment rates and hence although these factors were perceived as privately negative to the 
borrowers, they were essentially socially beneficial. Furthermore, the small size of loan 
typically will increase contingent on the satisfactory repayment of previous loan installments 
                                                          
66
 Mr. Kimantu Mutu is an Associate of the Alliance for Financial Inclusion and founder of K-Rep Bank 
Limited in Kenya 
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from the borrowers. Besley and Coate (1995) and Hulme and Mosley (1996) viewed such 
approach as ‘dynamic incentives’ in securing high repayment rates and it is referred to as 
‘step lending’ in ACCION67 network (Murdoch, 1999). Since KWPGBM had never obtained 
any subsidies or loans from the government or donors, they relied on the deposited savings by 
their clients in issuing credit/loans. Unfortunately, as mentioned in our findings earlier, 
increasing saving through deposit facilities at KWPGBM is the last ranking in the borrowers’ 
priority and due to this, KWPGBM might find itself short of money to give out larger loan 
amounts. Even though they are facing the shortages of savings to mobilize, it doesn’t deter 
them from expanding the number of members and non-members registered which in our 
opinion is a very risky move. The increase number of borrowers could create ‘crowding out’ 
effect on the available credit, increase the cost of monitoring (Armendariz and Morduch, 
2005) and the fixed costs since small size of loans
68
 do not dilute the fixed costs of the cash 
transactions (Schreiner, 2001).  Hence, we have expected that such move will lower their 
profit margins, earning power and return on net worth ratios (Appendix 6). This is in support 
to our finding for the third hypothesis in which we have concluded that the benefits-costs ratio 
will decline as the number of borrowers’ increases. To top it all, for the first time after their 
over 20 years of operation, they have taken a loan from ‘Dinas Koperasi’ or Co-op Ministry to 
support the increasing need for larger loan amounts and the increasing demand from new 
members. Our main concern is that such move will lead KWPGBM to be a subsidy/loan-
dependent institution and hence, in our opinion, KWPGBM should instead encourage greater 
voluntary saving deposits from its members to meet the demand for larger loans. Gonzalez 
                                                          
67
 ACCION is an acronym for US Agency for International Development 
68
 KWPGBM extends small size of loans not only to its current members but also to its new members which will 
increase its fixed costs. 
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and Meyer (2009) have provided two primary arguments in support of voluntary deposit 
mobilization among MFIs: voluntary deposit mobilization helps MFIs to be independent from 
donors and investors especially during the period of liquidity constraints and the access to 
deposit mechanisms benefit the poor households greatly than those derived from access to 
credit.  
Overall, the exposure of KWPGBM existence serves as a good example of a microfinance 
institution that had survived for more than 20 years without relying on external financial 
assistantship. This was possible due to the uniqueness of their group lending practice that has 
successfully brought positive net impact to their clients. In addition, it is important to realize 
that for small scale MFIs especially those operating in rural areas; the lending mechanism is 
not homogenous
69
 and should be tailored in such that it will incorporate the socio-economy of 
the community. For instance, in our case study we have found that KWPGBM not only 
extended the credit but acted as an intermediary in marketing the clients’ products in which 
they would take the proceed from the sales for the repayment of the clients’ loans before 
disbursing the balance. Unfortunately, during the year that this research was conducted (2009) 
we discovered that KWPGBM has implemented many new changes such as receiving the 
financial assistance from ‘Dinas Koperasi’ or Co-op Ministry which means that it would be 
interesting for further research in making comparisons between its previous and current 
lending practices. Finally, a better comprehensive survey that takes into account the 
perception of KWPGBM non-borrowers would provide further insights into its advantages 
and disadvantages in drawing more accurate conclusions for our hypotheses.   
                                                          
69
 Not homogeneous here means that there is no one standardized common lending practice for all small scale 
MFIs. It could be that KWPGBM group lending mechanism meets the demand of its borrowers but may not 
work in other community. 
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APPENDIX 
Appendix 1 
1.Collecting the Clay – The brown or brownish white clay which is considered as the good 
quality clay is directly excavated from the soil.  
2.Preparing the Clay – These clays are washed with water and dried for a day or two. Then 
they are grind so that they will be sticky and tough. There are two ways of grinding the clay, 
manual grinding or mechanical grinding. Manual grinding is by stepping on the clay until it is 
soft and tough evenly while mechanical grinding is by using the grinding machine.  
3. Shaping the Clay – The clay is now ready to be shaped into various designs and shapes 
according to the order from the seller. The length of time and the amount of clay needed 
depends on its shapes, design and size. The pottery maker uses both hands to shape the clay 
and both legs to turn the pottery wheel (perbot). This requires great uniformity of movement 
and concentration. 
4. Drying the Gerabah – After the clay is shaped accordingly, it is placed under the sun until it 
completely dries and hardened. The clay is now has formed into a ‘gerabah’ or earthenware 
vessel. 
5. Burning the Gerabah – Now that the ‘gerabah’ is completely dried, it is burned in either the 
‘burning furnace’ or  at the ‘burning site’ in order to hardened it further so that it won’t break 
easily. These ‘gerabah’ is burned for three to four hours using the fuel made of dry straw, dry 
coconut leaves or firewood. 
317 
 
6.Decorating the Gerabah – The burning process finishes when the ‘gerabah’ has turned into 
dark brown color. The ‘gerabah’ is now being polished and ready to be decorated by carving 
it with certain designs, or using glued shells, banana leaves, white sand and etc.  
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Appendix 2 
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Appendix 3 
A1. With Respect to Goal of BMGL: 
To Eradicate Poverty                                   
  9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9   
Impact of BMGL on Your 
Family/Environment                                 
Impact of BMGL Personally 
on You 
                                    
A2. With respect to Impact of BMGL 
on Your Family/Environment                                   
  9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9   
Children's Education                                 Health Care 
Children's Education                                 
Improve Food and Daily 
Needs 
Children's Education                                 
Provide Employment 
Opportunities 
Health Care                                 
Improve Food and Daily 
Needs 
Health Care                                 
Provide Employment 
Opportunities 
Improve Food and Daily Needs                                 
Provide Employment 
Opportunities 
                                    
A3. With respect to Impact of BMGL 
Personally on You                                   
  9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9   
Empower Decision Making                                 Increase Purchasing Power 
Empower Decision Making                                 Increase Saving 
Increase Purchasing Power                                 Increase Saving 
                                    
A4. With Respect to Children's 
Education                                   
  9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9   
Yes                                 No 
                                    
A5. With Respect to Health Care                                   
  9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9   
Yes                                 No 
                                    
A6. With Respect to Improve Food 
and Daily Needs                                   
  9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9   
Yes                                 No 
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A7. With Respect to Provide 
Employment Opportunities                                   
  9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9   
Yes                                 No 
A8. With Respect to Empower Decision 
Making                                   
  9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9   
Yes                                 No 
                                    
A9. With Respect to Increase 
Purchasing Power                                 No 
Yes                                   
                                    
A10. With Respect to Increase Saving                                   
  9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9   
Yes                                 No 
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Appendix 4 
B1. With Respect to BMGL Goal: To 
Eradicate Poverty                                   
  9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9   
Microenterprise/Business                                 Group 
                                    
B2. With Respect to 
Microenterprise/Business                                   
  9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9   
High Cost of Borrowing                                 Lack of Training 
High Cost of Borrowing                                 Small Size of Loan 
Lack of Training                                 Small Size of Loan 
                                    
B3. With Respect to Group                                   
  9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9   
Group Pressure/Internal Punishment                                 High Cost of Monitoring 
Group Pressure/Internal Punishment                                 Joint Liability 
High Cost of Monitoring                                 Joint Liability 
                                    
B4. With Respect to High Cost of 
Borrowing                                   
  9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9   
Yes                                 No 
                                    
                                    
B5. With Respect to Lack of Training                                   
  9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9   
Yes                                 No 
                                    
B6. With Respect to Small Size of Loan                                   
  9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9   
Yes                                 No 
                                    
B7. With Respect to Group 
Pressure/Internal Punishment                                   
  9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9   
Yes                                 No 
                                    
B8. With Respect to High Cost of                                   
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Monitoring 
  9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9   
Yes                                 No 
                                    
B9. With Respect to Joint Liability                                   
  9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9   
Yes                                 No 
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Appendix 5 
C1. With Respect to Goal: Sustainability 
of BMGL                                   
  9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9   
Loan Character                                 Growth 
                                    
C2. With Respect to Growth                                   
  9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9   
BMGL's Management                                 Deposit Facilities 
BMGL's Management                                 
Promotion or Marketing 
Products 
Deposit Facilities                                 
Promotion or Marketing 
Products 
                                    
C3.With Respect to Loan Character                                   
  9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9   
Loan Duration/Repayment                                 Loan Interest Rate 
Loan Duration/Repayment                                 Loan Procedure 
Loan Duration/Repayment                                 Loan Size 
Loan Interest Rate                                 Loan Procedure 
Loan Interest Rate                                 Loan Size 
Loan Procedure                                 Loan Size 
                                    
C4. With Respect to BMGL's 
Management                                   
  9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9   
Less Than 10 years                                 More Than 10 Years 
                                    
C5. With Respect to Deposit Facilities                                   
  9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9   
Less Than 10 years                                 More Than 10 Years 
                                    
C6. With Respect to Promotion or 
Marketing Products                                   
  9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9   
Less Than 10 years                                 More Than 10 Years 
                                    
C7. With Respect to Loan Duration or 
Repayment                                   
  9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9   
Less Than 10 years                                 More Than 10 Years 
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C8. With Respect to Loan Interest Rate                                   
  9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9   
Less Than 10 years                                 More Than 10 Years 
                                    
C9. With Respect to Loan Procedure                                   
  9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9   
Less Than 10 years                                 More Than 10 Years 
                                    
C10. With Respect to Loan Size                                   
  9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9   
Less Than 10 years                                 More Than 10 Years 
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Appendix 8 
 
 
 
 
 
 The Positive Impact and Benefits of KWPGBM on its Borrowers from External Perspectives 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Goal (Benefits) 
Eradicate Poverty 
Impact of KWPGBM on Your Family/Environment (0.9) 
Inconsistency Index: 0.066 
1.Children’s Education (0.1645) 
Yes  0.9000 
No  0.1000 
 
2.Health Care (0.0518) 
Yes  0.8333 
No   0.167 
 
3.Improve Foods and Daily Needs(0.7836) 
Yes  0.8333 
No  0.333 
 
Impact of KWPGBM Personally on Borrowers (0.1) 
Inconsistency Index: 0.032 
1.Empower Decision Making (0.1333) 
Yes  0.9000 
No  0.1000 
 
2. Increase Purchasing Power (0.8) 
Yes  0.9000 
No  0.1000 
 
3. Increase Savings (0.0667) 
Yes  0.2500 
No  0.7500 
Alternatives 
1. Yes  (0.846)                 2. No   (0.154) 
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Appendix 9 
 
 
 
 
The Negative Impact and Costs/Risks of KWPGBM on its Borrowers from External Perspectives 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Goal (Risks) 
Eradicate Poverty 
Risks from Individual Borrowers  
 
Inconsistency Index:  
 
1. High Interest Rate  
Yes   
No    
 
2. Small Loan Size  
Yes   
No    
 
3. Short Duration of Loan  
Yes   
No    
 
Risks from Cooperative  
 
Inconsistency Index:  
 
1. Pressure/Sanction from Co-op 
Yes   
No  
 
2. Management of Co-op  
Yes   
No    
 
3. Lack of Training 
Yes   
No   
 
Alternatives 
1. Yes                              2. No    
Profitability Ratio 
 
Inconsistency Index:  
 
1. Profit Margin  
Yes   
No   
 
2. Earning Power 
Yes   
No    
 
3. Return on Net Worth 
Yes   
No    
 
Liquidity Ratio 
 
Inconsistency Index:  
 
1. Quick Ratio 
Yes   
No  
 
2. Current Ratio 
Yes   
No    
 
 
 
Solvency Ratio 
Inconsistency Index:  
 
1. Total Asset to Debt Ratio 
Yes   
No   
 
2. Net Worth to Debt Ratio 
Yes   
No    
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